

With my best regards  
Suresh Chandra Bose  
21. 11. 36.

# Dissemination Report

With Preface

— 344 —

By

SURESH CHANDRA BOSE

Non-official Member,  
Netaji Enquiry Committee.

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SHAH NAWAZ KHAN, M.P., NO.PS/50  
Chairman, Netaji Enq.Cttee,



PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY  
TO  
MINISTER FOR  
TRANSPORT & RAILWAYS  
INDIA

New Secretariat Building,  
Block B, Strand Road,  
Calcutta, Dt. 25th April '56


Shri Tripurari Chakravarty,  
14 Fern Place,  
Near Balighat Station,  
Calcutta-19.

Dear Sir,

Your name has been mentioned to the Committee as a person who visited Japan last year and collected certain evidence which might be of interest to the Netaji Enquiry Committee. Since we got this information on the last working day in Calcutta, I tried to contact you over the phone but was informed that you had no telephone at your residence and that the University was closed for some time. I am, therefore, writing this letter to you in the hope that it would be possible for you to appear before the Committee on their return from Japan which would be some time in the 1st week of June 1956. We shall contact you on our return.

Yours faithfully,

*Shah Nawaz Khan*  
(SHAH NAWAZ KHAN)



NETAJI SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, AS HEAD OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF AZAD HIND ( FREE INDIA ) & AS SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY.

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NETAJI'S PARENTS, JANAKINATH & PRABHABATI BOSE.

## P R E F A C E

Innumerable persons from different parts of India and a few from abroad have been enquiring of me as to why the Government has not as yet published the dissentient report submitted by me, as a non-official member of the Netaji Enquiry Committee. Some of them, desirous of perusing the same, have requested me to publish it, as they believe that the Government has no intention of doing so. I have considered the matter and have been astonished at the partiality of our Government in not publishing my report, though they very promptly printed in book form, that of my colleagues. I am further astonished that in this matter, the Ministry of External Affairs had forgotten the very ordinary and necessary official etiquette of even acknowledging the receipt of my report, though it was duly sent to them by registered post, acknowledgment due, on the 9th. October last. Then again, they did not have the courtesy to send me a copy of my colleagues' report, though I am informed that they made a free distribution of the same in certain circles.

The title of their book is, as I am informed, "Netaji Enquiry Committee Report". In my humble opinion, it is not only incorrect, but it has

been done so intentionally, to mislead the public and to make them believe, that it is the only report of all the members of that Committee.

For these reasons, I consider it to be my duty and also that to my countrymen and in my service to them, to publish my report and, especially, because I am firmly of opinion, that the evidence that has been placed before us, does not justify coming to the finding arrived at by my colleagues.

It gives me pleasure to inform my readers that the British and American Military Intelligence Officers, as a result of thorough enquiries made by them soon after the alleged incident, agreed with my finding and that they did not believe the announcement made by the Japanese that Netaji was dead. They believed that it was a hoax and that Netaji was living and hiding somewhere. In one of their secret reports, it is also mentioned that Shri M. K. Gandhi and a few Russian diplomats also believed that Netaji was alive.

Although my colleagues held that Netaji died as the result of a plane crash accident, they accepted as correct, that after the Japanese had surrendered, it was their joint and agreed plan that he (Netaji) would finally move to Russian territory and that the Japanese Government were, accordingly, removing him to Manchuria and taking him out of the clutches of the victorious Anglo-Americans. In my opinion, the evidence has been so unsatisfactory, that I have disbelieved the same. I, therefore, believe that in accordance with this plan, the Japanese Government took Netaji to Manchuria, from where he evidently moved into Russian territory.

It was for this reason, that in June, 1956, when we were in Tokyo, I had an hour-long interview with Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister of Japan and who held the same position during Netaji's activities in the Far East and I personally thanked him on behalf of our family and also on behalf of a large section of our countrymen for the laudable part played by him as well as by his Government regarding this matter.

Some friends and followers of Netaji have requested me to give them some information about his early days. I have mentioned a few incidents in this connection in my report and so may only add a few lines here. The main point that would be necessary for me to emphasise is that he was made of different stuff and something above the ordinary. Religion was ingrained in him and love and sympathy for all living beings were part of his nature. Even as a boy, he was of a reserved, sober and thoughtful type and he generally spent some time in meditation secretly. Although we were not allowed to leave the house for meeting friends, our revered parents were rather lenient towards him, because, evidently, they were convinced that the time he spent with his friends was for a laudable cause and so they did not consider it necessary to restrict his movements. Far from receiving any hindrance from them, they, in a way, allowed him free scope for carrying out his plans and intentions. This, I believe, was instrumental in moulding his character and conduct in the light of his ideas.

With regard to my dissentient report, I regret very much to state that hindrances, obstructions and pressure were brought to bear on me by some of


the highest Government officials with the sole intention of making it impossible for me to write it. With that purpose in view and after I had dissented from the opinion of my colleagues, which was also the opinion of the Prime Minister, not a single piece of paper, necessary for writing my report was given to me, inspite of repeated requests by me and also by the Chief Minister of West Bengal. It was due to some amount of resourcefulness combined with luck, that the secret reports mentioned above together with some photographs and sketches could be got hold of. The importance of the same is immense, because the conclusion arrived at in them, is that probably Netaji was alive and was concealing himself somewhere.

Due solely to The Almighty's Grace, it has been possible for me to write my report, which I beg to tender herewith as my humble contribution in the service of my countrymen.

JAI HIND !

2, Moira Street,  
Calcutta-16.  
Dated, 11th. Nov. 1956.

Suresh C. Bose,  
Non-official Member,  
Netaji Enquiry Committee



Mr. M. SHIGEMITSU, WARTIME & ALSO THE PRESENT FOREIGN  
MINISTER OF JAPAN IN AN EXCLUSIVE HOUR-LONG INTERVIEW  
WITH THE AUTHOR IN TOKYO IN JUNE, 1956.

## INTRODUCTION

I am constrained to state at the outset that I have had to carry on my duties as a Member of this Committee under great handicaps and obstructions in all possible ways, which, in my opinion, is due to the fact that I did not fall in with the opinion of my colleagues and thereby enable them to submit a unanimous report.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, was pleased to nominate me as a member of this Committee as a representative of our family. I duly accepted it, as I felt it to be my sacred duty to associate myself with an investigation into the mysteries of the alleged demise of my brother, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, at Taihoku in Formosa on the 18th August, 1945.

As would ordinarily be expected, I had a firm belief that this enquiry would be conducted with an impartial, just and open mind and without any preconceived or prejudiced idea or notion and

without any mandate from any quarter. I regret very much to state that, in this matter, I have been sorely disappointed.

Although the closest of ties bind me with Netaji, I can assure my countrymen and, incidentally, my Government, with all the sincerity I possess, that such relationship will not stand in any way in my impartial adjudication of this matter, and, after all, as a brother, I would be more interested than anybody else in knowing exactly what the real truth is. From my limited experience of the little judicial work I did while in Government service, I can justly claim that no considerations, whether personal, Governmental or political, have ever, by the Almighty's Grace, made me deviate from the path of truth and justice. Fortunately for me, there was never any mandate to me from the higher authorities. My experience tells me that mandate from the Government is generally conveyed only to those, who carry it out with unusual ardour and zeal. I have, accordingly, played my part as a member of this Committee to the best of my limited capabilities and strictly in keeping with my ideas and policies, as stated above.

As members of this Committee, there is no gainsaying the fact, that it is our bounden duty to conduct this enquiry with an open and unpreju-

diced mind and to arrive at a just and impartial finding, as the evidence would justify and not to be influenced by any consideration whatsoever. In this matter, I am aggrieved to say there has been frustration and my colleagues, both connected with the Government, have tried their utmost to secure and to manipulate the evidence, so that it could easily conform with the Prime Minister's statements in Parliament and which is evidently the opinion of his Government and that with them, loyalty to Government has been their guiding principle and 'Interest' has had the better of "Duty".

#### WHY THIS ENQUIRY ?

It would be desirable and necessary to state in this connection that the Prime Minister, in reply to questions put in the Parliament by Shri H. V. Kamath, was pleased to state, "I have no doubt in my mind—I did not have it then" (in the Parliament on 5-3-1952) "and I have no doubt today of the fact of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's death"— "I have said that the question of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's death, is, I think, settled beyond doubt. There can be no enquiry about that".

The opinion of the Prime Minister and evidently that of his Government, as conveyed in these categorical statements of his, was apparently

confirmed by the Chairman of this Committee as his opinion also, in his statement made to the Press in Tokyo on the night of the 4th May, 1956, immediately on our arrival at the Airport there, and which was reported in some of the Calcutta newspapers on the 6th idem, that, "his mission was mainly to interview people, who might offer direct evidence on Shri Bose's death". So, the admission of the Chairman exists and that in an initial stage of this enquiry, that his mission was to interview only those persons, who might offer direct evidence on Netaji's death, so as to enable him to confirm his death, which was already the confirmed opinion of the Government and that he had no intention whatsoever of interviewing others, who would be expected to depose contrarily or to take the trouble to ascertain whether Netaji did not die. In view of this, it could almost be presumed that, whether the evidence recorded during the course of this enquiry, justified coming to the finding that the plane crashed or not or whether Netaji died or not, the Chairman appears to have made up his mind to conclude that the plane crashed and that Netaji died as a result of the same. As it appears that the intention of the Government for holding this enquiry was only to confirm Netaji's death, which was already the confirmed opinion of the Prime

Minister and his Government, one fails to understand what the necessity was for obtaining the same opinion again and for spending so much public money for it.

In view of the definite statement recorded above, that, "There can be no enquiry about that", made by a person of the rank and stature of the Prime Minister of India, a question would forthwith arise, "Then why was this enquiry held?" The only simple answer to this would naturally be that there must have been a pressing necessity that compelled the ordering of this enquiry. It appears, that from all that has transpired during the pendency of this enquiry, that, after getting Netaji's death confirmed by this Committee, the ultimate object of the Government is to bring those "ashes" from Tokyo, for reasons best known to the sponsors of this Committee.

### THE DISSENT

I do not propose here to go into the manner in which my colleagues have manipulated the statements tendered by some of the witnesses, but it will suffice to say that inspite of their joint and concerted efforts, they have not met with success and it is my confirmed opinion, after a very careful

consideration, that the evidence does not justify the finding that the plane crash took place and that Netaji died therefrom. I, therefore, feel it my duty, not merely out of respect for Netaji, but in the national interest and in deference to truth and candour to record my considered verdict that he did not die in the circumstances, as alleged and as found by my colleagues.

In this situation, I have no other alternative, but to record my dissent and to give my findings and reasons and arguments in support of my findings for the kind consideration of my Government and of my countrymen.

### THE PLAN

It has been proved without the shadow of a doubt that as early as 1944, Netaji foresaw that the Japanese nation would have to surrender and that it was only a question of time. As the main object of his life was to continue his struggle for the liberation of India and as he could not do the same in those countries in the East, where he was then working, as they would come under the occupation of the victorious British and American forces and as for the same purpose and for the same reason, he could not continue his work also in Japan, he considered Russia to be a convenient

and suitable country for his next future activities. He, accordingly, started making contacts with the Russian Ambassador in Japan.

When the time came for the Japanese to surrender, their Government expressed great sorrow at the failure of Netaji's mission and which they ascribed to their defeat and they then decided to "respect his last wishes", in whatever manner it was possible for them to do under such changed circumstances. Netaji, accordingly, requested them to take him to Russian territory. This request they could not comply with, because, they said, it would embarrass both the Russians as well as themselves, as they were negotiating for surrender and treaty terms with the Anglo-Americans through the Russians. Netaji accepted this and, as a next alternative, requested them to take him to Manchuria, which was still under their occupation and he told them that he would make his own arrangements for entering into the adjoining Russian territory. This plan was agreed upon, and, in pursuance of the same, Field Marshal Count Terauchi, the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Southern Command, who had his headquarters at Dalat, near Saigon, arranged a plane for Netaji and allowed Lt- Gen. Shidei, the Chief of Staff of the Burma Army, who had seen service in Man-

churia and was a renowned General in the Kwantung army and, who knew that territory and also about Russian affairs well, to accompany Netaji in the same plane, with directions to drop both of them at Dairen in Manchuria and that General Shidei would look after Netaji, as long as he would be there and to help him in entering Russian territory and after which, the Japanese would announce to the world that Netaji had "disappeared."

Shri S. A. Iyer, witness No. 6, who was at one time a Minister in Netaji's Cabinet, has given a detailed account of this plan and has used the word, "disappeared". This plan has been corroborated by Mr. T. Negishi, witness No. 20, who was at that time the Japanese interpreter attached to Netaji and is now the General Manager of all the branches in India and Pakistan of Messrs. Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd., one of the biggest firms in Japan with branches in all parts of the world, by Lt. Gen. S. Isoda, witness No. 35, who was the Head of the Hikari Kikan in South-East Asia, a Liaison Organisation between the Indian National Army (I. N. A.) and the Provisional Government of Azad Hind on the one hand and the Japanese Military Command and the Imperial Japanese Government on the other, by Mr. T. Hachiya, witness No. 32, the Japanese Minister to the Azad

Hind Government, by Mr. N. Kitazawa, witness No. 61, who was at that time Deputy to the Japanese Ambassador in Burma and now a member of the House of Representatives, Japan and also by a few other witnesses. This plan of Netaji of going to Russia via Manchuria has been very satisfactorily proved by such eminent persons and has also been accepted by my colleagues.

General Isoda has stated that the plane arranged for Netaji was a brand new bomber and that its take-off from Saigon aerodrome was quite normal and which has also been confirmed by Messrs. T. Hachiya, T. Negishi, Shri S. A. Iyer and others, who were present there.

Shri Iyer has used the word, "disappeared" with reference to Netaji's departure in the plan agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji. It is to be considered what this word "disappeared" could actually signify and what the correct word in this connection should be. The plan was that the Japanese would remove Netaji to a safe zone, so as to prevent his arrest by the ~~Americans~~ Americans, who were expected to be in imminent occupation of that territory and that, after he was safe in Russian territory and out of their clutches, the Japanese would make the announcement regarding Netaji. As the Japanese were also surrend-

ing to the same Anglo-Americans, they could, in my opinion, under no circumstances make an announcement that they had removed alive or had otherwise helped the disappearance of their erstwhile ally, Netaji, and who was an arch enemy of the Anglo-Americans and who were naturally very keen on arresting him. So, after having removed Netaji in a plane from his theatre of activities and away from his countrymen and beyond the control of the Anglo-Americans, the Japanese duly announced that Netaji had died, as the result of a plane crash. So, under such circumstances, the Japanese had no other alternative but to declare that Netaji had died and therefore, the word "disappeared" used by Shri Iyer could only be "died" and nothing else.

As Netaji was travelling in a plane, it was the easiest thing for them to announce that Netaji's death was caused by a plane crash accident and which is obviously a readily-believable story and which was actually what they had announced.

It has been stated, that Police Officers, Shri H. K. Rai and Shri K. P. De, witnesses Nos. 14 and 15 respectively, were members of two teams, under the leadership of Messrs. Davies and Finney, that had been despatched by the British Indian

Government to the Far East, soon after the surrender of the Japanese for arresting Netaji, against whom a case had been started under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance, as they did not believe the announcement made by the Japanese that Netaji had died as the result of a plane crash and they considered that it might be a hoax.

The facts and circumstances narrated above, give a very clear, convincing and readily-believable story that, in accordance with Netaji's final request to be taken to Manchuria, with the ultimate object of going to Russia, the Japanese Government flew him in a brand new bomber plane from Bangkok to Saigon and then onward to Dairen in Manchuria, Netaji's final destination under the auspices of the Japanese.

### WHY TAIHOKU ?

It has been proved satisfactorily and accepted by my colleagues that Netaji reached Saigon from Bangkok quite safely and that the take-off, landing and flight **enroute** as well as the take-off from Saigon were quite normal and smooth. It may be stated that Taihoku was nearest to and only one hop from Dairen, without any Indian national there and very far from Saigon, which was practically the easternmost end of Netaji's area of acti-

vities and where a large number of Indians lived. As the Japanese could not possibly announce that Netaji's plane had met with an accident in Manchuria, so Taihoku would be the most suitable place for a plane accident, in pursuance of the plan agreed upon by them as well as by Netaji. It now remains to be considered that after the take-off from Saigon, what finding the evidence on record justifies.

### THIS PLAN WHY PROVED ?

The passengers in the plane, as it took off from Saigon were :—

- (1) Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, (2) Lt. General T. Shidei, (3) Col. Habibur Rahman, (4) Lt. Col. T. Sakai, (5) Lt. Col. S. Nonogaki, (6) Major T. Kono, (7) Major I. Takahashi, (8) Major Takizawa, (9) Capt. K. Arai, (10) N. C. O. Ayoagi, (11) Mr. Tominaga, Radio operator, (12) Sergeant Okshita and (13) An Engineer, (name not known).

Besides Netaji and his Adjutant, Col. Rahman, the rest were all Japanese Military Officers and Crew of that military plane. In view of the plan of the Japanese Government to remove Netaji to a safe place and from the clutches of the Anglo-

✓ Americans and at the same time to announce that he had died as a result of his plane meeting with an accident, the only version that could be expected from all the Japanese witnesses, regarding Netaji's journey from Saigon onwards, would be the one that would be in keeping with the plan of their Government. My colleagues were of opinion that though these witnesses were at that time military officers and under the control of their Government, now, after a lapse of about eleven years, almost all of them, being in different walks of life as civilians and as Japan is not a totalitarian state, they are no longer under any compulsion or obligation to support their Government. I regret, I am unable to accept this view of my colleagues. These witnesses, apart from their education and respectability, are citizens of Japan, and whose unbounded patriotism is probably unique in the world. They have made statements to different authorities at different times, supporting the aforesaid plan of their Government. As such, I consider it an impossibility for them to go beyond their previously recorded statements and thereby disgrace themselves as well as their own Government, who, after all, had done a magnanimous act by giving succour to their friend and ally, "Mr. Chandra Bose".

## ENQUIRIES BY FOREIGNERS

Another very interesting aspect from quite a different angle is as follows :-

Soon after the surrender by the Japanese and naturally the I. N. A. also, the British rulers in India sent two teams of British and Indian Officers to Netaji's scene of activities to arrest him. Shri H. K. Rai and Shri K. P. De, witnesses Nos. 14 and 15 respectively, who were in those two teams and Shri S. Mazumdar, witness No. 11, who held a high post in the Intelligence Branch at that time, and all three of whom are still holding high posts in the Police Department, confirm this fact. These teams were unsuccessful in their attempts to arrest Netaji, though they were very intelligently given different areas for simultaneous activities to find out Netaji for the purpose of arresting him. Thereafter, different British and American Intelligence parties under the commands of Lord Mountbatten, General MacArthur and others scoured that area in a vain search for Netaji and the main reason for such furious activities was that from the time of the announcement of Netaji's death by the Japanese, they believed it to be a hoax and were under the impression that Netaji was living and was hiding somewhere. The final result of their


enquiries was indefinite and it was their opinion that this was probably a cleverly-conceived master deception plan on the part of the Japanese and Netaji. In short, they failed to be convinced that Netaji was dead, as had been announced by the Japanese. In my opinion, much reliance and weight should be placed on the result of these enquiries, held under different auspices with different personnel and in all the areas covered by Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon and Taihoku, soon after Netaji's departure from that area and because of their keen and earnest efforts to find him out for purposes of arresting and taking action against him under the provisions of the Enemy Agents' Ordinance and also because he had been declared an International War Criminal.

The manner in which our enquiry was made, viz., "mainly to collect direct evidence on Shri Bose's death", as stated by the Chairman, would, in my opinion, be considered to be perfunctory, when compared with those enquiries mentioned above and our finding should consequently be regarded to possess a similar value.

### VOLUNTEER WITNESSES

In addition to this, the Chairman made it a point to confine his witnesses to those who, he

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expected, would support his view, but for the satisfaction of the public, he made an announcement in the papers both here as well as in Tokyo, inviting persons to appear before him and to depose, if they knew anything about the subject matter of this enquiry. In response to this, I believe, a fair number of applications was received, but in view of his biased attitude and of the result of the examination of only three of them, which unfortunately proved unfavourable to him, he did not dare examine any more of them and also kept me in the dark regarding most of those applications.

Out of these applicants, the Chairman told me that he desired to examine one Mr. K. Satoh, witness No. 40, who, being a bomber mechanic attached to 136 Air Unit at Taihoku Aerodrome at that time, was expected to be an important witness about the plane crash there, Netaji's injuries, etc. He, however, gave a different version of another minor plane accident, which took place at 7 A. M. and not at about at 2-30 P. M. and that only two passengers were in that plane. The first passenger opened the door and jumped out. He was a non-Japanese and resembled Netaji. The other was pulled out of the plane and was a Japanese. He was told by a senior Military Officer there that, that

plane was carrying "Mr. Chandra Bose" and when he saw the first person come out, he thought him to be "Mr. Chandra Bose". His version of the crash and other details is different from that of the other Japanese witnesses, who were said to have been passengers in another plane, that is alleged to have crashed. Mr. Satoh continued that neither of these passengers was injured or burnt in any way and they started talking to each other.

The time of this accident has been corroborated more or less by Shri H. K. Rai, witness No. 14, which was rather unexpected. The deposition of Mr. K. Satoh was, unfortunately, a set-back for the Chairman. The second such witness to be examined was Shri S. N. Sen, witness No. 49, who appeared before us and insisted on being examined.

He has been in Japan for the last twenty years and was connected with the Indian Independence League in the Far East and knew Netaji there. He

deposed that Netaji was not in that plane. Then, evidently, with the expectation of making up for lost ground, the Chairman told me that he wanted to examine another person, viz., Mr. M. Miyoshi, witness No. 59, who, being a medical orderly in the same hospital at Taihoku at that time, would be in a position to state about Netaji's injuries, treatment and subsequent death there and probably

also about his cremation, but it was a great disappointment, as he only said that he was asked to lift a coffin from a room in the Hospital and to place it on a truck, that was waiting there, which he did with the help of three others. He had no idea as to whose body was in that coffin. Though, admittedly, a nursing orderly in that hospital and on active duty there, it is exceedingly strange that he had no knowledge whatsoever that such a renowned person like "Mr. Chandra Bose", and a non-Japanese and whose introduction is stated to have been given to and known by the hospital staff, had been treated in that hospital, had died in that hospital and whose body had been kept in that hospital for two or three days, as stated by some of the officially produced Japanese witnesses.

The case of Mr. K. Satoh, witness No. 40, is a similar one. He was admittedly in the Japanese Military Air Force Staff at Taihoku Aerodrome at that time and it is exceedingly strange as to why his version is totally different from that of the other Japanese witnesses, who were produced before us by the Japanese Foreign Office. Neither of these three witnesses had been examined by anybody else, before they appeared before us and so, obviously, they were not bound down by any statements previously made by them. The depositions of these

persons are significant and in my opinion carry much weight. If my colleagues have discussed their depositions, I am almost certain that they have done so in a superficial manner, because it is quite apparent that a proper and correct consideration of the same would go much against their findings. In any case, they must have failed to explain why these witnesses have made such statements, which are contradictory to those made by the witnesses produced by the Japanese Government. There is, moreover, no suggestion anywhere that they have been sponsored by any party or by any individual to depose in such fashion or they had any ulterior motive in doing so. They read the notice published in the papers at the instance of the Committee, as stated above, and as they found that they were in a position to say something about the subject-matter of this enquiry, they came forward and volunteered themselves before the Committee in good faith to depose whatever they knew about it. The Chairman, as a result of this unfavourable experience, evidently, received an unexpected shock and so fought shy of the other persons, who had so volunteered and did not risk examining any more of them, though they were about twenty in number.

Out of such applicants, one, Mr. Bondai Mori,

a Japanese mine-owner, requested the Chairman for being examined, but as he was not asked to do so, he published the fact of his disappointment in the Calcutta newspapers on 13-5-56.

### BIAS

In this connection, I consider, I will be failing in my duty, if I do not place on record certain facts, which, I regret to state, amount to serious allegations against the Chairman.

As this enquiry is of a semi-judicial nature, and which has been in a way expressed by the Prime Minister in his letter dated 14-4-56, in reply to a reference made by me to him in my letters dated 2-4-56 and 14-4-56, it is my humble opinion, that our position is somewhat akin to that of judicial officers. I am aggrieved to state that the Chairman's attitude and conduct at times, far from maintaining a judicial approach, has been similar to that of a zealous partisan and worse than that of the most unscrupulous prosecutor. With the intention of manipulating the evidence, so as to make it easy to lead to the finding that the plane crashed and that Netaji died, to which conclusion, Shri S. A. Iyer, witness No. 6, has arrived at in his book "Unto Him, A Witness", the Chairman, considering that to be an authoritative book, regarding the subject matter of this enquiry, put leading questions to some

witnesses from relevant portions of that book and at times allowed a few of them to peruse the book during their examination. Whenever any witness made a statement that did not fit in with his opinion, he would make a suggestion to him as to whether he remembered it definitely, as the incident took place about eleven years ago or would put other questions or suggestions to him to confuse him and to make him modify his answer or change his definite statement to a vague one. Another unimaginable conduct of his was that when a statement made by a witness did not suit his purpose, he would modify it, while dictating it to the Stenographer. Objections were invariably raised by me and at times it was a daily occurrence.

The climax was reached on the 1st June, 1956 in Tokyo, when Mr. M. Miyoshi, named above, stated that Netaji's coffin was placed on one stool, which the Chairman deliberately dictated to the Stenographer as two, because two stools had been stated by other witnesses. When I raised my objections and demanded the Chairman to inform me whether the witness had stated one stool or two stools, he evaded a reply and eventually explained that as an eight feet long coffin, in his opinion, could not rest on one stool, he dictated two instead of one. As stated above, such conduct cannot be readily

imagined. This sort of conduct on the part of the Chairman compelled me to make notes at times of the statements of the witnesses separately and to compare the same with the draft copy of the statements submitted by the Stenographer. I fully realise the seriousness of these allegations, but I assure my readers that there has not been the slightest deviation from truth.

When I have been compelled to go so far, I would like to note for the information of my readers, a much less damaging statement, but probably a more interesting one in some other respect. When on the 9th June, 1956, during our sitting in Calcutta, Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, witness No. 22, started stating about Netaji's wrist watch, the Chairman stopped him from proceeding further, on the ground that this witness was not entitled to make any statement about Netaji's wrist watch, as Shri S. M. Goswami, witness No. 16, had already made statements regarding that watch. As the witness was taken aback at the Chairman's objections and insisted on continuing with his deposition, our colleague, Shri S. N. Maitra, came to the Chairman's rescue and explained to him, as one would do to a child, by saying, that if a red shirt was hung up against a wall, a person could state that it was so, another could say it was green and not red,

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a third could come and say it was white and not red and so on, and so this witness should not be prevented from speaking about that wrist watch. This, I am certain, is something unique in the annals of all judicial proceedings and exhibits the Chairman's colossal ignorance in the matter of holding enquiries. There has not been the slightest deviation from truth in this matter either. This remark of mine and the similar one at the end of the last paragraph, I have been compelled to make, as these facts cannot be readily believed.

Another point, that should be considered, is our failure in visiting Taihoku. In my first interview with the Prime Minister on the 2nd April, 1956, along with the Chairman, I pressed this point and told him that I would not consider it to be a satisfactory enquiry, unless we visited that place, made a local inspection and examined the local people there. The Prime Minister was pleased to reply that it was not possible or necessary to do so, for the following main reasons, (1), because no diplomatic relations existed between the Formosan and our Governments, (2), because, in all probability, that aerodrome with its runway, buildings etc. no longer existed, (3), because, the Hospital, being a Japanese Military one, had probably been demolished, (4), because, the Hospital and the Aerodrome

staff, being Japanese, were no longer there and, they, being at present somewhere in Japan, it would suffice, if we went and examined them there, i. e., in Japan. I pressed this point in vain with our Ambassadors at Bangkok and Tokyo. Before finishing our work in Tokyo, and on my query, the Chairman told me that our visit to Taihoku could not be arranged, but he was, however, trying to bring to Tokyo, the Formosan murse, who was said to have attended on Netaji.

On the 13th July, 1956, during our sittings in New Delhi, I was taken aback, when the Chairman told me that the Japanese Foreign office had arranged for our visit to Taihoku. On asking him, whether our Ambassador in Japan stood in the way of our going there, he replied that it was not so, but that our Prime Minister did not approve of it. This omission on the part of the Committee to visit Taihoku in Formosa, was also stated by Shri Amiyanath Bose, when we visited their house on 9-6-56, for inspecting the rectangular wrist watch there, and it was to the effect that the Chairman had told him that the Japanese Government had arranged for our visit to Taihoku. He enquired of the Chairman in our presence and hearing, as to the reasons why the Committee did not go there and avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered.

to us, and said, that it would be admitted on all hands, that a local enquiry would be exceedingly beneficial for a correct adjudication of the subject-matter of this enquiry, and an omission thereof would, on the other hand, leave a gap and void that could never be replaced. The Chairman gave no reply. It was for this and for the other statements of Shri Bose and which appeared in the newspapers on the following day, that I requested the Chairman to record the statements of Shri Bose as a witness, which he declined to do, as I have stated elsewhere. I fail to understand why our visit there, to which great importance is attached and which was evidently secured after great difficulty and opposition, was not allowed. If this be correct, it may naturally lead one to suspect that such a visit would probably reveal certain points, which would tend to change the whole aspect of the findings of my colleagues.

#### ENQUIRY BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ?

In reply to a question put in the Parliament by Shri H. V. Kamath, on the 29th September, 1955, our Prime Minister was pleased to state, "In a matter of this kind, the only enquiry that is to say, satisfactory enquiry that can be made is by the Japanese Government. The matter is in Japan

the whole thing is there. We cannot impose ourselves or an Enquiry Committee on the Japanese Government. Of course, if they choose to enquire we will gladly co-operate and give such help as we can. But we cannot simply enquire into their territory and more specially also when all the possible witnesses are probably either Japanese Government officials or others connected with that Government" - - - "And as I said, the initiative must come from the Japanese Government in this matter. If it comes naturally we shall give them such help as we can".

These statements are also quite clear and definite. Though the incident is alleged to have taken place in August, 1945, no enquiry was made by the Japanese Government during the last eleven years nor has any initiative or suggestion come from that quarter up to the end of September, 1955. It is really puzzling to persons, who have little knowledge of international affairs, but are possessed with the usual amount of common sense, to realise that an enquiry as to whether Netaji is dead or not, should be the duty of the Japanese Government and not of the Indian Government, but, in the course of the next few months, the common sense view was eventually accepted in preference to the other and our Government on its own initiative

formed a Committee for making an enquiry, which, it had only recently said, was not at all necessary. It imposed this Committee on the Government of Japan, by deputing it to hold its sittings in their territory and for examining their nationals there. As stated once before, a pressing necessity must have arisen for a sudden change in a long-standing plan and conviction.

#### NON-OFFICIAL COMMITTEE VIS-A-VIS OFFICIAL COMMITTEE

Another very interesting point in this connection is, that the Chairman announced in a meeting of the Netaji Smarak Samiti (Memorial Committee) held in Calcutta on the 6th October, 1955, in which he was the President, that our Prime Minister was not in favour of setting up an Official Committee for purposes of this enquiry. So, it is not understood as to why an Official Committee was formed soon after by the self-same authority. I have gone into this matter in some details below. This change in decision was evidently also brought about by some pressing necessity.

One cannot help noticing that these are, after all, very curious and confusing statements and ever-changing decisions, viz.,

I. The question of Netaji's death, being settled beyond doubt and there can be no enquiry about that, - was changed to, - the only satisfactory enquiry that can be made, is by the Japanese Government. Therefore, the decision,—no enquiry,—gives place to an enquiry by the Japanese Government.

2. The decision, viz., no enquiry and enquiry by the Japanese Government, vanishes and an enquiry by the Indian Government takes place instead.

3. The opinion, viz., not in favour of setting up an Official Committee,—disappears,—and soon after, an Official Committee is actually formed and made to function.

The sudden change in these long-cherished ideas and plans is certainly significant and was evidently due to certain unforeseen circumstances, that suddenly cropped up immediately after our Prime Minister's categorical statements made in the Parliament on the 29th September, 1955, and which, apparently, resulted from the initiative taken in the meeting of the Netaji Memorial Committee, stated above, for the formation of a Non-official Committee, that would soon go abroad to ascertain definitely whether Netaji was dead or not. In the Resolution passed in that meeting, there was a

request to me to associate myself with the Committee, as a representative of the family, and to guide its activities, and, accordingly, the President of that meeting, who happens to be the Chairman of this Committee, was authorised to meet me at Karmatar in Bihar, where I was living at that time, and to persuade me to join it, so that the Committee could go ahead with its work. The Chairman duly met me there on the 11th October, 1955, and, after handing over a copy of that Resolution, explained to me the whole position and persuaded me to associate myself with it as its leader and thereby help it in having an enquiry made, as a result of which, the Indian public would know definitely whether Netaji actually existed or not, as it was high time that they did know about it. He also told me that he would report the matter to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, who, he said, was not in favour of an Official Committee, but of a Non-official one and he would request the Prime Minister to use his good offices and to issue necessary instructions to the departments concerned, so that this Non-official Committee could carry on its work smoothly both here and abroad. He told me further, that soon after contacting Shri Nehru, he would hold a bigger and more representative meeting in Calcutta

of the admirers, followers and well-wishers of Netaji and in that meeting the remaining personnel of the Committee would be selected. He opined that necessary funds for this Committee would be readily forthcoming from private sources. After a few hours' stay with me there, he left for Delhi and promised to inform me soon about all the developments that would take place there. There was no further news from him, not even about the result of his interview with the Prime Minister, nor did he hold his promised meeting in Calcutta. So, up to this period, it is clear, according to the Chairman's statements, that our Prime Minister had no intention of setting up an Official Committee, but, was, on the other hand, good enough to promise necessary help for the proper functioning of a Non-official one.

The danger of a Non-official Committee, coming into existence and functioning soon and which was expected to announce a finding that Netaji was not dead, as the sponsors of that Committee were generally of that view, set our administrators in Delhi a-thinking. This, coupled with the fact that the papers, left by the British rulers, as a result of their and the American's thorough on-the-spot enquiries, soon after the alleged incident and which are in the possession of our Government, did not

reveal the truth of Netaji's death as convincing, apparently made our Prime Minister change his original plan and form this Official Committee, and also because the finding of the Non-official Committee, as anticipated, would not only be a challenge to his statements in the Parliament, but may also go to the extent of disproving those statements. This was evidently, too much for our high officials in Delhi to remain complacent and inactive any longer. They, therefore, quickly nipped the formation of a Non-Official Committee in the bud and set up this three men Committee, with two of their own men as members.

### THE COMMITTEE

The Chairman of this Committee, Shri Shahnawaz Khan, was an Indian Commissioned Officer in the British Indian Army. He saw service in Burma during the last war and eventually became a Prisoner-of War, when his rank was that of a Captain. When the I. N. A. was organised, he joined its ranks at a comparatively late stage, as he was pro-British, and he has admitted in his book viz., "I. N. A. and its Netaji", that innumerable persons from their families have been in the service of the British Indian Army for the last three generations. When Netaji, as the Head of the

Provisional Government of Azad Hind and as Supreme Commander of the I. N. A., ordered that army to go into action against the Anglo-American forces, he moved forward with his unit and took part in military operations. Later on, when the I. N. A. was compelled to retreat and finally surrendered, he also surrendered, when his rank was that of a Colonel, which is evident from the Secret British Military Intelligence reports, and not that of a Major-General, which, he was compelled to admit before me, was self-imposed after the surrender of the I. N. A. He had practically no position in the administrative set-up of Netaji's Goverment nor any important assignment in the Military Headquarters Staff and, being in the forward lines and without any decoration for any specific bravery or conduct, he had little opportunity of coming in personal contact with Netaji, the last of which was in the first week of March, 1945. He is at present a member of the Parliament on behalf of the Congress and is Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport and Railways. Even if he does not continue to be a Pakistani, all his relations, including his eldest adult son, and his property are there, and in the course of a comparatively short stay here, he has created a position for himself in government circles and is the proprietor of a

mechanised farm with an area of a few hundred acres. He is one of those rare fortune-favoured persons, who has successfully managed to retain his feet on two territories quite profitably. His tact and cleverness in this matter are really praiseworthy. He has been nominated as a representative of Netaji's Azad Hind Government.

Shri S. N. Maitra is a member of the Indian Civil Service, which he joined in 1935. He has served the Government in various capacities, mostly executive and administrative. Lastly, he was Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands before joining this Committee. He is a nominee of the Government.

As for myself, I joined the Bihar and Orissa Executive Service in 1915 and served the Government, till I resigned on political grounds in 1924. During this period, however, I underwent industrial training in Germany. After a lapse of about fifteen years and during which period, I had my own business, I was re-appointed in the Bihar Executive Service, which I again resigned on political grounds in 1944. I have been selected as a representative from the family.

In an enquiry of this nature, it is my humble opinion that the services of a military officer were

not necessary. As it was considered essential to have a representative from Netaji's Government, I may be permitted to suggest that it would have been better to choose one from his civil administration rather than one from the military. As such, Shri A. M. Sahay, witness No. 30, who is at present our Consul General at Hanoi, should have been, in my opinion, the first choice. He started his political career in 1920, when he was a medical student at Patna and was Private Secretary to Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the present President of India. In 1922, he met Netaji, who told him that propaganda and work for India's independence should also be carried on in Japan and in other parts of the world. In 1923, he left India for Japan, where he took to journalism and politics. He joined Shri Rash Behari Bose and Raja Mahendra Pratap, the renowned revolutionaries, in their movement for the liberation of India. When the last war broke out, he came to Burma side and after the Anglo-Americans surrendered to the Japanese in March or April, 1942, they formed a Committee of Action and organised the Indian Independence League with Shri Rash Behari Bose as the President and along with it, the Indian National Army. They then arranged with the German Embassies in Tokyo and Shanghai and with others for bringing Netaji

from Germany to the Far East, which he actually did, first in a German and then in a Japanese submarine. On 3. 7. 43., at Singapore, he met Netaji, who had reached there on the previous day. In the course of their conversation, Netaji told him that Mahatma Gandhi was just like his father and he could never think of going against him and whom, he subsequently designated in his radio broadcasts from the Far East as "Father of the Nation". Shri Sahay was then appointed Secretary General to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind with the rank of a Minister. On the 28th October, 1943, he, along with Major-General Bhonsle, Major Abid Hasan and Col. Raju, accompanied Netaji to Tokyo, where he went to attend the Greater East Asia Conference. At the end of December, 1943, he went with Netaji to the Andamans, which the Japanese Government had handed over to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. He was a member of the Azad Hind Dal, founded by Netaji and which took over charge of the Civil administration of the areas round about Imphal, that had been liberated by the I. N. A. Later on, when Netaji was not hopeful about Japan's success in the war, he was sent in January or February, 1945 to Japan for sounding the high officials for getting into touch with the Russian

Ambassador there, as Netaji expected to secure the help of the Russians in his future activities for the liberation of India, because he was of opinion that, though Russia was an ally of the Anglo-Americans, they would fall out in the course of the next ten years, when he expected another world conflagration.

While in Tokyo, Shri Sahay met Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, who happens to hold the same position today, and who may be considered to be one of the topmost Japanese diplomats. On the 31st July, 1945, according to Netaji's instructions, he reached Hanoi in North Viet-Nam, the headquarters of Dr. Ho Chi Minh's party, that could probably help Netaji in contacting the Russians or the Chinese Communists. He also knew that at the time of the surrender by the Japanese, it was Netaji's ultimate aim to remove his headquarters to Manchuria, and, so, on or about the 18th August, 1945, when he learnt that Netaji was going to Tokyo, he was confident that Netaji's destination was Manchuria. He, accordingly, requested the Japanese to take him by plane to Manchuria, where he expected to meet Netaji and whom he could help materially, as he had travelled widely in that area in 1938. On the 20th August, Shri Debnath Das, Col. Gulzara Singh, Col. Pritam Singh, witnesses nos, 2, 3 and 5 respectively,

along with Major Abid Hasan and others reached Hanoi by air and informed him that Netaji with Col. Habibur Rahman had left Saigon for Tokyo. As they also knew that Netaji's destination was Manchuria, they desired to accompany him there, in case a plane was secured. At 6 or 7 p. m. on the date of their arrival at Hanoi, news came over the Japanese controlled radio that Netaji's plane had crashed at Taihoku and that Netaji was dead. This came as a great shock to them, but they could not accept it as true, as they knew about Netaji's plan of going to Manchuria and thought that it was a camouflage for preventing his enemies from following him. In my opinion, all these activities of Shri A. M. Sahay qualify him as the best selection from Netaji's Government.

The question of Shri Debnath Das, witness No. 2, whom Netaji made the General Secretary of the Indian Independence Headquarters of East Asia and who was one of the Advisers and a member of the Council of Ministers and who was the only high-ranking person, whom Netaji had instructed at the time of his final departure from Bangkok, to carry on underground work and for which he was given money and arms, should, in my opinion, be

considered next. He is now in the service of the West Bengal Government.

Shri S. A. Iyer, witness No. 6, is, in my opinion, the next best candidate. He was a Minister in Netaji's Cabinet and was in charge of Information and Broadcasting from the beginning to the end and always had personal contact with him. He is now attached to the Government of Bombay.

Shri Das and Shri Iyer were two of those six trusted lieutenants, and the only two civilians, whom Netaji had selected and taken with him on his last journey from Bangkok and whom he left at Saigon, when he took the plane from there on the 17th August, 1945 for an "unknown destination."

I would also mention here the name of Shri N. G. Swamy, whom Netaji gave training in Germany in secret service, submarine, parachute, etc. and brought him from there also in a submarine to the Far East, where he was the head of the secret service and was always in close touch with Netaji.

If, however, one from the military side be considered necessary, I would humbly suggest that the first choice should go to Major-General J. K. Bhonsle, witness No. 7, who, as Chief of the Staff, had the closest and the most frequent contact with Netaji, the Supreme Commander, and who

was a senior and better qualified military officer, having passed out from Sandhurst. He is at present Deputy Minister, Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of India.

The next best selection would be Col. Gulzara Singh, witness No. 3, who, like the Chairman, was also taken in Netaji's Cabinet, as a member representing the Army and who was with his regiment in the fighting line. Later on, Netaji appointed him Assistant Chief of the Staff, Supreme Headquarters, which position he held till the last. He was in Netaji's party during his last withdrawal from Burma and he was one of those six trusted followers, whom Netaji intended taking with him to Russia via Manchuria. He is at present a Captain in the Indian Army, as he was compelled to start his military career afresh from the lowest rank.

He should be followed by Col. Pritam Singh, witness No. 5, who, like the Chairman, was a Captain in the British Indian Army at the time of surrender, but who joined the I. N. A. in its earliest stage. He was present at the Singapore Aerodrome, when Netaji first arrived there. He took part in the Imphal operations and advanced about fifty miles behind the enemy lines and for his bravery, he

was decorated Sardar-e-Jung by Netaji. He was also one of those six loyal persons, stated above, whom Netaji wanted to take with him to an "unknown destination" to help him in his activities for the liberation of India. He is at present carrying on somehow with a small farm of his.

I have intentionally omitted the names of Col. Habibur Rahman, who was Deputy Chief of Staff and Major-General M. Z. Kiani, a high ranking officer, who held important assignments, whom it would have been difficult to get from Pakistan and Major Abid Hasan, who had distinguished himself in the I. N. A. operations and whom Netaji brought with him in a submarine from Germany, because he is abroad on Indian Diplomatic Service and could not easily be at hand.

The qualification of a person selected from Netaji's Government should be judged from the nature of his connection therein and also personal contacts with Netaji. In my humble opinion, the Chairman's selection on this Committee, as a representative of Netaji's Government, has been an improper one and injustice has been done not only to those named above, but to many others, who possessed better qualifications.

It is my opinion, that, this Committee, as constituted, is not competent or weighty enough to do justice to the onerous responsibility entrusted to it, and as this matter could be considered to be of international interest. Realising this, I mentioned in my letter dated the 2nd April, 1956, (copy attached, App. A) and spoke to the Prime Minister that the nomination of Shri Shahnawaz Khan, as Chairman of this Committee, was not appropriate and I requested him to request Dr. Radha Binode Pal, the jurist of international fame, to form a Committee and to lead it, as I felt that this enquiry would be of great interest to millions of persons, throughout the world and whose confidence in the Committee could not be secured, unless such eminent persons constituted it. The Prime Minister, however, did not accede to my request for reasons best known to him, but Shri Shahnawaz Khan later on clarified this point.

In reply to a question by Shri U. M. Thevar, M. L. A., Madras, who was the first gentleman to appear before the Committee on the 4th April, 1956, as to whether there was any possibility of the inclusion in this Committee of Dr. Radha Binode Pal, the Chairman stated,—“I had talked to the Prime Minister. There is no possibility,—he was there during the war time and the Prime Minister does

not think that he could be associated with this Committee, because he has already formed his opinion that the plane crash did not take place".

There may be some meaning in this, but a gentleman of Dr. Pal's position and an eminent jurist and one who had earned international reputation for his learned exposition of law and independent spirit in the historic Tokyo War Crimes' Tribunal, could never be imagined to possess a prejudiced mind, when sitting in judgement over any matter and especially that, concerning a great Indian Leader.

It is, therefore, apparent, that one of the main qualifications for being entitled to be a member of this Committee is that instead of being neutral, one must preferably be expected to be of the opinion that the plane crash took place and that Netaji died as a result of the same, as has been expressed by the Prime Minister in the Parliament on the 29th September, 1955 and also by the Chairman later on in Tokyo on the 4th May, 1956, when he said his mission there was mainly to collect direct evidence regarding Netaji's death. I am constrained to state that this has also explained why not a single piece of important and relevant paper or exhibit from the record was given to me after I had disagreed from the findings of my colleagues, though I was le

imately entitled to all such papers for writing my dissentient report and had repeatedly requested the Chairman and the authorities concerned in Delhi for the same and though the Chief Minister, West Bengal, was also pleased to recommend my request.

### THE COMMITTEE'S ITINERARY AND WORK

After the personnel of the Committee had been finalised, the Chairman and the Under Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs informed me in Calcutta that the first sitting of the Committee would be held in New Delhi on the 29th March, 1956. Both the Chairman and I duly attended, but Shri Maitra did not do so. He joined us on the 4th April, when the examination of witnesses, who had already been waiting, was commenced. During its sittings there up to the 14th April, ten witnesses were examined. Due to some private work of the Chairman, the Committee assembled in Calcutta on the 20th April and where, up to the 26th idem, thirteen gentlemen and one lady were examined, but three of them not completely.

The Committee left Calcutta the same night by air and reached Bangkok after about four hours' flight, where up to the 29th idem, four gentlemen

were examined and the house, where Netaji stayed at times, was also visited.

Leaving Bangkok by air at about 11 o'clock the following morning, the party reached Saigon the same afternoon, where up to the 3rd May, two gentlemen were examined and during that period, Tourane, a small town in French Indo-China, was visited, as Netaji is alleged to have spent a night there on his flight from Saigon to Taihoku. There one gentleman was examined. At Saigon, the Committee went to see the house where Netaji stayed during his visits there, but they were informed that the house had been destroyed outright soon after Netaji had left that place on the 17th August, 1945 and that other houses had been built on that site and which were inspected.

The party then left Saigon by plane the next morning and reached Tokyo the same night, where up to the 5th June, thirty-one gentlemen and one lady were examined. On the 30th May, the <sup>1951</sup> Renkōji Temple, where the alleged ashes of Netaji were kept, was visited.

On the morning of the 6th June, the party left Tokyo by air, reaching Calcutta the same night. On the 8th and 9th idem, the unfinished examination of three gentlemen was concluded and one other gentleman was examined.

On the latter date, the party visited the house of the late Sarat Chandra Bose, where his son, Shri Amiyanath Bose produced two wrist watches, one rectangular and the other round, which he said had been made over to his deceased father by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru and Major Swamy of the I. N. A. respectively. According to Shri Bose, the rectangular one had been made over to Shri Nehru by Shri Bhullabhai Desai, who had received it from Col. Habibur Rahman, witness No. 4, through the Chairman of this Committee, with the report that it was worn by Netaji and recovered from him, before he expired at the hospital at Taihoku. Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, witness No. 22, who was deposing about the wrist watch worn by Netaji, was allowed to be present there. Shri Amiyanath Bose produced two photographs of Netaji, wearing a round wrist watch. All the gentlemen present there, including the three members of the Committee, agreed that the round watches shown in both the photographs were one and the same watch and all of them, except the Chairman, also agreed that that round watch was not the same as the round one produced by Shri Amiyanath Bose.

I then requested the Chairman to have a note of inspection recorded, as a result of the inspection

made by us there and, if necessary, with his sole dissenting opinion incorporated in it and also to have the statements of Shri Amiyanath Bose recorded, as our stenographer was also with us, but he declined to do so and when questioned, also declined to give his reasons for not doing so. Shri Amiyanath Bose, it appears, released a statement to the press, which appeared in the papers on the following day, expressing his surprise at the arbitrary conduct of the Chairman in deliberately declining to record facts, that should legitimately have been recorded.

Before leaving Calcutta on the night of the 9th June, the Chairman requested us to assemble at New Delhi on the 18th idem, as he had to go to his farm at Aithal. Both the Chairman and I duly met there on the 18th, but Shri Maitra joined us on the following day. Up to the 27th June, three gentlemen were examined by us.

On the 30th June, along with Shri Kundan Singh, witness No. 65, we inspected in the National Museum, at Rashtrapati Bhawan, the damaged materials said to have been recovered from the alleged plane crash site, as he was a personal orderly of Netaji and was expected to know about them. An Inspection Note (App. B; in this connection was subsequently written and signed by us.

The last gentleman to be examined was Shri A. M. N. Sastri, witness No. 67, an Aircraft Inspector, Accidents Investigation Branch, Civil Aviation Department, New Delhi on 27-6-56. It appears from his deposition, that excerpts of the statements of a few of the witnesses already examined, sketches drawn by them and photographs, totalling seventeen items, were sent to him on 22-6-56. All this was done without my knowledge and is again one of the several instances of hush-hush policy and other tactics for keeping me in the dark, adopted by my colleagues during the course of this enquiry.

The total number of persons, including two ladies, examined by the Committee is sixty-seven. A list of same (App. C) with details, showing dates and places of their examination, is attached herewith.

A written statement, said to have been obtained from one Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who is alleged to have been a passenger with Netaji in that plane and who is reported to be in Formosa now and who could not be made to appear before the Committee, was obtained and a copy of which was made over to me on 27-6-56.

This concluded the oral and written statements adduced before the Committee in the course of this enquiry.

## PREPARATION FOR THE REPORT

On 23-6-56, I was taken by surprise, when the Chairman suddenly asked me to let him know what my findings were regarding the subject-matter of this enquiry. I replied that I had not formed any such opinion at that stage and it was too early for me to do so, and it would be possible for me to come to a decision, only after I had studied the evidence recorded, after I had tabulated the statements of witnesses regarding the different main issues and after I had carefully weighed the **pros and cons** of the same. He told me again that it was indispensably necessary for him to know what my findings were, otherwise it would not be possible for him to start writing the draft report. I failed to understand his view-point and after explaining myself, I told him that, in my opinion, what he meant would amount to putting the cart before the horse. When we met again on 25-6-56, the Chairman put me the same question and insisted on a definite reply from me. I again regretted my inability to do so, but told him that I could agree with him **in toto** or, partly or I could hold a wholly different opinion.

After examination of the last witness, Shri A. M. N. Sastri on 27-6-56, we assembled on 30-6-56 and started discussion as to how the draft report should

be written. The Chairman started by saying that the three issues were, Netaji's death, his cremation and his ashes and that the last two would go a long way in proving the first one. On this, I suggested that, as the ashes are not identifiable articles, exceedingly stringent and unfailing proof is necessary from the time of formation of the same up to its present existence by way of containers, seals, guards, continuity of possession etc., otherwise it could not be held to be those of the individual, they are meant to be. I suggested that it would be essential to record the suggestions for the draft report, which should be started with Netaji's plan of going to Manchuria for continuing his activities for the independence of India in Russian territory and that the Japanese Government, agreeing to this plan, were taking him in a plane to Manchuria and had deputed Lt. Gen. Shidei, who knew that area well, to help him in crossing over into the adjoining Russian territory and that after Netaji had succeeded in doing so, the Japanese Government would announce that Netaji had died. Shri Maitra then added that Netaji had discussed this plan with his Cabinet Ministers also. I, accordingly, made a note of this point also. The next point suggested by me was to decide whether the plane

actually crashed or not and I told them that if it was held that it did not crash, the recorded evidence on the subsequent events would be of not much importance. My colleagues did not agree with me and they said that it would not be proper to drop the matter so lightly at that stage, but to consider in details the whole of the evidence that was on record on all the remaining points. The discussion continued and I kept notes in my own way and which were exclusively for my personal requirements. The Chairman kept notes also, but Shri Maitra did not do so. In my notes, I recorded the suggestions of all the members, but did not consider it necessary to specify what the suggestions of each member were, as I knew what my suggestions were and so the remaining ones would be those of my colleagues. Our discussions continued and we finished all the main points, a complete record of which I made, containing the suggestions made by all three of us.

Up till then, I was under the impression that the Chairman would write the report and that we would help him in doing so and so I recorded the suggestions of all of us, so that I could arrange the evidence for the report in the light of all these suggestions, which I had made a note of. The Chairman then suggested that Shri Maitra should

write the report. I was a bit astonished, but agreed to it. The Chairman then enquired of Shri Maitra as to the date by which he would be able to submit his draft report, observing at the same time, that the report must be submitted to Government by 16-7-56. Shri Maitra said he could do so by 10-7-56, on which date, the Chairman said that we should assemble for considering the draft report and that we must finish the discussion, correction and finalisation by 13-7-56, so as to enable submission by 16-7-56, as the Parliament was coming into session and that the Prime Minister was returning home from abroad soon. After I had noted all these points, Shri Maitra asked me whether he could peruse my note, as he had not kept any. I agreed and handed it over to him. He then had typed copies made of the same and requested me to sign on them and both of them signed on my manuscript note. I did not object to any of these requests. I am constrained to say that my colleagues and some of the high officials, both in Delhi as well as in Calcutta, tried their utmost to obstruct, influence and coax me in signing the report of my colleagues and thereby make it a unanimous one, after it was decided by all three of us that I would have to write and submit a dissentient report. It is exceedingly strange and cannot easily be imagined

that such high officials would stoop to such tactics for preventing the expression of an honest opinion and conviction by a member of a Committee.

## THE DRAFT REPORT

On 10. 7. 56, Shri Maitra submitted a draft report, covering 42 typed sheets on points 2,3 and 4 of my note and on 11. 7. 56 and on 12. 7. 56, he produced pages 43 to 56 and pages 58 to 71 respectively. On 13. 7. 56, we started considering the draft report and we did so up to page 28, where all of us put our initials, showing that we had proceeded so far. While discussing this report, I told my colleagues that it contained only a few discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses, which Shri Maitra explained was due to lapse of time and because the witnesses were not tutored, which I said is the usual explanation given while writing judgments, but this could not be a satisfactory explanation for the innumerable discrepancies that existed in the evidence on almost all the major points, some of which, however, Shri Maitra had failed to mention in his report. I requested him to give due consideration to such defective nature of evidence and to reconsider whether such evidence would justify the findings he had arrived at.

On the following day, viz., on 14. 7. 56, we continued discussing the draft report, which, however, contained a larger number of discrepancies and contradictions on almost all the major points, to quote a few of which would be, the nature of injuries alleged to have been received by Netaji, the manner and the vehicle, in which he was said to have been taken to the hospital, the place and nature of his alleged treatment there, the time of his alleged death, a telegram dated 28. 8. 45 from the Chief of the Staff, Japanese Southern Army to the effect that Netaji's body had been flown to Tokyo and lastly, the complete failure at the attempt to prove that, at about the time Netaji is alleged to have died in the hospital, Col. Habibur Rahman, witness No. 4, deposed that the attending Medical Officer, Dr. T. Yoshimi, witness No. 48, handed over to him a rectangular wrist watch, said to have been worn by Netaji at the time of his alleged death and which finally came into the possession of the late Sarat Chandra Bose, one of Netaji's elder brothers. This Medical Officer has denied all knowledge of this alleged conduct of his, viz., that he had handed over the rectangular wrist watch to Col. Rahman. There has, moreover, been a complete failure in adducing even an iota of evidence that Netaji ever wore any

rectangular wrist watch, nor has a single such photograph of Netaji been produced. Even though Shri Maitra apparently omitted in his draft report several discrepancies and contradictions and tried to explain and minimise only those referred to by him, he was completely non-plussed with the evidence adduced with regard to the watch and had no other alternative, but to observe pithily, "The point about the watch remains inconclusive." Another interesting point worthy of notice here is that Col. Rahman stated definitely that Netaji had a cut on his head, four inches long, which was bleeding. A straight denial regarding this injury comes from the Medical Officer, who is alleged to have attended on Netaji, but, who, however, makes detailed statements regarding the alleged injuries on Netaji, his treatment etc. Regarding this point, Shri Maitra has again made a very terse statement, viz., "This is a discrepancy". His resources, evidently, failed him to come forward with any explanation whatsoever. In another portion of his draft report, he has stated, "There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to who travelled in which vehicle and who arrived first, but these are minor points and may be overlooked." I am constrained to say that "overlooking" is the third mode of reasoning adopted by my learned

colleagues for not considering and judging the discrepancies in their legitimate aspect. At another place it is recorded, "There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to who were in the same ward with Netaji." Our wise colleague, after discussing some of the evidence regarding this point, concluded, "After a lapse of years, it would be perhaps unwise to lay too much stress on such minor discrepancies." Regarding the blood transfusion, alleged to have been given to Netaji, his conclusion is, "There is no way of reconciling these different statements and they must remain as they are." This is a very clear and frank confession of sheer helplessness on his part.

These are only a few of the many instances in which my learned colleagues have, in my humble opinion, failed to explain the glaring discrepancies and contradictions and to give due weight and consideration with a just, impartial and unprejudiced mind for coming to a correct conclusion or finding, which such evidence would legitimately demand. I cannot but record a queer incident that took place, when I was a student in College about 42 years ago. A British Professor of ours, failing on our repeated requests to explain a mathematical problem, eventually said, "Anyhow it comes to this," and then wrote the final result.

I am constrained to say that I have now had the opportunity of obtaining its parallel from my learned colleagues, viz., "anyhow" it comes to this, that the plane carrying Netaji crashed, he died, he was cremated and his ashes are now in Renkoji Temple in Tokyo.

I cannot but bring it to the notice of my countrymen that though the draft report of my learned colleagues contains only a few discrepancies, they, in my opinion, have thought it wise not to make a correct estimation of the whole of the evidence, which contains a "multitude of discrepancies" and to come to a legitimate conclusion for the following reasons so wisely suggested by them, viz., because, (1) the incident took place about eleven years ago, (2) the witnesses were not tutored, (3) the point about the watch remained inconclusive, (4) there was no way of reconciling the different statements regarding blood transfusion, alleged to have been given to Netaji, (5) the inability to explain the contradictory statements about a four inches long bleeding injury on Netaji's head and, lastly, as a trump card, they appealed to their magnanimous readers to use their good sense not to lay too much stress on such discrepancies and finally to "overlook" the same and to agree with their findings

Under such circumstances, I believe, my readers will agree with me that I have some amount of justification in observing, as I have done above, that my colleagues have come to their findings on the sole basis and reasoning of "anyhow", that has suggested itself to me and that, evidence or no evidence, my loyal colleagues were determined to put down on paper such findings of theirs. After I take up the evidence on record and discuss and consider the same, I am almost certain that our Government and our countrymen will be pleased to agree with me that the findings and conclusions arrived at by my learned colleagues cannot at all be a correct and proper assessment of the evidence recorded and as such, they will also be pleased to agree with me, that with my colleagues, "anyhow" was the only weapon in their armoury, which they had to wield for arriving at their findings.

Though out of regard and pity, we did not pursue the matter further with our helpless Professor, I do hope and pray that our just and benign Government and our inquisitive countrymen, on whose initiative this enquiry has been made, will in due course be pleased to pursue the matter and to consider the evidence very carefully in an impartial and unprejudiced mind and draw their own conclusions therefrom.

From all that has been stated above, from the reports that have appeared in the newspapers from time to time, from the correspondence that has been exchanged between me and some of the high officials in Delhi, from my interviews and conversation over the telephone with the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who has also taken the trouble of speaking to a few of my nearest relations, it is evident that it is the intention of my energetic colleagues to have those ashes brought very soon, for reasons best known to them and also to our Government, from the Renkoji Temple in Tokyo to India, as they say that the Japanese nation is belittling the Indian nation for not honouring the ashes of such a renowned Indian leader, who, however, they believe, was mostly instrumental in expediting the departure of the British rulers from India.

### THE DISSENT DISCUSSED

Returning to our consideration of the draft report, when we came to the portion at Page 42, viz., "They all point to the fact that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose died at Taihoku Military Hospital on the night of the 18th August, 1945. The Committee accepts this conclusion," I immediately and firmly told my colleagues that I regretted

my inability to subscribe to this opinion of theirs. It is rather strange that the statements immediately preceding these are in a different and contradictory tone, though, however, with some sort of an explanation. They are "In fact, as will be seen, different witnesses, have given different stories, which would disprove any suggestion of 'Prompting'. So, notwithstanding discrepancies and variations, which are too likely after this lapse of many years, the statements of witnesses must be taken as worthy of credit". Thereupon, I suggested to my colleagues, that in view of such innumerable glaring discrepancies and contradictions and which, in some instances, Shri Maitra had admittedly failed to explain, whether they would not make up their minds to change their findings and to agree with me that such evidence would reasonably justify coming to the only conclusion that the plane crash did not take place and that Netaji did not die. It is left to my readers to form their own opinion as to how much justification there could possibly be for drawing such conclusions from such admittedly defective and flimsy evidence.

## CHAIRMAN'S ADVICE FOR DISSENTING REPORT.

There was silence. I then requested the Chairman to let me know what my next move should be. He replied that I would have to write a separate dissenting report. I, accordingly, requested him to give me the remaining portion of their draft report and copies of all relevant papers, including exhibits, photographs etc., which Shri Maitra promised to do. As the day's work was over, we all left together with the understanding that we would meet on the morning of Monday next, the 16th instant as usual, which we did, as arranged, when the Chairman told me that I could no longer sit with them, when they continued further consideration of their draft report.

## HARASSMENT & DEPARTURE FROM DELHI

I, therefore, requested him to put me in touch with the officer, whom he had on my request, referred to on the 13th instant for arranging accommodation for my stay in Delhi. I duly took leave of my colleagues and met Shri S. K. Roy, Deputy Secretary, External Affairs, accordingly. I may mention here that when Shri R. S. Chavan, Under Secretary, External Affairs, informed me in his

letter dated 16. 3. 56, that the first sitting of our Committee would be held in Delhi on 29. 3. 56, he enquired of me at the same time about arranging accommodation for me in Delhi. As during the whole of my 48 days' stay in Delhi, I stayed with my daughter in her quarters, arrangement and consequent expenditure by the Government on that score was not necessary, but as on 12. 7. 56, she had to vacate her quarters suddenly, I had to shift from there at about 10. 10 o'clock that night and a friend of mine was kind enough to come to my rescue and to give me shelter. On the morning of the following day, I requested the Chairman to have accommodation arranged for me and regarding which, he was good enough to take action. We were informed the next day, that rooms in Kotah House had been secured and all three of us went to inspect the same. We were, however, disappointed, as rooms in the hutment and not in the main building had been arranged. I objected to staying in the hutment and told the Chairman that I took this as an insult. I then requested him to arrange for rooms for me in the Imperial Hotel, to which I could legitimately lay claim, as apart from other considerations, I had lived at the Maidens Hotel on my own, only a few years ago, after having failed to get rooms in the Imperial. The Chairman said that nothing

could be done that day, as it was about 1. 45 PM. and as it was a Saturday. I told him that the matter was a very urgent one, as I was inconveniencing both my generous friend as well as myself and as Government had maintained telephones in the residences of officers, it is expected that urgent work should be managed therefrom beyond office hours.

When we met on the morning of the 16th instant, I learnt from the Chairman that nothing had been done. I told him that this was the fourth day that we were experiencing inconvenience and so, more interest and quick action should be taken in this matter. After that, I met Shri S. K. Roy, stated above, and explained the whole situation to him. He was pleased to reserve rooms provisionally for me in the Imperial Hotel and said he would confirm the same before 1 PM. and inform me accordingly. On my way back to my friend's room, I dropped in at the Imperial Hotel where I received confirmation of the above fact. As there was no news from Shri Roy, I phoned him at about 2-45 PM. He met me soon after and told me that he would meet me definitely before 4 PM. and inform me that he had fixed up rooms for me. I told him distinctly that if he failed to do so by that time, I would be compelled to leave Delhi as I could no longer inconvenience my friend as well

as myself and as there is a limit to our endurance. He did not turn up as promised nor, was there any news from him. When the driver of the External Affairs staff car came to enquire from me at what time he would have to come the next day for taking me to the Imperial Hotel, I enquired of him whether he had any message, written or verbal, from the External Affairs Department or from Shri S. K. Roy. He replied in the negative.

Under such circumstances and with such indifference and callousness on the part of officers concerned and without any assurance that accommodation would be arranged for me in the near future, as the Chairman had told me that I could no longer sit with them and as he had not told me that he had arranged any place, where I could sit separately for writing my dissentient report, I was left with no other alternative but to leave Delhi for Calcutta.

### OBSTRUCTION & PRESSURE

On reaching the latter place on the morning of the 18th instant, I sent a telegram to the Chairman, which reads as follows :— “Unavoidable circumstances compelled immediate departure from Delhi please send immediately remaining portion

draft report, five interrogations requisitioned by me and all connected papers." On the 21st idem, I received his telegraphic reply, viz., "Your telegram eighteenth stop surprised you left Delhi without informing me stop submission on report to Government overdue stop please intimate immediately when you will return Delhi to enable finalise report and submit to Government." I immediately sent my reply, viz., "Your telegram informed you both fourteenth my disagreement with your finding Netaji died plane crash whereupon you both decided submitting joint report and undertook sending me remaining portion your draft report after perusing which I should start writing dissentient report stop reiterate legitimate demands conveyed my telegram eighteenth please note non-compliance whereof holds you not me responsible for delay submission my report to you." There was no news from the Chairman for the next seven or eight days. In the meantime and since the date of my arrival in Calcutta, I had started writing my report from the scanty materials with me, viz., copies of depositions of all the witnesses, excluding two, and tracings of some sketches filed by some of the witnesses. On 29-7-56 at 7-5 P. M., I received the following telegram from the Chairman :—"Your telegram of twentyfourth stop as decided all reports were to be

written and finalised in Delhi stop you were not  
authorised to go anywhere else for writing any  
report stop no question of sending papers to you  
arise unless you return Delhi stop as you are aware  
Committees life extends to thirtyfirst July and  
report or reports must be submitted to Government  
by then stop unless you send whatever report you  
wish to reach me by thirteen July will assume you  
have no submission to make.

I may state here that twentyfourth is a mistake for twentyfirst. I was astonished to peruse the contents of this telegram and with the tone in which it was written. I at once suspected that some inspiration from higher circles was behind it. The demand made in it was doubly impossible, firstly, to complete a report without being in possession of relevant papers and, secondly, to send a report so as to reach him within a few hours. Anyway, I continued writing my report, inspite of such handicaps. The progress was naturally slow, though the effort was more taxing. I was at a loss to make out the reason for such sort of behaviour on the part of the Chairman of a Committee to one of its members and to deprive him of papers and facilities, which he is legitimately entitled to. The only explanation I could think of was, that, as I had disagreed with them and had prevented them from submitting a

unanimous report, such obstructions were purposely put in my way and such impossible demands made, so that I would be unable to submit a dissenting report and they would then state before the people that I neglected in submitting my report and that their report was the only report of the Committee. I leave it to my countrymen, for whose knowledge and consideration, this enquiry was held, to judge this matter.

On 9-8-56, a sensational piece of news (App. D) appeared in the papers with big and bold headlines, viz., NETAJI DIED IN A FORMOSA HOSPITAL DURING LAST WAR—ENQUIRY FINDINGS : REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TOMORROW." As this contained a few incorrect and distorted news and as there were some allegations against me and as the Chairman's name was mentioned therein, I wrote a reply, (App. E) to the Chairman regarding that newspaper report and forwarded copies of the same to the Prime Minister of India and to the Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. The Prime Minister was pleased to send me a reply on 13-8-56, (App. F), which I received on the following day. I sent my reply, (App. G) to him on the 15th August, 1956 and on which date in the morning, the Chief Minister of West Bengal was pleased to phone

me and to request me to meet him in his office at 4 P. M. the same day, which I did. He started by coaxing me in several ways to make me agree with the findings of my colleagues and to sign their report, so as to make it a unanimous one. I regretted my inability to do so and gave him a few reasons for the same. Having failed in his intention, he then enquired of me as to why I was not submitting my report. I explained to him that it was not possible for me to do so, as the Chairman was not sending me the papers necessary for writing the report and to which I was legitimately entitled and which they promised to send me. He then asked me that if he helped me in getting those papers, how many days it would take me to complete my report. I told him that I had already written some portion and that I expected to do so within another ten days from the date of receipt of those papers. He appeared to be ~~gather~~ satisfied with this reply of mine and was pleased to dictate a reply to the Prime Minister's letter, he had received in this connection, and in which, he requested the latter to arrange to send me those papers soon, so that I would be in a position to submit my report by 30-8-56. In the meantime, our Chief Minister and also another Minister took the trouble of influencing and persuading me to agree to sign the report of my colleagues through a few of my nearest relations.

I cannot but repeat that for want of the requisite papers, it has been exceedingly difficult for me to make headway with my report and its completion will naturally take much more time than what it would ordinarily have taken. I am still at a loss to make out what could really be the cause for such attitude on the part of the Chairman and how could the Government face the public with a report signed by only two members of the Committee, when there was a third member on it, and on a matter, which would be considered to have more than an All-India interest, and in which there exists great inquisitiveness.

As certain reports were published in the papers relating to this enquiry and some conflicting reports regarding me, I considered it necessary to send a statement (App. H) to the Press on 17th July, 1956.

#### NETAJI'S EARLIER ACTIVITIES.

Before I take up for consideration the evidence on record, I consider it necessary to give an introduction to my countrymen of the hero of this drama, to facilitate a better and easier understanding of his outlook, ideas, capabilities and work.

His religious tendency and service to the poor and down-trodden were apparent, when he was

about twelve years of age. They had a small Ashram for this purpose and held schools for "harijan" boys. They helped the poor and needy and nursed and gave medical aid to the sick and diseased. He



SUBHAS —as a school-boy

had the opportunity of living in the same house at Puri, Orissa, with Swami Brahmananda, President, Ramkrishna Mission and his brother Swamijis on a few occasions and in some respects Swami Vivekananda was his ideal. He started Durgah Pujah in a mess, in which some of his schoolmates

lived at Cuttack, Orissa, and he was instrumental in introducing the same in almost all the jails in India and Burma, where he was incarcerated, at times against the vehement opposition of the British administrators. When cholera was raging fiercely in a remote part of the district of Cuttack, he took training in its treatment under Dr. Debendra Nath Mukherji, who was similarly inclined. As his parents were away from Cuttack and as his guardian did not permit him to go to the cholera-affected area, he was not found in the house the next morning. As both he and his ashramites were of a secretive nature, two strong young men were despatched to bring him back forcibly and who, after wandering about a lot, managed to trace him in an out-of-the-place cholera-infected village, but they were unable to bring him back. He returned later on of his own accord, after he had finished his work there.

During the latter part of 1922, he went to the flood-stricken areas of North Bengal and did relief work there under the guidance of the renowned Professor and Philanthropist, Dr. P. C. Ray. When he was a student of the Presidency College, Calcutta, he left his Calcutta residence, without informing anybody, not even his mother and there was no news from him for about a month. He

returned home suddenly in a bad state of health and it transpired that he was in search of a *Guru*, (religious preceptor) and had trekked widely and in some portions of the Himalayan regions. Whatever he did was without any fuss or publicity and some of his activities were of a secretive nature.

As he grew up, politics, mainly, liberation of India from British yoke, was added to his existing mental outlook and this was practically the only goal of his life thereafter. To this end, he resigned from the Indian Civil Service and on his return to India, his first duty was to meet Shri M. K. Gandhi and to place himself under his command. On reaching Calcutta, he became the right-hand man of Shri C. R. Das, who had sacrificed his extensive lucrative practice as a Barrister-at-Law in the High Court and had started working for the independence of India. During the course of such activities, Netaji suffered humiliation at the hands of the British rulers and their stooges and was imprisoned several times for prolonged periods, generally under Regulation III of 1818. Though it was said, that he had connection with revolutionary activities, he was not hauled up under any such specific charge, probably due to his intense secretive nature of work. For gaining experience in this line, he underwent military training in the Calcutta University Corps and carrying

this into practice, he gave similar training to the Indian National Congress volunteers. It was unique in the annals of the Congress, when in 1928, he arranged a mile long procession for the President, Pandit Motilal Nehru, on his arrival in Calcutta and led his volunteers on horseback, as General Officer Commanding, in military formation through the streets of Calcutta.

He was intensely patriotic and could never brook any dishonour to his country or to his countrymen. In this connection, he was said to have been implicated in an affair against a British Professor, for which he was rusticated by the University. Two other outstanding achievements of his, among others, were the complete boycott of the Prince of Wales' visit to Calcutta and in getting rid of the Britishers from the administration and from the contracts in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and in running the same on purely nationalistic lines.

It is also well known how in January, 1941, he gave the slip to the British rulers, whose about 250 Police staff kept a day and night watch over him, and, after travelling through the whole of northern India, entered Afghanistan, with Germany as his destination. This was planned and executed in an exceedingly secret manner and his only confidants

were, probably, only one of his brothers, three nephews and a niece, who were under strict oaths of secrecy to him. His aged mother, who was occupying an adjoining room, and all others, including members of his family and his political associates, had no knowledge of this. As pre-arranged, the public as well as the other members of his family, came to know that he had left home, only when his confidants broke the news after about ten days of his actual departure and after he was reported to have crossed the Indian frontier and had entered Afghanistan safely.

R His secret and hazardous mission and dare-devil enterprise in coming all the way to the Far East from Germany in 1943 to hasten his work for the independence of India, first in a German and subsequently in a Japanese submarine, risking the Allied naval blockade and mines, is too well known, as also the fact that during his military operations against them in Burma, he was quite oblivious to aerial bombing by them and took shelter on rare occasions and only, when compelled to do so by his followers and that, after he had seen that all others had been safely lodged.

He was an arch secret service man, with a dogged determination in carrying out his plans, always unmindful of the difficulties and consequences that

they would entail. In such matters, he confided in the minimum few, devised his plans and movements secretly and in the furtherance of or in the execution of the same, there was nothing in the world, including his own self, that he could not risk or sacrifice.

All these characteristics of his were revealed to the world in greater prominence in his activities in the Far East during the years 1943 to 1945 and for which, the people there of all nationalities had the highest admiration and regard for him. For this, credit is due to his countrymen there for their intense and all-out sacrifice, to the Japanese Government and that great nation for their unstinted help to and co-operation with him in his struggle for the liberation of India from foreign yoke and to the Heads of all the States there and their citizens for the facilities and help rendered by them. It is my humble opinion, that it is mainly due to them that his achievement there could be so brilliant.

This is the person, who inspired his countrymen, living in foreign lands in East Asia, into volunteering their lives for fighting with arms against the British rulers for the independence of their country, who, with such support and sacrifice, inaugurated the Provisional Government of Azad Hind with all the usual requisities and paraphernalia of

a Government, that was recognised by no less than nine free nations of the world, who organised the Azad Hind Fauj (Indian National Army), manned, trained and officered by his countrymen and who led that army as a separate entity against the British rulers with the great and mighty Japanese Army by his side. Though physically unsuccessful in the end against them, final victory was his, as his demand for the independence of India by force against force, permeated the ranks of the British Indian Army, Navy and Air Force Services and which expedited the departure of the British rulers from India.

#### COLLEAGUES ACCEPT NETAJI'S PLAN PARTLY.

Undaunted by superior enemy forces, he was determined to carry on his struggle for the liberation of India and not depressed by failure in his pilgrimage to Delhi, via. Imphal and Kohima, he closed that chapter there, and secretly planned his next move, viz. that the "Next road to Delhi would be via. Moscow."

In furtherance of this new plan, he was fortunate enough in securing the whole hearted support of the Japanese Government, who inspite of utter depression and confusion in their ranks, due to their

surrender to the Anglo-Americans, were magnanimous enough in taking him away from the clutches of their common enemy.

Regarding this new plan, some details of which I have given earlier, the Japanese Government were giving protection to their friend and ally and were removing him to a safe zone, as the Anglo-Americans were naturally expected to wreak their vengeance on him. While removing him in a brand-new bomber plane from his centre of activities, with only one of his trusted followers, viz., Col. Habibur Rahman, and whom probably they were reluctant to allow and who, therefore, was probably allowed to travel only up to a portion of the journey his plane is alleged to have met with an accident, resulting in his death.

I have stated above, that not only in my opinion, but also in that of my colleagues, this plan, agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji, was prearranged and the last and the most significant portion of it was, that after Netaji had found himself in a safe place, the Japanese Government would announce that he had died and that is actually what they subsequently did. This was just in keeping with what he had previously planned in Calcutta in January, 1941, and that is what his collaborating nephews actually did, viz., that they announced,

after reports had been received that he had safely crossed the Indian frontier and had entered Afghanistan, that Netaji had left the house and which consequently was about ten days after his actual departure from Calcutta. I fully realise that this, however, does not take away the possibility of a plane crash, as after all an accident is an accident and is in most cases beyond human control.

Therefore, up to the time of Netaji's arrival at Saigon and his subsequent boarding the plane there for an "unknown destination," which has been stated by many eminent persons, there has been more or less unanimity of opinion among all the three members of the Committee. Events immediately following this, are of vital importance and the evidence on record has, therefore, got to be considered very carefully and the conclusions should be arrived at after mature deliberation and irrespective of any consideration whatsoever, especially when these conclusions are not only eagerly awaited by our countrymen, but are of exceptional interest to millions of persons of different nationalities throughout the world.

It may be considered by the most critical and sceptic reader that the foregoing pages may have been written with some bias or prejudice on my part

and which, unfortunately for me, may have suggested itself to him from the fact that I happen to be a very close relation of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, but I assure him with all sincerity, that it is not so. On the other hand, I take this as an opportunity to place before him for his most careful consideration that the facts, circumstances and manipulations, some of which have lately gained so much in volume, as to have overflowed the normal bounds and found expression in newspaper reports, correspondence and interviews with some of the highest officials of the land, would go to show that the findings arrived at by my learned colleagues were preconceived and prearranged and for being in accordance with the confirmed opinion of the Prime Minister and of his Government. Instead of prejudicing him by telling him what the correct finding of the evidence on record should be, I would in all earnestness, request him, my Government and my countrymen to peruse, not only the conflicting reports submitted by the members of the Committee, but also the evidence on which, reports submitted by the Committee have been based and thereby form their respective individual opinion regarding the subject-matter of this enquiry.

## TERMS OF REFERENCE.

Now to come to the subject-matter of this enquiry, it would be necessary, in the first instance, to consider the TERMS of REFERENCE, which are as follows :—

R “To enquire into and to report to the Government of India on the circumstances concerning the departure of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose from Bangkok about the 16th August, 1945, his alleged death as result of an aircraft accident and subsequent developments connected therewith.”

The points necessary to be considered may, therefore, be classified as follows :—

I. CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING THE DEPARTURE, which may be subdivided into,

(a) CIRCUMSTANCES and (b) DEPARTURE.

II. ALLEGED DEATH AS A RESULT OF AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT.

In this connection, it may be said that the wording of the “Terms of Reference” is such as to give the impression that the aircraft accident has been accepted as a settled fact. In my humble opinion, it should not be so, as the truth or otherwise of this point is an important subject-matter for decision in this enquiry. The points that may arise subsequent to this alleged accident, hinge to a great extent on

the finding on this point. So, before making a decision on this crucial point, it would be indispensably necessary to consider carefully, the whole of the evidence on all the other connected points. If after such careful consideration, the finding be that the aircraft accident did not take place, then only would that finding be a very definite, conclusive and irrevocable one. With such a finding the remaining subject-matter of this enquiry would automatically simplify be itself considerably. Therefore, it has got to be decided first, (a) as to whether the aircraft accident took place or not, and then, (b) if it be held, that such accident did not take place, whether the remaining evidence on record would justify and confirm that finding, and (c) that if it be held, on the contrary, that such accident did take place, then it has got to be decided further, whether, (d) death took place, or, (e) death did not take place.

### III. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS CONNECTED THEREWITH.

The points to be considered here, depend, mainly, on the findings on points II(a), (b), (c), (d) & (e) above.

If according to point II(b), the definite finding be that the aircraft accident did not take place, then

it would automatically follow that Netaji did not die. The subsequent developments arising therefrom would therefore, be as to where Netaji went after leaving Saigon. As no steps were taken for making enquiries on these lines, it would suffice to say here that, as it has been held that the aircraft accident did not take place, so Netaji did not die and there is no knowledge of his subsequent whereabouts.

If, however, according to II(c), it be held that aircraft accident took place, then such accident may or may not have caused death to Netaji, and so the next finding would be in accordance with either II(d) or II(e). If the finding be in accordance with II(e), viz., that Netaji did not die, then the subsequent developments arising therefrom, would more or less, be similar to those of II(b) stated above.

If, however, the finding be in accordance with II(d), viz., that Netaji died as a result of that aircraft accident, then the subsequent developments would not only be as to how his body was disposed of, but it would also be very important and necessary to account for the baggage, including treasure, he was carrying, the dress he was wearing, the articles he was wearing or carrying on his person, e. g., his wrist watch, his spectacles, his rings,

fountain pen, cigarette case, cigarette lighter, religious books, Gita & Chandi, purse, magnifying glass, insignia as Supreme Commander, I. N. A. & I. I. L. badges, etc. and, as stated by Shri Das, witness No. 2, his revolver also.

As regards treasure, it is my humble opinion, that so much of the evidence on record regarding it, as is necessary for the correct decision of the subject-matter of this enquiry, as embodied in the TERMS of REFERENCE and its clarification noted above, may only be taken into consideration for the purposes of this enquiry and as, by itself, it is a very important and complicated matter, it should, if considered necessary, form the subject matter of a separate enquiry, which should go into full details, commencing from the various sources from and the different descriptions in which they were obtained and ending with the small fraction of the same now in deposit in the National Museum, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi and after considering carefully all the intermediate stages.

#### I. (a) CIRCUMSTANCES.

It has been discussed, considered and held under the heading, "NETAJI'S PLAN," recorded above, that due to the surrender of the Japanese nation and consequently that of the Indian National Army,

formed and organised by Netaji in the Far East, that a plan was agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji, that the Japanese would move Netaji to a safe zone, viz., Manchuria, where the Anglo-Americans would no longer be able to arrest him, with the ultimate object of entering Russian territory, where he would continue his struggle for the liberation of India and in pursuance of that plan, Netaji left Bangkok on the morning of 17-8-45 and Saigon the same afternoon with Manchuria, as his destination under the auspices of the Japanese. With regard to this plan and up to Netaji's departure by a Japanese plane from Saigon on 17-8-45, I believe, there has been more or less unanimity of opinion among all the three members of the Committee. It is, unfortunately, not possible for me to make a definite statement on this matter, as inspite of repeated requests, I was not furnished with the complete draft report of my colleagues and all other important and relevant papers, exhibits, photographs etc., that are on the record and which I am legitimately entitled to be in possession of, for purposes of writing this dissentient report.

All of Netaji's associates in the Far East, who have been examined before us, have stated about Netaji's plan of going to Manchuria, when he parted company from them in a plane from Saigon on

17-8-45 for an "unknown destination." Though Col. Habibur Rahman had admittedly more secret consultations with Netaji than the rest of his Indian brethren there and though he was the only Indian to proceed with him beyond Saigon, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Col. Rahman definitely knew that Netaji's destination was Dairen in Manchuria and he also knew more of Netaji's secrets than any of the others. The fact that Col. Rahman states that Netaji's destination was Tokyo with intention to return to Singapore soon and that he does not state Dairen or Manchuria or Russia, is enough to suggest, as stated by Shri Dwijendranath Bose and Shri Arabindu Bose, witnesses Nos. 22 & 24 respectively, that he did so intentionally, on the lines he was tutored by Netaji, and not to mention the names of these places, but Tokyo instead, so as to give a wrong scent about Netaji's whereabouts and also to save the Japanese Government from embarrassment and also to narrate the story of the plane crash etc., as was announced by the Japanese in consultation with Netaji and which he did to the best of his abilities. Both of them state that Col. Rahman must have been under strict oath of secrecy to Netaji not to divulge his plans or secrets. They are those nephews of Netaji and two out of his only five confidants, who helped him to get out of Calcutta

secretly in January, 1941 and who were also instructed by him to make such statements, which he had tutored them to say and who were also under similar oaths of secrecy to him, regarding his escape from Calcutta.

Netaji started contacting the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo as early as 1944, because he was under the impression at that time that the Japanese would lose the war and he along with them and because he considered Russia to be a suitable country for carrying on his future struggle for the independence of India. With the gradual lapse of time, this took more definite shape. Shri A. M. Sahay, witness No. 30, and some others have stated that Netaji made attempts at contacting the Chinese Communists through Mr. Ho Chi Minh's party and also the Russians through Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister of Japan and others. Shri Debnath Das, witness No. 2, also stated that one of Netaji's plans was to go to Yenan, the headquarters of Mr. Mao Tse Tung and that Netaji had asked Shri Iyer, witness No. 6, his Minister for Information & Broadcasting, in May, 1945 to write to Mr. Shigemitsu and enquire whether the Japanese Government would contact the Russians on his behalf and provide other facilities to him and to a few members of his staff for going to Russia. A reply to this was received from the

Japanese Government in June, 1945. Shri Das further stated that on more than one occasion, Netaji requested General Isoda, witness No. 35, to continue letting him know the position of the Japanese in Manchuria and North China. Witness No. 5, Col. Pritam Singh, deposed that Netaji had told him that he (Netaji) had contacted the Russians through Mr. Shigemitsu and he wished that he and some of his party should move to Russian territory and operate from there and he also said that the ideology of the Russians was so different from that of the Anglo-Americans, that sooner or later and in about ten years' time, they would come to a clash, when it would be an opportune moment for them to go into action again for the independence of India.

All these would go a long way to show and prove that Netaji's plan of going to Russia via Manchuria, after his failure in his armed struggle against the Anglo-Americans in South East Asia, was not a cursory suggestion, but was a carefully-thought-of well-matured plan, which, as a matter of fact, was the only alternative left to him, as he did not want to surrender himself to the Anglo-Americans and thereby be instrumental in not only finishing himself, but also bringing to an end, his only cherished goal in life, viz., the independence of his

mother country. He was naturally very sincere in having his plan executed. It is also proved that though the Japanese Government, were in utter distress and confusion, due to their surrender to the Anglo-Americans, they were magnanimous enough • "in respecting Mr. Chandra Bose's last wishes" and were also, with all sincerity, giving effect to the same plan, by taking him in a plane to Manchuria and had deputed one of their topmost and renowned generals, who knew that territory well and who, according to Mr. T. Negishi, witness No. 20, was considered to be a key man for negotiations with Russia, with instructions to remain with him there and to help him in crossing over into the adjoining Russian territory. The Japanese Government were keen for the quick execution of their plan and their instructions were, that the plane should make a *detour* to Dairen in Manchuria, and after dropping only Netaji and General Shidei there, the plane would then come back to Japan and alight the remaining passengers there. The keenness and sincerity on the part of both the Japanese as well as Netaji for the proper and prompt execution of the plan, naturally gives additional importance to it and as the main idea underlying it, was to remove Netaji to a safe place, so that the Anglo-Americans would not be in a position to get hold of him, it would be a natural

sequence for the Japanese to announce that Netaji had died, after they were sure that Netaji was safely lodged in a place that was not under the control of the Anglo-Americans. It will be of interest to mention here, that, according to the statements of Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose and Shri Arabindu Bose, witnesses Nos. 22 and 24 respectively, a similar announcement was made by them, when Netaji secretly left Calcutta in January, 1941 and it was made ten days after his actual departure from Calcutta and after information had been received that he had crossed the Indian frontier and was safe in Afghanistan and beyond the clutches of the British rulers of India.

From the evidence on record on this point and which is practically free from discrepancies, though the statements have been made by persons of different nationalities, it can, therefore, definitely be said that the aforesaid plan has been proved very convincingly and without the shadow of a doubt.

It has been stated earlier that both the British as well as the Americans had made thorough and on-the-spot enquiries under different auspices soon after the surrender of the Japanese and had also tried to arrest Netaji under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance

and also as he was considered to be an "International War Criminal" and because they doubted the truth of the announcement made by the Japanese that Netaji had died in a plane crash accident and as they considered it to be a hoax and believed that he was alive and was hiding somewhere. Being the victorious party, they had all the facilities and opportunities of making thorough enquiries in all the areas, where they thought Netaji could possibly have been living or hiding.

In one of their reports, it transpires that Netaji wanted to shift a nucleus of his Government to Yunan Province in China and through the Communists there, to get into touch with Soviet Russia. Another report states that in July, 1945, Netaji sought permission to enter U. S. S. R. via Manchuria, with a few selected members of his movement, but the same source contends that there was no need for the Japanese to ask the Russians for Netaji's entry, because he wanted to go to Manchuria, from where he thought he would be able to get into touch with the Russian forces. The same report also states that it is beyond doubt that Netaji had plans to go underground together with a number of his selected friends. This report contains the final conclusion arrived at as a result of the enquiry, and it is to the effect that in the

absence of substantial proof, it is still difficult to state conclusively the fate of Bose. This finding, to say the least, carries great weight and, having been contrary to the expectations of the Anglo-Americans, maximum efforts must have been made by them to find out Netaji's whereabouts and also to arrest him for purposes of taking action against him, as he was not only an arch enemy of theirs, because, being a British Indian subject, he waged war against his King and Emperor, but was also a top-ranking "International War Criminal", against which persons, after the last war, the maximum penalty was generally inflicted. It must have been with great reluctance and sorrow that the British and American enquiring officers were compelled to come to the finding that it was difficult to state conclusively the fate of Netaji Bose, which finding, however, should be considered to carry great weight. As stated by me above, our enquiry should be considered to be a very perfunctory one, when compared with the numerous all-round careful enquiries made by them and whereas, the intention of my colleagues appears to have been to come to the conclusion "anyhow" that Netaji had died and the places in the Far East visited by the Committee were the bare minimum and had been arranged accordingly, the main intention of the Britishers and the Americans

must have been to find him out by all possible means and after getting hold of him, to wreak their vengeance on him.

### I (b) DEPARTURE.

In the TERMS OF REFERENCE, the departure from Bangkok has been stated to be about 16. 8. 45. To be definite, it should be on the following day, viz., 17. 8. 45 and which has been stated without any ambiguity by a large number of witnesses, viz., Shri Debnath Das, Capt. Gulzara Singh, Col. Habibur Rahman, Col. Pritam Singh, Shri S. A. Iyer, Mr. M. Kunizuka, Mr. T. Negishi, Mr. T. Hachiya, General S. Isoda and others.

Netaji arrived at Bangkok on 16. 8. 45 from Singapore in a bomber plane, specially chartered for him, with Mr. Negishi, Col. Rahman, Shri Iyer and Col. Pritam Singh and, after having had repeated consultations with his associates and some of the highranking Japanese Officers and after working the whole of the night, left Bangkok the next morning, viz., 17. 8. 45 for Saigon with another three of his followers, viz., Shri Debnath Das, Col. Gulzara Singh and Major Abid Hasan, all six of whom, he intended taking with him to Russia via Manchuria for continuing his activities for the liberation of India.

## AT SAIGON

The party reached Saigon in the forenoon and here difficulty was experienced by Netaji in securing accommodation for all of his six associates for their forward flight to Manchuria, where the Japanese had agreed to take him.

The conduct of the Japanese authorities, who had decided to "respect Netaji's last wishes" in offering only one seat for Netaji alone, though his request for only six more for his trusted and loyal followers was decidedly a very meagre one, has been construed by some of the witnesses to have some serious significance and weight. It is well known and it is on record that the Japanese nation had not only a very high regard and admiration for Netaji, but their Government had recognised the Government he had formed there and had all along given him due honour and respect as the Head of a State, had presented him with an aeroplane, in which he always went about, flying the flag and insignia of his State, had handed over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to his Government, had supplied him with war materials and all other equipment to the best of their resources and had rendered him help and facilities in all possible ways. It is on record that though the Japanese had surren-

dered, they were ordered by their victors to ground their planes at about the end of that month or the early part of the next month, viz., September and that their planes were flying in the meantime. On 20-8-45, four of Netaji's associates, whom he was compelled for want of accommodation with him, to leave behind at Saigon, were flown to Hanoi and the fifth one, Shri Iyer, was flown to Tokyo along with other Japanese. A few days later, Dr. Ba Maw, the Prime Minister of Burma and a few others were also flown to Tokyo.

Shri Iyer has deposed that when he was informed by Staff Officer, Col. Tada, that Netaji's plane had crashed at Taihoku and that Netaji had died there, he told the Colonel bluntly that neither the Indians in East Asia nor those in India would be prepared to believe that story, unless positive proof was forthcoming and he, therefore, pressed the Colonel to see that the plane, in which he was offered a seat for going to Tokyo, took him to Taihoku, so that he could get a chance of seeing Netaji's body with his own eyes and be of some service to Col. Rahman in his precarious and helpless condition there. Though Col. Tada promised him that he would be taken to Taihoku, the plane did not land there, but did so at a nearby aerodrome at Taichu, for reasons best known to

them. It has been proved by quite a number of witnesses that the usual route for planes from Saigon to Tokyo is via Taihoku and not Taichu. An additional suspicion arises here, because the usual route was not followed in this case and no explanation was given as to why it was not followed.

Col. Pritam Singh, witness No. 5, has clarified this well-founded suspicion into a believable story, when he deposed that, "At the Saigon aerodrome, I learnt that the Japanese were of the opinion that it would be difficult to conceal such a big party. The inference I drew from this was that the Japanese wished to take Netaji alone to some 'unknown destination.' But Netaji was of opinion that it was not for the purpose of going into hiding that he was going to some 'unknown destination.' His primary object in doing so was to continue the struggle for India's freedom, for which it was essential that he should be accompanied by a number of his officers. Netaji discussed all these points with the two Japanese Officers, General Isoda and Mr. Hachiya, who had accompanied us from Bangkok. After consultations with Netaji at the aerodrome, the two Japanese officers left by plane for the Headquarters of Field Marshal Count Terauchi at Dalat"—"to have consultations with the Field Marshal, who was the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Forces

✓ in South-East Asia." Later on, he states, "On arrival at Netaji's bungalow, I saw General Isoda and Mr. Hachiya seated in one corner." — "Netaji told us that the Japanese had informed him that they would like to take him away alone." As these statements have not been challenged in any way, they must be accepted as correct and as such, it explains, why, instead of a separate plane for Netaji and his six followers, which would ordinarily have been expected from the Japanese, who expressed, as an only solace "to respect Netaji's last wishes," five of them were not accommodated in the plane, in which Netaji and Col. Rahman were taken.

It is, therefore, evident that though Netaji explained to those two high-ranking Japanese officers, his reasons for taking six of his associates with him to Manchuria, the Japanese authorities there, on the other hand, whose intention was to remove Netaji secretly, would, from their own standpoint, carry out the plan as secretly as possible and thereby not expose themselves unnecessarily to the wrath of the victorious Anglo-Americans. This would, therefore, readily explain why only one seat was offered by the Japanese and that out of regard for Netaji, only one more seat was subsequently made available on his further request and that probably with great reluctance. Netaji asked two

more of his associates to carry their kit with them, so that they could also accompany him, in case he could persuade the Japanese at the aerodrome to provide him with two more seats. In view of the intention of the Japanese and the risk they were taking for removing Netaji to a safe zone, it would be agreed that they could not possibly accede to Netaji's further request for more seats.

As the consultations both at Saigon as well as at Dalat and as arrangements for seats for Netaji and his party, as stated above, naturally took some time, the plane could not take off from Saigon till late in the afternoon for the onward flight. After Netaji's treasure boxes had been deposited inside the plane, and which will be considered later, he took leave of his associates and his Japanese friends present there, and after embracing them, emplaned for "an unknown destination", so kindly arranged by the magnanimous Japanese Government.

As stated earlier under the heading, "THIS PLAN WHY PROVED?", the total number of passengers in the plane, including the crew, as stated by some of the passengers alleged to have been in the plane, would be thirteen. Col. Rahman has shown twelve in the sketch drawn by him, a fair copy of which, reproduced by a draughtsman, is attached herewith, (App. I). Col. Nonogaki has

stated it to be thirteen and has shown the same number in the sketch A drawn by him, a copy of which is attached, (App. J). Major Kono has given the number as fourteen, which is also shown in the sketch A, drawn by him, copy attached, (App. K) Capt. Arai has shown thirteen in his sketch, copy of which is attached, (App. L) and according to the statement of Major Takahashi, the number would be between twelve and fourteen. Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who is reported to have sent a written statement from Formosa, has made no mention of the number of inmates in that plane. The sketch, copy attached, (App. M), accompanying the report of the Japanese Government, shows the number to be twelve. Taking the view of the majority, the correct number could be accepted as thirteen.

As stated by these witnesses, the plane took off from Saigon aerodrome between 1.30 p.m. and 5-20 p.m. with this complement of passengers, including the crew and Netaji's five trusted followers, who could not accompany him, returned home with a heavy heart.

Those outside the plane had no idea as to where the inmates inside the plane were seated.

#### AT TOURANE.

According to the statements of the witnesses, who travelled in that plane, it landed at Tourane between

5 and 7 p. m. and the take off from Saigon and the landing at Tourane were quite normal and the flight enroute was quite smooth.

Col. Rahman stated that after reaching the aerodrome at Tourane, Netaji's and his baggage were placed in a car and in the company of some Japanese Officers, they came to a hotel, where they spent the night and that about sunrise of the next day, they were taken in a Japanese car to the aerodrome, where he found all the passengers waiting for them there. The statements made by Capt. Arai are that all the persons on board the plane put up in the largest hotel there and all of them had dinner together and at the dinner table, Netaji, General Shidei and he took part in a conversation regarding the future of Asia and Europe and that the next day, they proceeded to the plane at about break of dawn. Major Takahashi deposed that though all of them stayed for the night in the hotel, he did not see Netaji there and had dinner separately and that they left the hotel at about 5-30 A. M. the next day for the aerodrome. Col. Nonogaki stated that all of them stayed in the biggest hotel there and had dinner together and that Netaji and General Shidei talked to each other in German, which, however, does not tally with the statement of Capt. Arai. They left early next morning for the Aerodrome and

having realised there that the plane was overloaded, they took down from the plane all the surplus things, viz., a machine gun, its ammunition and an anti-air craft gun, which were still fixed to the plane and they then took off from there, when the sun was rising. The Colonel has introduced a new story here, which has not been stated by the other witnesses. Major Kono has given given another different version, viz., that as their plane had to traverse the whole length of the runway, about 2,000 metres long at Saigon aerodrome, before it could take off, he formed the impression that the plane was overloaded and so he made up his mind to reduce the load on the plane when they reached the next halt and that after they landed at Tourane, Major Takizawa and he, accordingly, stayed behind at the aerodrome and in the same evening, they took down no less than twelve anti-air craft machine guns and all the ammunition and also some baggage, which they found on the bomb rack, and thereby reduced the load on the plane by about 600 kgs. They then attended to the maintenance of the aeroplane and after satisfying themselves that everything was correct, they went to the hotel, which they reached at about 8.30 P. M. Both of them had dinner separately from that of the first party. Next

morning, they went to the aerodrome before 5 AM. and after testing the engines, they took their seats in the plane, which took off at 5 AM. and as it was much lighter than what it was on the previous day, the take off was perfectly normal. Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who is reported to have sent a written statement from Formosa, narrates another new story, viz., that they reached Tourane Airfield at 5 or 6 P. M. and stayed overnight at the Supply Base Billet there and so could not possibly state anything about staying at the Hotel, which has, however, been stated by all the other witnesses. It is strange that these witnesses have given somewhat different versions, some of which cannot be reconciled in any way.

#### THE SEATING.

From the seats occupied by the passengers and the crew, and from the relative position of the petrol tank inside the plane, the general impression obtained from the evidence on record is that as Netaji was seated near this petrol tank and as petrol had, therefore, splashed on his dress, it caught fire easily. In the sketch drawn by Col. Rahman and which was reproduced clearly by a draughtsman of the Civil Aviation Department, a copy of which is attached herewith, (App I) and which has been

compared with the Colonel's drawing and certified to be correct by the Chairman on 14. 4. 56, it will be seen that Netaji's seat is shown at No. 6, whereas the petrol tank is shown much lower down. The Pilot is shown at No. 5 in front of Netaji, and to the Pilot's right, at No. 4, is shown General Shidei and behind Netaji, at No. 7 is his ( Col Rahman's ) seat and nobody is shown to the right of either Netaji or Col. Rahman. In Capt. Arai's sketch, ( App L ), General Shidei and Lt. Col. Sakai are shown to the right of Netaji and Col. Rahman respectively. In Col. Nonogaki's sketch, ( App. J ), Major Kono is shown in front of Netaji and in front of Major Kono is the Pilot, evidently, N. C. O. Ayoagi, because to the right of this Pilot is shown the other Pilot, Major Takizawa, whose name has been written there. To the right of Major Kono is shown General Shidei and to the right and a little below it, is shown the petrol tank. Col. Rahman ( Asst ) is shown along the centre line of the plane and not exactly behind Netaji. In Major Kono's sketch, ( App. K. ), the position of the two Pilots tallies with that shown in Col. Nonogaki's sketch, but behind the Pilot on the left, viz., N. C. O. Ayoagi, is the Engineer, behind whom, is shown Major Kono and behind whom and a little to the right is shown Col. Rahman, above whom is shown a petrol tank, which is also above

and behind Netaji. Another petrol tank is shown to the right and on the front side of Netaji. The position of Lt. Col. Sakai has been shown to be quite different from that shown in Capt. Arai's sketch, (App. L). The actual position shown in the respective sketches drawn by them vary and cannot be reconciled. There are also variations in their sketches regarding the seating arrangement of the other inmates of the plane.

In my humble opinion, there can be no explanation whatsoever for such marked variation in the statements of the different witnesses, each of whom has stated in his own way. This variation should not have arisen, especially, because all of them stated that the same seating arrangement was adhered to by all of them during all the different stages of the flight from Bangkok to Saigon, thence to Tourane and from there to Taihoku and lastly on the flight from Taihokn. The seating arrangement, therefore, given by each of them, should have tallied and should not have been so divergent. In view of all these discrepant and contradictory statements made by these witnesses and the difference in the seating arrangement shown in the sketches drawn by them, I am constrained to state that little reliance could be placed on such evidence. There is, however, only one statement common to

all of them and it is, that the seating arrangement was the same throughout the different stages of the flight and which, therefore, appears to me to have been a tutored one.

### TO TAIHOKU

Now to proceed onward with the journey, the plane, according to Col. Rahman, was ready to take off from Tourane Airport, when Netaji and he arrived there. The crew were already inside the plane. All the others entered the plane and the seating arrangement was the same as before. Netaji wore a bush-shirt, coat, khaki drill trousers, all cotton, a warm serge cap, I. N. A. and I. I. L. badges and shoes. Their luggage was placed in the rear part of the plane and below the turret and not near them, as stated and shown by Col. NONOGAKI in his sketch (App. J). He did not see anybody check-up the plane or take out the certificate for its air-worthiness. This has, however, been contradicted by Major Kono, who was an Air Force Officer and a Pilot and who stated that he along with Major Takizawa and an Engineer, who was also in that plane, tested and tried the engines and after certifying them to be alright, took out the certificate for its air-worthiness. Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto), witness No. 51, who was the Ground

Engineer attached to Taihoku Aerodrome, deposed that Major Takizawa, Pilot Aoki (Aoyagi) and he tested the engines and after all of them were satisfied that the engines were functioning properly, the plane was allowed to take off. He, however, does not mention the name of Major Kono in having taken part in this job. Col. Rahman proceeded with his story and said that the take-off was quite normal and there was no trouble with the engines during the flight to Taikoku, where they touched down in a normal manner at 2 p. m. They were asked to have a light lunch, during which period, the plane would be refuelled. The runway was in flat country with mountains at a distance of 8 to 10 miles off. As he felt cold, he changed into warm uniform, viz., bush-shirt, coat, (full sleeves), breeches and top long boots. Netaji declined to change his dress, but he handed over a warm pull-over to Netaji. They finished their light lunch and after a total stay of half an hour there, they emplaned. The seating order in the plane was the same as before and the plane took off just about 2-35 p. m.

Capt. Arai stated that after finishing an early breakfast in the hotel, they proceeded to Tourane Airport at break of dawn and the plane took off soon after. The seating arrangement was the same as before and as shown in his sketch, (AppL). The

take-off was smooth and the landing at Taihoku at about noon, and not at 2 p. m. as stated by Col. Rahman, was also normal. Here he heard Netaji telling Col. Rahman that his intention was to go to Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, which, however, is a new place not named by any other witness, and as it was more distant than Japan, more gasolene was taken in, with the result that the plane became overloaded. The plane took off after about an hour of its arrival there, *i. e.*, at about 1 p. m.

Major Takahashi's deposition is that they reached Tourane aerodrome from the hotel at about 7 a. m. and took off soon after, reaching Taihoku at about 11 a. m. As he was seated right back towards the tail, he could not see the seating arrangement of the others in front, but Lt. Col. T. Sakai was seated in the rear next to him, but which is absolutely different from Capt. Arai's sketch, (App.L), in which Lt. Col. Sakai is shown as seated in front. After finishing their lunch and taking rest in a tent, the plane took off between 12-30 and 1 p. m.

Col. Nonogaki has stated that the take off from Tourane, when the sun was rising, was quite normal and the seating was the same as before. As during the flight, they got information that enemy planes

were near Swatan in South China, their plane made a detour and flew further east. Though their next stop was Heito, they did not land there, but flew on, and as the weather was favourable, they covered more distance, landing quite normally at Taihoku a little before noon. Here they had their lunch and the plane was refuelled. As the plane was scheduled to carry Gen. Shidei to Manchuria, Netaji also agreed to go with him to Dairen in Manchuria. There was, therefore, no change in the scheduled flight of the plane. They took their seats in the same order as before and the plane started after about two hours' stay there.

Major Kono had deposed that after Tourane, the next stop was to be Heito, but when it was sighted at about 11 A. M., they received information over the Radio that Russian forces had occupied Port Arthur in Manchuria and so after consultation with Gen. Shidei, Col. Nonogaki and Major Takizawa, they decided that they should rush to Dairen as quickly as possible and reach it before the Russians occupied it and so, instead of landing at Heito, they should push on to Taihoku and after a brief halt there, should leave for Dairen. This quite a different story from that of Col. Nonogaki, who is alleged to have taken part in this decision. According to this witness, the weather was perfect, the flight was

smooth and the engines were running very well. They landed at Taihoku at about noon and after filling up the petrol tanks, they decided to leave at about 2 P.M., which, however, is not a short stay, though Col. Rahman stated that they stopped there only for half an hour. They had their lunch in a tent there, where Netaji put on a woollen sweater over his cotton uniform, which consisted of trousers and shoes and not top boots. As there were no chairs in the plane, all of them were seated on the floor. Before 2 P.M., Major Takizawa tested the engines from inside and he tested them from outside. As he noticed that the left engine was not functioning properly, he went inside the plane and after examining the engine from inside, found it to be working alright. An engineer, who was also in the plane and whose name he could not recollect, also tested the engine and certified to its air-worthiness. The plane took off exactly at 2 P.M. and there was no change in the seating order.

In the written statement, alleged to have been sent by Lt. Col. T. Sakai, it is recorded that they reached Taihoku at about noon and left at about 1 P.M., and there was no change in the seating arrangement.

Col. Nonogaki and Major Kono have narrated

two stories, different from each other, the former that enemy planes were near Swatan in South China and so they had to make a detour and fly eastward and the latter that, as the Russians had occupied Port Arthur, they should rush to Dairen before the Russians occupied it.

This concludes the evidence on this point of the six persons, who were alleged to have been in that plane.

Another person, who stated about the plane at Taihoku on or about 18.8.45, is Capt. M. Nakamura (Yamamoto), witness No. 51. He said he was at that time the Ground Engineer and the Airforce Officer in charge of the Maintenance Unit at Taihoku Aerodrome. He stated that a serious accident took place there on 17-8 or 18-8-45, in which Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, Gen. Shidei and others were involved. He then stated that he was 90% sure that it could not be on 18-8-45, as on that day, about thirty American planes arrived there from the Phillipines and many other Japanese planes came and left on that day and he attended to all of them. As this date, viz., 17-8-45, did not fit in with what the Chairman wanted, he started manipulations, which I have mentioned earlier in this report and eventually succeeded in getting from the witness that the American planes did not come on

18-8-45 and succeeded only partially, when the witness said that the air accident took place either on the 17th, 18th or the 19th. of August, 1945. Capt. Nakamura continued that when he reached the aerodrome from the city at 11-50 A. M., he found the plane standing in front of the building shown by him at position A of the sketch I, drawn by him, copy attached, (App. N). He then went to the tent shown at B in the same sketch. All the persons then got into the plane, when it was at position A, from where the plane taxied all the distance to position C on the runway. It would appear that the place marked A and the tent shown at B by this Captain as well as the sketch of the runway and its surroundings are absolutely different from the corresponding ones shown by Col. Nonogaki in his sketches, B. (App. O) and C (App. P). The arrowheads in the sketches of both these witnesses show from which place the plane was brought to the runway for the final take off from there and these are also shown as different. The Captain, who was the Ground Engineer attached to the aerodrome there, stated that the runway there was 890 metres long and as the tail of a heavy bomber normally gets lifted half way down it, the logical inference is that the runway is sufficiently long. Major Kono, however, who is also an

Airforce Officer as well as a Pilot, stated that though the runway there was 1600 metres long, it was considered to be short. As regard Netaji's dress, the Captain stated that he was wearing topboots and evidently breeches, which has been denied by all the other witnesses, who have distinctly stated trousers and shoes. He has added another new story, viz., that before the plane was allowed to take off, Major Takizawa and Pilot Aoyagi entered the plane and tested it and he stood in front of it. After the engines were started, he found the left engine to be defective and accordingly drew the Major's attention to it, who immediately replied that it was a brand new engine that had been replaced by them at Saigon. This shows that the plane was an old one and that its old engine had been replaced by a new engine. Col. Nonogaki has stated that though it was a 97 K. V. Heavy Bomber, it was being used as a transport plane, as it had become old, and that the newest types of planes were being used as bombers, to which, a direct lie has been given by Gen. Isoda, who has stated definitely that it was a brand-new plane. Capt. Nakamura continued that after Major Takizawa had adjusted the engine twice, both of them agreed that there was nothing wrong with it. The engines were then speeded up and the plane

was then allowed to run on the runway. The statements of Major Kono are absolutely different from those of Capt. Nakamura and it is rather strange that though each of them claims to have taken part in the testing of the engines, neither of them states that the other took part in it or admits the other's presence there. The other witnesses, some of whom are Airforce Officers, are absolutely silent on this point. The reasonable inference that would be drawn from such evidence is that the testing of the engines, as alleged, did not take place at all. It is strange that the only point common in the statements of Major Kono and Capt. Nakamura is the left engine and it is to all intents and purposes so, as that engine will be brought into prominence later on.

Another statement of Capt. Nakamura is that when he met Gen. Shidei in the tent, the General told him that he would fly to Tokyo immediately. This is not borne out by the evidence on record, as it has been definitely stated by all the witnesses that the General was going to Manchuria and not to Tokyo and that the scheduled route of the plane was first to Dairen in Manchuria, where the General would alight and then the plane would come to Tokyo.

Being the Head of the Kikari Kikan, the function of which organisation has been explained earlier, Gen. Isoda had to handle important and secret diplomatic and military matters between the Imperial Japanese and Netaji's Governments. He deposed that in May, 1945, he received a wireless message direct from the Imperial General Headquarters, Tokyo, that his Government had accepted Netaji's plan of contacting Russia, as the military situation was deteriorating rapidly and that he immediately communicated the same to Netaji. He stated further that when Netaji reached Bangkok from Singapore on 16-8-45, Netaji told him that he wanted to go to Russia, on which, he promised Netaji all the necessary help for that purpose. The General also confirmed that Lt. Col. Tada, Staff Officer of F. M. Count Terauchi's Headquarters, informed Netaji and also the others as soon as they landed at Saigon Airport that only one seat had been arranged for Netaji and who should, therefore, travel without any of his associates, though Netaji desired that all six of them should accompany him. The General also stated that Netaji had told him that he wanted to go to Russia via Dairen and to Dairen via Taihoku and that before emplaning, when Netaji bid him good-bye with a shake of hands, he wished Netaji a happy journey, safe

arrival at his destination and success in his mission for securing India's freedom. These words of the General are significant and holding the high position stated above, he was in a position to know precisely that the joint plan of his Government and of Netaji was that Netaji was to be taken to Manchuria, where with the help of Gen. Shidei, who was deputed to accompany him, he would enter Soviet Russia and that his Government was carrying out that plan by giving the necessary transport facilities to that great Indian leader, their ally, and as they had already surrendered, it would naturally be done as secretly as possible and with minimum risk of being exposed by their victors, the Anglo-Americans.

To supplement the evidence that has been adduced by Netaji's associates and those who were alleged to have been with him in that plane, regarding Netaji's stay at Saigon and at Tourane from local persons, it would appear that only one person at each of these two places could be secured and their depositions will now be considered.

Shri Ramneo Goswami, witness No. 29, said to be a watchman of the firm of Chotirmal, in one of whose houses, Netaji stayed during his visits to Saigon, has stated, that about a week after the surrender of the Japanese, Netaji came to that

house accompanied by two Japanese Officers and enquired about Chatterji, Sahay and Iyer, he told Netaji, that they had left only two days previous to that date. As a matter of fact, Shri Iyer was with Netaji at Saigon on that date and had been in Netaji's company for a few days previous to that. So this alleged enquiry by Netaji regarding Shri Iyer does not arise at all. With regard to the subject matter of this enquiry, the deposition of this witness is useless, especially, when the little he has stated, in not borne out by the statements of the other witnesses ; on the other hand, they have been contradicted by some of them.

The other person, Shri Mir Ghulam Dastgir, witness No. 31, who states to have been at Tourane for the last 14 years, has deposed that sometime in 1945, he was asked by Mr. Suziko, the Japanese Administrator of Tourane, to meet Netaji, who, he said, had arrived there ; that inspite of his best efforts, he was unable to do so, due to continuous air raids. It is quite clear that the deposition of this witness has absolutely no bearing on the fact that has been attempted to be established that Netaji stopped on the night of 17th August 1945 at the biggest hotel there. It is for the exclusive purpose of establishing this fact, which is definitely considered to be an important point in this enquiry,

that all the three members of the Committee visited Tourane on 2-5-1956 in the company and under the guidance of Shri Kutti, our Consul-General at Saigon and though all of us stopped at the biggest hotel there for some time and made serious attempts to get evidence everywhere, including the hotel staff about Netaji's stay at Tourane, such attempts on our part ended in miserable failure. Far from obtaining any evidence, no clue about Netaji's alleged stay there, was secured and the only person we could get hold of there, was Shri Dastgir, whose worthless nature of evidence has been stated above. Such being the result of our efforts, a reasonable suspicion would naturally arise about Netaji's alleged stay at Tourane, which has been stated only by the six persons, who allege to have been with him in that plane, but, being Japanese nationals, are expected to support the announcement made by their Government.

It is necessary for me to state here that Netaji's name and fame in the Far East was immense. If he had come to the small town of Tourane, and stayed in the biggest hotel there, its staff and the people round about there would surely have known about it and we would surely have got several persons of good standing and position, who would have known about Netaji's stay there, than the

solitary Shri Dastgir, especially, when we had gone there with our Consul-General with the express purpose of confirming Netaji's stay there on the night of 17. 8. 45 from the local people. The evidence, therefore, on this point has remained uncorroborated by local persons, though sincere efforts were made to obtain it locally. The inference from this would, accordingly, have some significance.

The point, which is now being taken up, requires careful consideration. The conduct of the Japanese, in offering only one seat to Netaji, could reasonably be surmised to be the outcome of their and Netaji's agreed plan of removing him as secretly as possible and with the minimum of publicity, so that their conduct would not be exposed to the Anglo-Americans to whom they had surrendered, and not really due to their inability to provide seats for only six of his trusted followers, whom he had selected to take with him to Russia for carrying on his activities for the independence of India. The standpoint of the Japanese Government was quite different from that of Netaji. They were taking a great risk and it involved great danger to themselves, if their plan was found out by their victors. As stated earlier, Col. Pritam Singh inferred from the conversation of some of the Japanese at the Saigon

Aerodrome that they wanted to take Netaji alone and which Netaji is reported to have told him subsequently there. In this connection, very important and significant statements have been made by Col. M. Yano, witness No. 44, who was at that time, the Chief of Air-force Section No. 2 of the Southern Army Headquarters under the Supreme Command of F. M. Count Terauchi at Dalat and they are, (1) that Gen. Isoda had sent a telegram to Gen. Numata, the Chief of Staff, Southern Army, "that Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose wished to make contact either with China or with Russia to continue his struggle for India's independence in view of the fact that the Japanese were retreating away from India and were not in a position to help him very much," and (2) "the plan was to move Mr. Bose alone to Tokyo. Mr. Bose had desired to go to Russia. F. M. Count Terauchi decided that, in the first instance, Mr. Bose should visit Tokyo and discuss the matter with the Government of Japan and then proceed onwards. The arrangements for Mr. Bose to be flown to Tokyo were made by our Headquarters. The arrangements for aeroplane were made by the Air-staff Officer attached to the Headquarters at Dalat." Though this Officer states that it was decided that Netaji should go first to Tokyo, it has been proved

quite satisfactorily, that at Saigon aerodrome in the presence of Gen. Isoda and others and before the plane took off from there, that the plane would go to Dairen in Manchuria first and after dropping, according to plan, Netaji and Gen. Shidei there, it would then come to Tokyo. As Gen. Isoda had contacted the Field Marshal at Dalat, when he had gone there for making transport arrangements for Netaji for his onward flight from Saigon, it must obviously have been decided by these two high-ranking officers that Netaji and Gen. Shidei would be dropped at Dairen first and before the plane flew to Tokyo and according to this decision, the route of the plane was scheduled to be from Saigon to Taihoku, then to Dairen and finally to Tokyo; and which has been stated by several witnesses. This is a valuable piece of information and the more so, as it comes from the source of its origin.

Now to summarise the point about Netaji's departure from Bangkok on the morning of 17. 8. 45 and subsequent departure from Saigon the same afternoon, the underlying policy behind it, according to the plan agreed upon both by the Japanese as well as by Netaji, was that, to comply with Netaji's desire not to fall into the hands of the victorious Anglo-Americans, who would thereby

wreak their vengeance on him under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance or as a War Criminal, for having waged war against his King and Emperor, the Japanese Government, being exceedingly sorry for Netaji's failure in his mission to bring about the independence of India, which they ascribed to their losing the war, decided "to respect Netaji's last wishes", and in pursuance of the same, made necessary arrangements for removing Netaji to a safe zone, viz., Manchuria, from where Netaji said he would make his own arrangements for going into the adjoining Russian territory. For helping Netaji to do so, the Japanese Government were generous enough, though there was distress and utter confusion in their ranks, due to their having surrendered, to depute one of their top-ranking military officers, viz., Lt. Gen. Shidei, who knew Manchuria well and who was reported to be a keyman for negotiations with Russia. As there was difficulty for the Japanese in arranging transport for Netaji's party, primarily consisting of more than 100 persons, Netaji finally selected only six of his trusted and loyal followers to accompany him to Russia and accordingly requested the Japanese to arrange transport facilities for only seven of them.

As Netaji was an arch enemy of the Anglo-Americans, to whom they had also surrendered, it

is quite clear that the Japanese could not under any circumstances openly remove Netaji to a safe zone and out of the clutches of the victorious Anglo-Americans. They had, therefore, to do so very secretly and without the least chance of being found out. As stated by Col. Pritam Singh, the Japanese were talking among themselves at Saigon aerodrome that it would be difficult to conceal such a big party, which, however, consisted of only seven persons and so they decided to take away Netaji alone. In removing Netaji to a safe place, the primary consideration of the Japanese would naturally be to do so with the minimum chance of being detected by their victors. The question of Netaji having six associates along with him in his new sphere of activities would surely be of little consideration with them. They could in no case embarrass themselves and get themselves disgraced and punished, if detected. It should be very clearly understood, that it was under such circumstances that the Japanese Government had decided to remove Netaji alone to Manchuria.

After a very careful consideration of the evidence recorded on this point, I am of opinion that it is fairly satisfactory only from the time of Netaji's departure from Bangkok and subsequent departure from Saigon. Discrepancies worth considering

started commencing after that, and as the alleged flight continued, discrepancies, contradictions and different versions continued to be on the increase. It cannot but be mentioned here that inspite of the best and sincere efforts on our part and on that of our Consul-General at Saigon, we were unable to secure even a single person at Tourane, who was in a position to state that Netaji was there on the night of 17-8-45, especially, when it has not been stated by any of his alleged fellow passengers that there was secrecy about his stay or his movements there. This point should be considered to have some significance. Moreover, apart from the single statement that Netaji stopped at Tourane for the night, the other detailed statements made by the different witnesses are generally discrepant. Taking all these into consideration, it would be difficult to conclude that Netaji came to Tourane along with these witnesses, as alleged by them.

## II(a) THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

According to Col. Rahman, the plane after taking off, circled over the airfield as Taihoku at a height of a few hundred feet, which he later on stated, would be 1,000 feet or more. It then turned to the north or north-east and while it was still gaining height, he suddenly heard a deafening

noise, as if some cannon shell from an enemy plane had hit the starboard side of their plane, which immediately started wobbling and made a nose-dive, which is confirmed by another statement of his, viz., that while the plane was nose-diving, their heads were downwards. That the plane nose-dived has been stated by all the other witnesses, though the maximum altitude said by them to have been attained by the plane falls far short of and is nowhere near 1,000 feet stated by Col. Rahman, who then stated that within a few seconds, the plane crashed on the ground. Shri Sastri, witness No. 67, an Aircraft Inspector, Accidents Investigation Branch, Civil Aviation Department, Government of India, who was requested to give his opinion as an Expert, has stated that it takes about 8 seconds to fall down from a height of 1,000 feet and which confirms Col. Rahman's statement. Although Major Kono stated that as soon as the plane had attained a maximum altitude of approximately 30 metres, which is equal to about 100 feet, which, however, is quite different from what has been stated by Col. Rahman, the plane started falling and it descended rapidly. He failed to switch off the ignition switch, as he could not maintain his balance and proceed forward, but he saw the Chief Pilot Major Takizawa and N. C. O.

Ayoagi struggling hard to control the plane, which then crashed on the ground. According to Shri Sastri, it would take the plane 3 seconds to dash against the ground from a height of 150 feet and if it crashed from that height, a "Major" accident would be expected. Taking Col. Rahman's version that the plane crashed from a height of 1,000 feet and as stated by Major Kono that the pilots failed to control the plane, though they struggled very hard to do so and as no witness has suggested that the pilots had succeeded in doing so and as it takes only 8 seconds to crash on the ground from a height of 1,000 feet, the nature of the accident due to the downward mounting momentum of the plane could reasonably be expected to be something very horrible and shocking and beyond all imagination and nothing near what has been stated by the witnesses. This altitude of 1,000 feet, as stated by him, is also explained and made believable from another statement of his that the plane was in the air for 5 or 6 minutes. It could be said that it was not quite possible for the Colonel to form a more or less correct idea of the height the plane had attained from inside the plane, but, being an educated and respectable person, he was not expected to make a statement unless he could vouch for its correctness. The other inmates

of the plane were also in a position to give the height attained by the plane according to their respective estimates, which, however, are absolutely different from that given by Col. Rahman. Therefore, it could be stated definitely that Col. Rahman knew that the plane had reached a height of 1,000 feet or more. Moreover, his statement that the plane was in the air for 5 or 6 minutes was made with the belief that it was more or less correct, because persons do form an idea of time even without consulting a watch. Similar is the case with his definite statement that the plane crashed at a distance of 1 to 2 miles from the airfield and he could have made no mistake about it either. Another definite statement made by him is that after the plane was 5 or 6 minutes in the air and was still gaining height, he suddenly heard a deafening noise, as if some cannon shell had hit the starboard side of the plane and his immediate reaction was that some enemy plane carrying cannon had fired on their plane and had hit it and as soon as he heard the noise, the plane started wobbling and it nose-dived, and within a few seconds, it crashed on the ground. According to the Colonel, this was the reason that brought about the accident to the plane. It is exceedingly curious and at the same time inexplicable as to why this

reason given by Col. Rahman for the plane crash has not been stated by any other witness or inmate of the plane. The version of the majority of them is that there were two or more loud noises and bangs and, from inside the plane, they knew that the propeller of the left Engine and also the left engine, as stated by some of them, had dropped off the plane and which, therefore, is totally different from the reason given by the Colonel, for which there can be no explanation whatsoever.

These few statements made by the Colonel fit in with one another and, therefore, give the impression that it could be a probable story. That the plane was in the air for 5 or 6 minutes could reasonably prove that it had attained an altitude of 1,000 feet and that it could have flown to a distance of 1 to 2 miles from the airport, that shell from a cannon from an enemy plane after hitting their plane could cause damage to it, resulting in its wobbling, nose-diving and finally crashing to the ground. In my opinion, by no stretch of reasoning or arguments, could it be explained why not even any of these few but important statements has been supported in any the least manner by any of the other inmates of the plane and the other witnesses. As these statements of Col. Rahman have not been corroborated by any of the other witnesses, I regret, it is not possi-

ble to accept them as correct. From this, however, it does not necessarily follow that the statements made by the other witnesses would be accepted as correct either. They have to be judged on their own merits.

To continue with the further statements made by the Colonel, he is definite that as it was a bomber plane, there were no seats in it. This has also been stated by the other witnesses, except Col. Nonogaki, who has shown only two seats in his sketch A, (App. J) and which he stated were occupied by the two pilots. The evidence on record is that as there were no seats, all of them, including Netaji, squatted on the floor. As such, it would be probable and reasonable to expect that when the plane nose-dived, it would not be possible for any of them to retain their seats and they would have all dashed headlong into the cockpit or against any other obstruction in the front portion of the plane. In any case, when the plane dashed against the ground on its nose, they must have been hurled forward with the heavy and sudden impact and injured fairly severely also in the process, unless they were hanging like bats from any part of the plane, which they may have held firmly, but, even in that case, they would have had in all probability lost their grip. For doing this, it would be evident that they would not have

got the time, opportunity or presence of mind. Moreover, if the plane had crashed from a height of about 1,000 feet with the pilots unable to control it, the impact would be more than enough to finish all the inmates and that beyond all recognition. It does not require an expert to come to this opinion, though Shri Sastri has stated that a crash from a height of only about 150 feet is sufficient to cause a "Major" accident. So one would shudder to imagine what the result would have been if the plane had crashed from a height of 1,000 feet.

As regards the place where the plane is alleged to have crashed, Col. Rahman has stated that it was  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airport, and on being questioned, he stated that it crashed on "Plain Open Land". During the last part of the Colonel's examination, he replied to a question put by the Chairman that though he had some photographs, he did not bring any of them with him. He stated later that he had four photographs, two of the crashed plane, one of the coffin and in the fourth, he is shown as sitting beside the coffin.

It appears from newspaper reports recently published, containing the gist of my colleagues' report submitted to the Government, that they have relied on one of those photographs of the crashed plane, which was given very good publicity in the front

page of the newspaper. It is, therefore, evident that Col. Rahman sent those four photographs to the Committee. I regret very much to state that I had absolutely no knowledge of the same, till I could surmise this now from the newspaper reports. It is sickening to report that though these photographs and all other relevant papers were sent to Shri Sastri for his opinion as an expert, and which have evidently been referred to and relied upon by my colleagues in their report to Government, they have intentionally been withheld from me, the third member of the Committee, and to whom those photographs and all other papers are equally necessary for writing his dissentient report and that, inspite of requests, verbal, by letters and by telegrams, starting from 14. 7. 56 to 30. 8. 56 to the Chairman of the Committee, the Prime Minister of India and the Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. It is with deep regret that I am constrained to state that the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who was requested by some high official in New Delhi, to get me round to sign the report of my colleagues and thereby make it a unanimous one, and who tried his utmost to do so, by influencing, persuading and coaxing me, not only by contacting me personally and over the phone, but also through some of my nearest relations

and friends, failed to have his high position and prestige maintained. Having failed in his attempt, he heard patiently what I had to say in reply and he was good enough to request the Prime Minister by a letter, in reply to a letter he had received from him, in my presence on 15. 8. 56, requesting him to arrange to send me all the papers, I had requested them several times, so as to enable me to complete my dissentient report. I naturally expected that our Chief Minister's efforts in coming to my aid would meet with success and I was expecting the necessary papers from the Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs everyday soon after that. I was sorely disappointed, when he informed me over the phone on 28. 8. 56, that there was no likelihood of my getting any of those papers from Delhi. He advised me at the same time, to write my report by making use of the personal notes, I had maintained, regarding some of the important statements made by some of the witnesses. In this connection, I consider I will be failing in my duty, if I do not make it clear the circumstances, which compelled me to keep these notes as well as the nature of those notes. I have made mention of this in an earlier part of the report and I consider it necessary to point out here that the Chairman had decidedly a biased, prejudiced and preconceived

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opinion that Netaji was dead and which he in a way, openly expressed to the Pressmen in Tokyo on 4. 5. 56, immediately on our arrival at the airport there and which was also the confirmed opinion of the Prime Minister and which he also openly expressed in the Parliament on 29. 9. 55. This appears to have moulded the opinion of the Chairman in such a manner as to get those statements of the witnesses, that were not favourable towards his opinion, recorded in such a manner as would be least detrimental to his opinion. To guard against this, as much as I possibly could, I was compelled to keep notes to the best of my abilities and with the least inconvenience to the work of the Committee. As I have stated earlier, I had to check the draft statements of some of the witnesses recorded by our stenographer with these notes of mine and had on a few occasions, got them corrected after reference to and with the permission of my colleagues. This "Private Noting", as was styled by my colleague Shri Maitra, was evidently a hindrance to them and on a few occasions, he remarked that my "Private Noting" had no value and that I would not be allowed to take up the time of the Committee, to which I invariably replied immediately, that in doing so, I had never wasted a minute of their time nor did I

ever ask them for time for doing so. Whenever I put any question to any witness or listened to his answer, it was not possible for me to keep notes of the same. Besides this, I kept notes only when I felt inclined or thought it necessary to do so and they were accordingly kept in a haphazard manner. I had not the faintest idea at that time, that such notes of mine would be considered so valuable by the highest officials of our Government, as to cast aside all the evidence that had come to be placed on record during the course of our enquiry and for which so much time and money had been spent both here as well as in foreign lands and to be ordered to be made the basis of my report to the Government. Later on, the Joint Secretary was pleased to inform me that he regretted his inability to send me the papers I had asked for and requested me to rely on the notes I had kept and to write my report accordingly. In this matter, the climax was reached, when on 28. 8. 56, our Chief Minister advised me over the phone to depend on my memory also in writing my report. This is decidedly the limit. It is exceedingly unfortunate for me, as a non-official member of the Committee, to have been the victim of such injustice and oppression and the only guilt that I can make out is that I dissented from my colleagues and did not see my way to agree

with their finding that the aircraft accident took place. I regret very much that I am compelled to state that this sort of partiality, obstruction and injustice on the part of some of the highest officials, paid from the exchequer of Government, that is claimed to be a civilised and a democratic one, in withholding relevant papers that are filed on the record, from the non-official member of the Committee, with the apparent intention of making it impossible for him to write and submit his report to the Government, because his opinion happens to go against the opinion of the Government, is something really amazing and probably unique in the annals of any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and it will not at all be surprising, if it goes down to history as such.

Now to return to the four photographs, which, I believe, were sent by Col. Rahman and which along with all other papers were not sent to me, as already stated by me, I have to state that I have just managed after great difficulty, resourcefulness and expenditure to get hold of. As regards the photograph, ( App. Q ), showing the plane alleged to have crashed along with the place, where it is shown to have crashed, different versions have been given by different witnesses. Col. Rahman stated that the photograph

was given to him by the Japanese with the report that it was the identical plane, in which Netaji, he and others were alleged to have travelled and which subsequently crashed. The details shown in the photograph should have, therefore, more or less tallied with the statements of the witnesses, without which, it cannot be considered to have any evidential value. It will be seen that it does not show the "Flat Country" or "Plain Open Land", stated by Col.

Rahman nor does it show the airfield or the runway, stated by the other witnesses. It is absolutely different and it clearly shows hilly area. It is common knowledge that a photographic print correctly shows what really exists and nothing different from that. The discrepant, contradictory and irreconcilable statements of the witnesses, therefore, show that the aircraft accident, as alleged by them, cannot be said to have been proved and this finding is confirmed by this photograph. In my humble opinion, there can be no other conclusion.

As regards the other three photographs, copies attached, (App. R, S & T), I regret I am not in a position to state definitely whether they are the identical three sent by Col. Rahman. Considering the one, (App. R), which is likely to have been sent by him, it gives a view of the place, where the plane is alleged to have crashed. It is nowhere like what

the witnesses have said, but is similar to the first photograph, (App. Q), already discussed. The other two photographs, (App. S & T) will be considered at the proper place.

Regarding the aircraft accident, Capt. Arai stated that in a few minutes after taking off, the plane attained a height of about 500 metres, equivalent to about 1,600 feet, when he heard two loud noises and the plane immediately started to dive towards the earth. Except him and Col. Rahman, all the other witnesses stated that the accident took place soon after the plane became airborne and when the altitude attained was low and very much less than 1,000 feet or 1,600 feet, stated by Col. Rahman and him respectively. The Captain learnt later that the first noise was due to one of the propellers falling off and the second was due to one of the engines dropping off. After crashing on the ground, the plane broke into two pieces from near the middle, as shown by him in red pencil in his sketch, (App. L). This contradicts Col. Rahman's statement, the opinion of Sri Sastri, and the photograph, (App. Q) that the tail and wings were attached to the remaining part of the plane. He has also stated that the accident was due to overloading, but Shri Sastri is definitely of opinion that the propeller could not drop off due

to overloading. On the other hand, Col. Nonogaki and Major Kono have said, that as they considered that the plane was overloaded at Tourane, they relieved the load off the plane and the Major stated that he did so to the extent of about 600 kgs., which is even more than half a ton. It is curious, that the statements of the witnesses are, that up to Tourane, when the plane is alleged by some of them to have been overloaded, the take off, landing and flight enroute were quite normal and smooth. The opinion of Shri Sastri, after considering the overall evidence on record, including the photographs, sketches etc., is that the plane attained a maximum height of about 120 feet and then crashed near the runway, and which, even in that case, would be expected to result in a "major" accident. So anyone could easily imagine what the nature of the accident would have been, if the plane had crashed from a height of 1,000 or 1,600 feet, as stated by Col. Rahman or Capt. Arai respectively.

Major Takahashi had deposed that when the plane had just become airborne, there was an explosion and the plane tilted to the left side and crashed on the ground in front of and outside the runway and then came back to its normal position, which he has shown clearly in his sketch, (App. U) and which is absolutely different from what is seen

in the photograph sent by Col. Rahman, in which the tail is shown as pointing upwards and the place of crash, a hilly country. According to Major's statements and sketch, which are to the effect that there was no breakage or damage to the plane, it could safely be said that the plane had "belly-landed" after striking the ground and that there was no crash.

Col. Nonogaki, on the other hand, had introduced a novel story, which is again different from the three different versions given by the three witnesses named above. He has stated that shortly after he felt that the plane was airborne, and had attained a height of about 20 metres equal to about 60 feet, he heard an explosion and saw the plane nose-diving towards the ground. He also heard 3 or 4 bangs coming from the side of the engine, which he learnt later was due to the left propeller having blown off. The plane crashed on the ground and broke into two pieces, which he has shown in red pencil in his sketch, marked A, (App. J), which was near about the turret. In his sketch, marked C, (App. P.), he has shown on the runway in blue pencil, the X (cross) mark, from where the plane became airborne and the X (cross) mark in red pencil, where the plane crashed on the same runway. The rear portion of the plane broke off and flew away on the runway in the direction indicated in

blue dots and the main body of the plane dragged itself to a distance of 20 to 30 metres from where it had crashed and came to a stop on the runway, after striking against a pile of stones and sand, that had been collected at the edge of the runway and which were meant for filling up craters formed on the runway due to aerial bombing by the enemy. According to him, the complete drama of the alleged plane crash was enacted on the runway and nowhere else. It is impossible for anybody to explain this definite statement that the crash and breakage of the plane took place wholly on the runway with the definite statement of Col. Rahman that all this took place 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield or those of the other witnesses that it took place elsewhere.

According to Major Kono, the plane took off, and after reaching a height of about 30 metres, equivalent to about 100 feet, there was a single loud explosion and the plane tilted to the right side, because the propeller and the engine on the left side had dropped off. The plane then crashed on its right side and the right wing was completely smashed, which is an absolutely different version from those of the other witnesses, who have definitely maintained that it was the left side. The Major has confirmed his statement that the right wing was completely

smashed, in his sketch marked B(II), (App. V), in which all the main parts of the plane are shown intact except the right wing. In his sketch, marked B(I), (App. W), he has shown that the damage was caused at two places, shown at (a) & (b) of the same sketch, and in his sketch, B(II), in addition to the broken and blown off right wing, he showed at the portion marked (a), that the tail had broken off and at the portion marked (b), he showed and stated verbally that at that joint, the plane had bent inwards, which is his special, but uncorroborated, story of the damage to the plane.

In the written statement, said to have been sent by Lt. Col. T. Sakai, it appears that "shortly after taking off, the plane inclined to right. Thinking that this was not normal, I looked out through the machinegun cage. At that time, the plane had corrected its banking. But it went down lower and lower rapidly from the height of about 50 metres. From my position, I could see only the direction of the sides and rear ; when the plane came over the end of the airfield, which was waste land, I saw the rear wheel flew off backward in the left side drawing an arc in the air. The moment I noticed it, I fell unconscious". It will be seen that in these statements, there no mention about an explosion or a loud noise or bang, or the propeller or the engine of

the left side falling off, or of damage to any part of the plane, or of the plane having crashed at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield, or of having crashed and being left damaged on the runway itself or anywhere near it. In short, the statements of this military officer are unique by themselves and have remained uncorroborated by any of the five other alleged inmates of the plane, whose depositions have been considered above. I am, therefore, definite, that not a single person with a fair and unbiased mind, reading the depositions of these six persons and perusing the photographs, sketches and papers on record, would agree with the findings of my colleagues, that the plane crash took place, as alleged.

According to Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto), witness No. 51, who was the Ground Engineer at Taihoku Aerodrome, all the passengers boarded the plane, when it was at position A, shown in his sketch marked I (App. N), after the Pilot Major Takizawa agreed with him that there was nothing wrong with the engine. This position A, however, is quite different from that shown by Col. Nonogaki in his sketch C, (App. P). The Captain then stated that the plane was taxied to the position, marked C on the runway and shown on the same sketch, where the engines were speeded up and then slowed down, as

is usually done, and after he had satisfied himself that they were correct, they were speeded up again and the plane was allowed to run on the runway and it took off at a point about 50 metres from the end of the runway, and immediately after taking off, it made a steep ascent and then tilted to the left, when he saw something falling down from the plane, which he later discovered to be a propeller. In his opinion, the maximum height attained by the plane would be 30 to 40 metres or something slightly higher than that and that the plane crashed at point G, marked in his sketch I, (App. N), which was a little more than 100 metres from the end of the runway. He is definite that the whole of the plane was intact and that no portion of the body was broken. This statement, considered with the sketch of the plane at point G, shows that the plane had "Belly-landed" and without any damage whatsoever to it. He has, however, not stated that the left engine dropped off the plane, as has been stated by some of the other witnesses. He stated that he saw all this, when he was standing at point F, shown in his sketch, marked I, (App. N) and was only about 30 metres or about 100 feet from the runway. Almost all the statements of the Captain are so different from those made by all the other witnesses and as those statements have been very clearly

expressed, it is considered unnecessary to point out the discrepancy in each of them separately with those of all the other witnesses.

It must be very amusing for any reader to peruse how each of these seven witnesses have made seven different statements, not agreeing with one another on the single point as to how the aircraft accident took place.

From a portion of the draft report written by my colleague Shri Maitra, which I had the opportunity to read and discuss with them and from the newspaper reports recently published, giving a gist of the report they have submitted to Government, it appears that they have accepted the opinion of Shri Sastri that the plane attained a maximum height of 30 or 40 metres and that it crashed somewhere near the runway and that they have disbelieved the statement of Col. Rahman, who stated that the plane attained a height of more than 1,000 feet and had crashed at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield.

This opinion of Shri Sastri was given by him in the last portion of his deposition and in reply to a question put to him by the Chairman and is as follows :- "Chairman ; In the event of there being discrepancies between the statements of some witnesses, could you say from the statements and

other evidence placed before you, which statement or statements you consider the most reasonable from your point of view as an Air Expert ? Ans : Taking a general view of the entire picture, except for the latter portion of the statement of Major Kono, relating to the way in which the aircraft fell down to the ground, I consider Major Kono's and Capt. Nakamura alias Yamamoto's statements to be reasonable".

Before going into the question of Shri Sastri's opinion referred to above, I consider it very important to refer to the opinion and statement expressed by me earlier that the intention of the Chairman was "Anyhow" to come to the finding that the plane actually crashed and that Netaji died as result therefrom and that in pursuance of this intention of his, he regulated his conduct to the best of his abilities. In an earlier part of this report, I expressed my opinion as follows :- "I am aggrieved to state that the Chairman's attitude and conduct at times, far from maintaining a judicial approach, has been similar to that of a zealous partisan and worse than that of the most unscrupulous prosecutor". I consider myself fortunate that the Chairman's question itself clearly exposes himself, that he continued calling for new witnesses and examining them not with the intention

of arriving at the truth, but to fill up the gaps in the evidence and for explaining and reconciling discrepant and contradictory statements that stood in the way of his coming to the conclusion that the plane had crashed and that Netaji had died.

Now to proceed with the opinion of Shri Sastri, it appears that he has considered the statement of Capt. Nakamura ( Yamamoto ) to be a reasonable one and has also accepted only a portion of Major Kono's statement, but, as stated by him, after discarding, "the latter portion of the statement of Major Kono, relating to the way in which the aircraft fell down to the ground." I am constrained to state that this is a funny manner of believing only one portion and disbelieving the remaining portion of the statement of a witness relating entirely to the same simple point, viz., the manner in which the plane crashed to the ground.

In this connection, I feel it incumbent on me to refer to certain statements made by Shri Sastri. I may state here that when he first appeared before us, I requested him to make his statements after due thought and consideration, because, being examined as an expert, his opinion would be considered to be very weighty and could not possibly be challenged very easily and therefore would have to be accepted by us.

I have mentioned earlier, that the Chairman, finding himself unable to explain or reconcile the glaring discrepant statements of all the witnesses regarding the plane crash, got hold of this Aircraft Accidents Investigation Inspector to help with an expert opinion for tiding over his difficulty and which is plainly evident from his last question to him, as has been stated above.

Except for the statements of Shri Sastri stated below, I have nothing much to comment on his other statements, but it is quite clear from his conduct that he came prepared to state that the maximum height attained by the plane was about 40 metres and that it crashed not on the runway, but further ahead somewhere on the airfield, as stated by Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto) and which appears to have been accepted by my colleagues. It is not understood as to why he did not state that the maximum height that could have been attained by the plane would be less than 40 metres equal to about 120 feet, if the plane took off from the runway and crashed a little ahead on the same runway, which was shown to him in sketch 13 (App. P), evidently, sketch C, drawn by Col. Nonogaki and why he prevaricated in stating that though it could not be 1,000 feet he was not in a position to say whether it could be 500 feet or even 300 feet, which is decidedly an impossibility, unless the plane shot up vertically like a rocket. He has also rejected the altitude of 1,000 feet or 1,600 feet and also the place of crash as 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield or at that boundary, as has been stated by Col. Rahman and by Capt. Arai respec-

tively, without assigning any reason for the same. Later on, when he was questioned as to what would be the crew, he said he had no idea, though he admitted that in 1945 such a plane did not fly without a crew. He declined to give a reply, though several questions were put to him, but he eventually said about the crew both of heavy as well as of light bombers. Shri Sastri's rejection of Col. Rahman's version and my colleagues' acceptance of Shri Sastri's opinion obviously challenges Col. Rahman's veracity.

While considering only these few, but crucial, points in the evidence on record, viz., the maximum height attained by the plane, the period the plane was in the air, the cause for the accident to the plane resulting in its crashing to the ground, the condition of the plane after it had crashed, the place where it had crashed, and the nature of the place where it had crashed, considered with the same points as shown in the Photograph, (App. Q), produced by Col. Rahman, saying that it was given to him by the Japanese with the report that it was of the identical crashed plane, it stands out very prominently that the statements of Col. Rahman disagree with those shown in this photograph and are absolutely different from those made by all the other witnesses. It is exceedingly puzzling why quite a different version has been given by him and why not even a single statement of his is in common with those of the others. In my humble opinion, and I am convinced about it, that it could be ascribed to his intense devotion and loyalty to his "Beloved Leader", as Netaji has been designated by my colleagues.

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It is unfortunate that I was not given a copy of the report of my colleagues and so I am not in a position to know exactly the contents of the same. The little that I have been able to glean from the newspaper reports recently published, regarding their points or findings, I have noticed that at one place, where Col. Rahman and also some of the Japanese witnesses claimed to have individually removed Netaji's burning clothes, my colleagues disbelieved the statements of the Japanese witnesses, who stated to have volunteered their services for that great Indian leader, for whom they had the highest admiration, and discarding the same, accepted that of Col. Rahman on the sole ground that it must have been he, who, was most likely to have done so for his "Beloved Leader". Although I do not accept this to be the correct and the sole argument for accepting the Colonel's conduct, and for disbelieving what the others had said and done, I would accept Netaji, not only as the Colonel's "Beloved Leader", but also as his "Reverential Master", who believing and relying on the Colonel's unwavering loyalty, confided his secrets, with the hope that he would never be let down under any circumstances. I would, therefore, state that this loyal and devoted follower, dutifully proclaimed to the world under an "Oath of Secrecy", the secret instructions, he had received from his "Beloved Leader" and "Reverential Master", as has been suggested by Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose and Shri Arabindu Bose, who were also under similar "Oaths of Secrecy" to him at the time of



Appendix Q. PHOTOGRAPH OF ALLEGED CRASHED PLANE AND PLACE OF CRASH.

his secret departure from Calcutta in January, 1941.

#### FOUR PHOTOGRAPHS PRODUCED BY COL. RAHMAN

With regard to the four photographs brought by Col. Rahman to India after his return from the Far East and about which he stated in the last part of his deposition, in reply to a question put by the Chairman and which he evidently sent to the Committee later on and regarding which, I was not informed by the Chairman at any stage, he stated that two of them were of the crashed plane, the third was that of the coffin and in the last one, he is shown sitting beside the coffin.

I am in a position to assert, that due to the fear that these four photographs would easily upset the findings of my colleagues and which was also the confirmed opinion of the Government, they thought it wise not to send them or even show them to me.

As regards the first photograph of the crashed plane, (App. Q), which tallies with what was published in the newspapers and evidently also with the report of my colleagues, I have already held, that by itself, it falsifies the story of the plane crash, as stated by all the witnesses, including Col. Rahman. As I have not been furnished with my colleagues' report either, I am not in a position to know in what manner they have discussed the details shown in the photograph

with the statements of all the witnesses, but I am almost positive that they have not dared doing so. I believe they accepted the truth of the plane crash and in support of the same simply produced this photograph, alleging it to be that of the crashed plane.

After a lot of difficulty and expenditure, I have managed to secure prints of three more photographs, but I am not sure whether they are the same as those sent by Col. Rahman and the same three, on which my colleagues have relied upon. As they may be the same, I shall consider them one by one.

The second photograph, (App. R) shows a landscape, but though the Colonel has said that it is of the crashed plane, no plane is seen in it. There is, however, a similarity in the panoramic view shown in it with the same shown in the first photograph, (App. Q), but neither of them shows the "Flat Country" or "The Plain Open Land", stated by Col. Rahman or the airfield or the runway, stated by the remaining witnesses. Instead of these, they show rugged, hilly, undulating country. In my opinion, the second photograph, (App. R) also goes definitely against the findings of my colleagues.

The third photograph, (App. S) does not show any coffin whatsoever, as stated by the Colonel. It shows a white background which, I regret, I am unable to understand what it could possibly signify. If this photograph has been relied upon by my colleagues in coming to their findings, I would humbly state that it is

Appendix E. PHOTOGRAPH OF ALLEGED CRASHED PLANE AND PLACE OF CRASH.



In the fourth photograph, (App. T), there is no coffin either and if the person shown sitting on the chair, be said to be Col. Rahman, I would not protest against it, as I have not been able to recognise him. In my opinion again, this photograph does not and cannot support the findings of my colleagues.

If these be the sole photographic records to prove the story of the plane crash or of Netaji's death, I am definitely of opinion that not only has there been a miserable failure, but it goes much further and proves that both the plane crash and Netaji's death are false. The Japanese are alleged to have made over all these four photographs to Col. Rahman. If the plane did crash, as stated by the witnesses, though in a highly discrepant and contradictory manner, the two photographs, (App. Q. & R.) should have shown something that would tally with the statements of the witnesses and not something totally different. If Netaji had received injuries and burns, as a result of that plane crash and had been treated in a hospital and he had actually died there and if his dead body had been cremated, the Japanese Government, for warding off any calumny or treachery, that may have been suggested against them, if not for anything else, would have decidedly taken pains to maintain correct and detailed photographic records of the true incident for the satisfaction of the Indian people, for the Japanese nation and for the world at large and would have thereby prevented

any indignity or slander to themselves or to their Government, with regard to the gruesome tragedy, alleged to have befallen a great Indian Leader and Revolutionary, An International Figure and their Most Esteemed Friend and Ally, while under their care and companionship and as Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister of Japan, was pleased to remark during our first interview with him in early May last, soon after our arrival in Tokyo, as the "Greatest Asiatic Hero of The Age". I am definitely of opinion that no better photographs than these four could be available to the Japanese Government, as a plane crashing with Netaji in it, as Netaji with injuries and burns near a crashed plane, as Netaji being treated in a hospital for those injuries and burns, as a dead Netaji in a hospital, as the dead body of Netaji being placed in a coffin and as the dead body of Netaji being cremated and being put inside a furnace of a crematorium were not available to the Japanese Government for being photographed and therefore, it was not possible for them to obtain these photographs. If, on the other hand, it was possible for them to get such an opportunity, they would decidedly have taken, preserved and proclaimed the same, in support of the truth of Netaji's death, if it had actually taken place. In the absence of any such photograph or any reliable evidence, my firm conviction is that the aircraft accident did not take place and therefore, Netaji did not die, as alleged.

## COL. RAHMAN'S CONDUCT & ANTECEDENTS

As has been stated earlier, my colleagues appear to have accepted the opinion of Shri Sastri and the deposition of Capt. Nakamura (Yamamoto) that the plane, soon after taking off, attained a maximum height of about 40 metres and immediately hit the ground near about the runway and without any damage to itself, came back to its normal position, or in other words, "Belly-Landed". They consequently disbelieved the story of the other witnesses and also the version of Col. Rahman, viz., that after being 5 or 6 minutes in the air, and after the plane had attained a height of more than 1,000 feet and while it was still gaining height, he heard a deafening noise, as if a cannon shell from an enemy plane had hit the starboard side of their plane, when it started wobbling, then nose dived and crashed on plain open land at a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield. As I have not been given the report of my colleagues, I am not in a position to know the reasons given by them for disbelieving the Colonel or whether they have stated the reasons or the circumstances, which compelled the Colonel to make such statements. In any case, they have challenged his veracity, or in plain language, branded him as a liar, obviously, without offering any explanation for the same.

K In my humble opinion, the statements made by the Colonel, whatever they are, are in accordance with the instructions, which, I am convinced, he had secretly received from and with the sole intention of protecting his "Beloved Leader" in his escape to a safe zone, which was beyond the reach of the victorious Anglo-Americans and the Colonel had, therefore, amply justified the confidence and trust his leader had placed in him.

Col. Rahman was selected by Netaji from the last six of his trusted and loyal followers, whom he desired to take with him to Russia via Manchuria for helping him in his work there for the independence of India. In a way, he was Netaji's first choice from the whole of his administration, both civil and military. It, therefore, naturally follows that Netaji considered him to be his most reliable follower, in whom he could repose his trust, confidence and secrets, who would not disclose them under all trials and tribulations, who would implicitly obey all his commands and instructions and who would ever remain loyal to him.

His family connections are exceedingly good. He belongs to an aristocratic family; his father was Raja Mansur Ahmed Khan. They belong to the famous military clan of Chib Rajputs and from his great grandfather downwards, have loyally served in the British Indian Army, with whom he was in the last Burma Campaign. When they surrendered to

the Japanese there in early 1942, his rank was that of a Captain. He duly joined the I. N. A. and his first appointment in it was Commandant, Officers' Training School, which gives an idea of his worth: His work appears to have been appreciated by Netaji, who made him Deputy Chief of Staff in early 1944 and which post he held till 15. 8. 45, when Netaji brought him away to accompany him to an "Unknown Destination". He was always in close touch with Netaji and had accompanied him in his visits to Tokyo and to other places. In the British and American Intelligence Reports, it appears that he was praised for his bravery, resourcefulness and loyalty as a British Indian Army Officer. It also transpires from these reports, that he was interrogated several times by different enquiring officers, soon after Netaji's failure in his military campaign against the Anglo-Americans, as he was expected to give the maximum information regarding Netaji, being the only Indian to have accompanied him the farthest, and as they were not getting the requisite information they had expected of him and which they believed he knew. The main trend of their enquiry was to get some clue regarding Netaji's whereabouts, as their reports show that they were not convinced that Netaji had died, as had been announced by the Japanese and that they believed that it was a hoax and that Netaji was living and hiding somewhere. Eventually, they were compelled to confess, that this

officer, due to his attachment to his leader, had not disclosed truthfully all that he knew, that he had intentionally withheld certain facts, he was in a position to know and that he had intentionally made certain statements, which appeared to them not to be correct. I am, therefore, convinced that Col. Habibur Rahman would state only what he was ordered by Netaji to state and that he could not under any circumstances state anything, that would go against the interest of his beloved and respected leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.

#### AFTER THE CRASH & TO HOSPITAL

A careful consideration of the evidence on record, from the very begining up to the crashing of the plane, has resulted in the definite conclusion that the Aircraft Accident did not take place.

It is now to be seen what conclusion could be arrived at from an examination of the remaining evidence that has been adduced and it would commence with what took place imnediately after the crash. I have already held that as there were no seats in the plane and as all the passengers had squatted on the floor, all of them together with the baggage would have been hauled headlong into the cockpit or against any other obstruction in the front portion of the plane, during the period when the

plane was nose diving and decidedly, after the sudden impact due to the plane crashing on the ground with disastrous consequences also to the inmates themselves. However, Col. Rahman, remains slightly injured to continue his story. that even after the crash, all of them were still pinned up to their seats on the floor and the baggage also remained midway in the plane to jam the only door and exit of the plane, where there was no fire, and so he advised Netaji to get out of the plane through the fire in front, as the tail and wings, all being attached to the plane, left no opening in the rear. Netaji, accordingly, got out of the plane through a split that had been caused in the front and through fire and he also did so in a similar manner. On getting out of the plane, he saw Netaji standing about ten yards ahead of him with his clothes on fire and he experienced great difficulty in unfastening Netaji's bushshirt belt, as he was not wearing a woollen sweater; but, as his trousers were not so much on fire, it was not necessary to take them off. He laid Netaji on the ground, when he noticed a very deep cut on Netaji's head, about 4" long, bleeding profusely and whose face was scorched by heat and whose hair, had also caught fire and was singed. Netaji then told him that he would not survive and so gave the Colonel a message for his countrymen. This version has not only not been corroborated by the other witnesses, but they have also given new stories, also different

from each other. Considering the nature of injuries received by Netaji, barring the deep profusely-bleeding cut on his head, which has not been stated by the other witnesses or, surprisingly so, also not by the 2 Doctors, who allege to have taken all possible measures for no less than 6 hours to save his life, the nature of his injuries would reduce themselves only to burns, the nature of which, as stated by the Colonel, could not surely bring about death and that within the space of about 6 hours. He then lay down by Netaji's side and after 15 or 20 minutes, an ambulance and a lorry arrived with a few Japanese nurses. Both of them were then laid on the floor of the lorry and were the first to be rushed to the nearest Air-force Emergency Hospital.

Capt. Arai has stated that after the plane crashed, he was tossed out of the plane and became almost senseless. Soon after, he saw Lt. Col. T. Sakai running round the wrecked plane, shouting "Shidei! Shidei!" He was the first to be taken to the Hospital in a motor vehicle.

Major Takahashi also stated to have lost consciousness after the plane had crashed, but, after regaining the same, he found himself lying on the ground near the plane and as he was injured in his ankle, he could not walk and so crawled up to Col. Nonogaki, where he was told that both Netaji and Gen. Shidei were still in the plane. After some time, he saw Netaji get out from the left front portion

of the plane with his clothes on fire and trying to take off his coat, when he went up and caught hold Netaji's legs with a request to lie down and roll on the ground, in which manner they put out the fire on his clothes, which remained on him, as only patches of the clothes on the upper part of his body were burnt and as his trousers were slightly burnt. A military truck came and carried away Mr. Bose. He was the last to be taken from the place of accident to the Hospital in a lorry. As the plane had crashed on its nose, Gen Shidei and all the members of the crew were killed inside the plane.

Col. Nonogaki stated that he was thrown out of the plane and he took cover behind a pile of stones and sand, against which the damaged plane came to a halt. He first saw Netaji standing near the left wing of the plane, with his clothes on fire and Col. Rahman taking off Netaji's coat, but who was finding difficulty in taking off Netaji's woollen sweater, which, as stated by the Colonel and other witnesses, Netaji did not wear. Netaji was stripped of all his clothes in the aerodrome and when he saw Netaji arrive at the Hospital, he was absolutely naked and had nothing on him. The Colonel then went to a car waiting there, where he saw Major Kono and both of them were the first to be taken to the Hospital in it. He saw other lorries and cars arrive at the scene of accident in quick succession. After both of them had arrived at the hospital, he

saw Netaji arrive there in a peculiar vehicle known as "Shidosha", which, is used for starting the aeroplane propeller.

Major Kono has narrated a new story, viz., that, after the plane crashed, he broke open the plastic cover on the top of the plane and escaped through it and that the tail had broken off from from the plane. Petrol splashed on him, when he was getting out of the plane and as his clothes caught fire, he rolled on the ground and put it out. After a few minutes, he saw Mr Bose standing erect and completely naked near the plane. He was about 30 metres from the plane, when Col. Nonogaki asked him to get away from the plane as far as he could, as the ammunition in the plane might explode. He then saw 4 or 5 lorries, 1 or 2 cars and a "Shidosha" arrive and stated that some of the aerodrome staff lifted him up bodily into the "Shidosha" and took him away to the Hospital.

In his written statement, Lt. Col. T. Sakai has been very brief, viz., that "A rescue group from the Airfield carried us in a truck to the Army Hospital". Even this short statement is different from those made by the other witnesses. The Ground Engineer, Capt. Nakamura, who had certified that the plane was quite alright and who had allowed it to take off, was standing close by. According to him, the plane crashed, immediately after taking off. He at once jumped on to the "Shidosha", waiting near

him and rushed to the place of crash and was followed by 30 of his men, who were also there. They could not go near the plane, as ammunition inside it was going off. He is definite that the whole of the plane was intact and that no part of it was broken and as the front portion of the plane was on fire, they rescued the passengers through a normal door of the plane, which he showed as A in his Sketch II (App. X) and all his men were concentrated in front of that door. Mr. Bose was the last person to come out and he did so by walking out of the plane. The Engineer continued that when Mr. Bose was a few yards off from the plane, Col. Rahman shouted: "Bose Kakka," (meaning Excellency) "Bose Kakka," and he then saw that Mr. Bose was within the reach of the flames and as his clothes had been splashed with petrol, they caught fire. Mr. Bose then lay on the ground, where the Engineer and 3 of his men took off his coat and stripped him of all his clothing. He then had a blanket brought from a sentry doing duty there and wrapping up Mr. Bose, had all the injured persons, including Mr. Bose and Col. Rahman sent to the Hospital in one Army Truck, but as Mr. Bose was severely burnt, he was not laid on the floor of the truck, but he lay stretched out on the thighs of three of his men, who squatted on the floor of the truck. He also stated that Mr. Bose was not bleeding from any part of his body, but as he was very severely burnt, the skin

was falling out, but the hair on his head was not burnt, as he had his cap on. As regards the "Shidosha", he is definite that it was not taken to the Hospital and it must have been taken by one of his men to the depot. He is also definite that only 5 injured persons, viz., Mr. Bose, Col. Rahman, Lt. Col. Nonogaki, Lt. Col. Sakai and Sergeant Okhita were taken to the Hospital in the same truck. This is a nice, detailed story, making interesting reading, containing a few improbabilities and absolutely different from the stories narrated by all the other witnesses.

Another new story, different in some main points from those of others, has been given by Major K. Sakai, who was the Battalion Commander, in charge of the Taihoku Aerodrome Defence. According to him, the plane crashed at about 10 A.M. i. e., two hours before noon and not at about 2.30 P.M. He saw that the plane had been completely burnt, the left engine buried in the ground, the left wing of the plane broken and lying away from the plane, but the right wing intact. He also saw that the tail had also broken and was lying separated from the plane and that the plane had also broken into two at the place marked 2 on his sketch A (App. Y) and that the wrecked and broken plane was lying at a distance of 20 to 30 metres from the end of the runway. When he reached the aerodrome at about noon, he met Capt. Nakamura there and who told

him that Gen. Shidei and the Pilot were killed inside the plane, but he did not find their dead bodies or remains there and he believed that they were sent to the Hospital with the injured persons.

It is exceedingly strange that all these 8 witnesses, all military officers and educated and respectable gentlemen, should give different versions, regarding the simple questions as to the manner in which Netaji came out of the plane and how he went to the Hospital from the aerodrome. The only conclusion that could possibly be drawn from this is that as it did not actually take place, each of them stated whatever came uppermost in his mind. This, therefore, supports the conclusion arrived at above that the Aircraft Accident did not take place.

Except Capt. Nakamura and Major K. Sakai, all the other six persons named above state to have gone to the Hospital for treatment of their injuries or burns. Their statements in this connection may now be considered.

Col. Rahman started by stating that about 3 P.M., after he and Netaji had reached the hospital, Netaji was taken to the Operation theatre room, where the Doctor gave him a white transfusion of camphor and which he believed was not blood transfusion. The doctor is reported to have told him that Netaji had a very deep injury and his heart was affected. The Colonel then continued that after Netaji was brought

from the Operation Theatre to the general ward, he did not talk much and was not fully conscious and after about an hour, he fell into a complete coma and that about 9 P. M., he expired in the presence of Capt. Ayogi, who, he stated was the doctor, some Japanese nurses, an English-speaking Japanese civilian and himself and not in the presence of the other inmates of the plane, viz., Capt. Arai, Major Takahashi, Col Nonogaki, Major Kono and Lt. Col. T. Sakai, who had also been taken to the Hospital for treatment of their injuries.

Capt. Arai has stated that he was left at the Hospital gate, from where he walked inside the Hospital and he is definite and has repeated several times that Gen. Shidei was also brought to the Hospital, which has been denied by all the other witnesses, who state that the General could not get out of the plane and was burnt inside it. The Captain also stated that he was in a separate room from that in which Netaji was kept and he heard from the nurses at about 10 P.M. that he had expired. He had no personal knowledge about it, nor did he see Netaji's dead body or Netaji at all in the hospital. According to Col. Nonogaki, however, Capt. Arai, Major Takahashi, Major Kono and Lt. Col. T. Sakai along with himself were taken to another hospital at six the same evening, where they heard about Netaji's death. Major Kono and Lt. Col. T. Sakai support this statement also.

Major Takahashi's statements are different, viz. Netaji was first brought to a room, where he and

6 or 7 others were kept and was then removed somewhere else, that he did not see Netaji's dead body, nor had he personal knowledge about his death. He only heard about it from Col. Nonogaki, who as well as Major Kono and Lt. Col. T. Sakai, stated that all of them were removed the same evening to a different Hospital, where they learnt about Netaji's death.

The statements of Col. Nonogaki are again otherwise and to the effect, that he alone was taken to one room, whereas all the others including Netaji were taken to a different room and also that about 6 the same evening, he, Capt. Arai, Major Takahashi, Major Kono and Lt. Col. Sakai were taken to another hospital, where he heard about Netaji's death.

Major Kono's version is that on reaching the hospital, he was helped by 2 persons and he walked to the ward, where he learnt that Mr. Bose was in the next room, that about 8 the same night, he was taken to another hospital along with others about 20 kilometres or 12 miles off where he heard about Netaji's death, either on the first or on the second day of his stay there.

It appears from Lt. Col. T. Sakai's written statement that Mr. Bose was lying on a bed opposite to his in the same room of the hospital, that he and some others, who had received slight injuries, were sent to a branch hospital the same evening, where he learnt afterwards that Mr. Bose had died.

#### IN HOSPITAL & DEATH

These are the six persons, who are alleged to have received injuries along with Netaji, and who

were also taken along with him to the same hospital for treatment. It is unique that except Col. Rahman, none of the five others had any personal knowledge of Netaji's death, nor had any of them even seen his dead body, though he is said to have died in the same hospital. So, regarding Netaji's death, Col. Rahman's statement remained absolutely uncorroborated, though it could have easily been corroborated by all these five persons. Under these circumstances, Netaji's death cannot be accepted to have been proved. Moreover, that though a high-ranking military officer, Lt. Gen. T. Shidei, along with 2 pilots are alleged to have died instantaneously in that plane crash and though Netaji, the Head of a State recognised by the Japanese Government and also their ally, is alleged to have died only six hours later, as a result of the same crash, no enquiry was made by the Japanese Government nor by any Japanese officer, as has also been stated by Gen. H. Isayama, witness No. 57, Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, which creates a good deal of reasonable suspicion about this alleged incident.

The evidence of the two Japanese doctors and the two nursing orderlies, attached to that hospital and who have been examined by us, may now be considered. Dr. T. Yoshimi, witness No. 48, is said to have been the Medical Officer in Charge of the Nanmon Military Hospital, where Dr. T. Tsuruta, witness No. 39, was one of the Medical Officers, and Messrs. Mitsui Kazuo and M. Miyoshi were two Medical Orderlies, witnesses Nos. 54 and 59 respectively.

Dr. Yoshimi started by stating that at about 2.30 P. M. on 18. 8. 45, a 'Shidosha', carrying Mr. Bose alone, arrived

at the Hospital, followed by a car occupied only by a 'staff officer' of the Military Headquarters in Formosa and then by a lorry carrying 12 or 13 injured persons and that Mr. Bose, who was lying absolutely naked on a bed in the 'Shidosha', was brought into the Hospital on a stretcher. When he examined Mr. Bose in the Dressing Room and not in the Operation Theatre, he found that Mr. Bose's burns were of the severest, third degree type, but there was no injury on any part of his body, from which blood came out. He had high fever and his heart was weak. Dr. Tsuruta applied white ointment on the burns, which were all over his body and bandaged them, and while this was being done, he gave him one after the other, for his heart, four injections of Vitacamphor, two injections of Digitamine and three injections of Ringer's solution. He also let out about 200 c. c. of blood and transfused about 400 c. c. of blood, which he obtained from a Japanese soldier there. He was then given Sulfanomide injection to prevent infection. He then went to attend to the other injured persons, leaving Dr. Tsuruta in charge of Mr. Bose, during whose treatment and even later, the following persons were present, viz., Mr. Nakamura, witness No. 55, the Chief Nurse and another nurse, both Japanese, and Col. Rahman. As he did not consider Mr.

Bose's case to be satisfactory, he instructed Dr. Tsuruta to give him Vita-Camphor injections every half an hour. During this period, he paid occasional visits to Mr. Bose, whom he found talking in a low tone to Col. Rahman. At 7 or 7-30 P. M., Dr. Tsuruta informed him that Mr. Bose's condition had deteriorated and his pulse was very weak. He immediately started giving him injections of Vita-Camphor and Digitamine, but to no effect, and shortly after 8 P. M., Mr. Bose breathed his last. He then tried artificial respiration, but that was also of no use. At the time of his death, he, Dr. Tsuruta, Mr. Nakamura, those two Japanese nurses, Col Rahman, one Military Policeman and Col. Nonogaki were present. He then conveyed the sad news over the phone to the Formosan Army Military Headquarters, from where two staff officers, the Adjutant to the Commander-in-Chief, several other persons and a platoon of military guard arrived the same night. Mr. Bose's dead body was then removed to a corner of the same room and a screen was put in front of the body. He also stated that the Assistant Pilot, sub-officer Aoyagi and the Pilot, the condition of both of whom was serious, were also brought to his hospital, where after being treated for about 3 days, they were sent to another hospital, where, he heard, they died, but this has

## Appendix S



PHOTOGRAPH OF HAZY WHITE DOMESHAPED OBJECT, SAID  
TO BE OF A WHITE SHEETCOVERED COFFIN.

been contradicted by almost all the other witnesses, who stated that both of them died inside the plane.

The statements of Dr. Tsuruta are different on some important points. According to him, on 18. 8. 45 at about 3. P. M., about a dozen injured persons, including Mr. Bose and Col. Rahman, arrived at the hospital in a truck and all of them were carried to the Dressing Room and they were attended to there, while they were lying on their stretchers and after having been dressed, all the Japanese were removed to one room and Mr. Bose and Col. Rahman were sent to another room, and for privacy, a screen was put round Mr. Bose's bed. When Mr. Bose was first brought to the Dressing room, both the doctors attended on him and his burns, which were of the severest type, were smeared with white ointment and were then bandaged. Later on, he was removed to the Ward, where an injection of Ringer's solution and after that, injections of Cardiotonica and Sulfonamide were given him. To the best of his recollection, no other injection or blood transfusion was given him, nor was his blood let out. A Japanese Military police soldier was put on as a guard over him. He was present all the time in Netaji's room and Dr. Yoshimi paid occasional visits and there was no whole-time nurse on duty in his room. At about 7 p. m., his condition

suddenly took a turn for the worse, when they gave him injections for the heart, but to no effect, and he expired between 7 and 8 P. M., when both the doctors, Col. Rahman, Mr. Nakamura, the Military Police guard and two nurses were present. The Chief nurse, a Japanese and two other nurses from Okinawa and not from Formosa, occasionally attended on him. His body remained on his bed and at the same place for the whole of the night.

Medical Orderly, Mr. M. Kazuo, gives another version, viz., that all the injured persons arrived at about 2 P.M. at the Hospital in a Military truck and in a car, called 'Joyosha' in Japanese. He rang the alarm bell and 20 medical orderlies collected near the vehicles with 4 or 5 stretchers. The first injured person taken to the hospital was Major Kono, whom he carried on his back, because he was not so seriously injured, though he was seen by the members of the Committee to have been seriously injured. When he returned to the vehicles, he saw a great big man, non-Japanese, evidently Mr. Bose, lying on a stretcher, wearing the full uniform of a light brown colour, resembling that of an Airforce Officer, which wholly contradicts the statements of the other witnesses, who stated that he was absolutely naked. The buttons of his tunic were open and the front

portion of his trousers was slit open with a pair of scissors to expose the burns on his legs. His clothes were taken off and he was made to wear hospital uniform. Dr. Yoshimi applied white ointment on his burns and bandaged them and he only helped in bringing the medicines etc. He had no other injury except burns and he had no hair on his head. On reaching the Hospital, Mr. Bose, Col. Rahman, Lt. Col. Sakai, Major Kono, Sub-Officer Aoyagi and Sergeant Okita were taken straight from the vehicles to their beds in the ward, where he alone was posted on day and night duty and, after their injuries had been attended to, no other orderly or nurse was in that room. Dr. Yoshimi visited Mr. Bose every half an hour and he saw Dr. Tsuruta come to the ward only once with the other doctor, but did not see him again. So, according to this witness, Dr. Tsuruta did not attend on Mr. Bose at all. Later on, the witness stated that out of the 3 or 4 nurses, who were present, when Mr. Bose was dressed in the first instance, one of them was from Formosa. Mr. Nakamura talked to Mr. Bose at times. The doctor gave Mr. Bose a number of injections. At about 9 P. M., the doctor noticed that his pulse had become very weak and he expired at 9-30 P. M., when he, Dr. Yoshimi, Miss Otake, a Japanese nurse, Col. Rahman and Mr. Nakamura were

present. It is strange that this witness gives a story quite different from those of the others and none of them states about the 4" long deep cut, profusely bleeding injury on Netaji's head, as has been stated by Col. Rahman.

The other Medical Orderly Mr. M. Miyoshi, though on duty at the Hospital at that time, has stated nothing that has been stated by the two doctors or by the other Medical Orderly. It has not been explained either, as to how this could happen. His deposition has been dealt with in an early part of this report under the heading, "Volunteer Witnesses".

Mr. J. Nakamura deposed that on the evening of 18-8-45, he was taken to the Hospital, as he knew English and had to interpret into Japanese to the Hospital staff, what Mr. Bose said or wanted. He was brought to a large room, where he saw Mr. Bose ~~bandaged~~ all over and lying on a bed, which was screened off and with Col. Rahman and 3 other Japanese officers lying on their respective beds and all of whom, he was told, were injured in a plane crash. When he came near Mr. Bose's bed, he heard him speak to Col. Rahman in a low voice, asking him to take care of his men, who were following him to Formosa. After about an hour,

he asked the Colonel about Gen. Shidei and after half an hour or so, he said that blood was rushing to his head from his waist. Soon after 9 or 9.30 P. M., Netaji's last words were "I want to sleep". He then started snoring and after ten minutes or a little more, "his head fell forward towards the chest and that was the last" and at that time, he, Dr. Yoshimi, Col. Rahman and 6 or 7 soldiers, including Medical Orderlies were present. There was no nurse or anybody else in that room at that time. After Netaji's death, all the Japanese stood up and saluted and Col. Rahman knelt by Netaji's bed and prayed twice. After he prayed for about quarter of an hour, he left for home. It will thus be seen that a fresh witness narrates a new story and which appears to have been the rule, rather than the exception.

Another person, who is in a position to say something in this connection, is Shri Harin Shah, witness No. 9, a journalist with several high connections in his line. He stated that in November, 1945, he went to China as a war correspondent on behalf of the Free Press of India News Agency of Bombay. In August, 1946, the Chinese Government at Nanking requested him and a number of prominent foreign correspondents to visit Formosa, which they had taken over from the

surrendering Japanese authorities. While they were at Shanghai, on their way to Formosa, two Indian businessmen asked him whether he would enquire about the reported death of Netaji there. This idea struck him and he made up his mind to do so. They accordingly reached Taihoku on 30-8-46 and, after contacting the local high officials there, came across sister Tsan Pi Sha, a Formosan nurse, who told him that she had attended on 'Mr. Chandra Bose' in the Military Hospital at Taihoku on 18-8-45. Excerpts from her story to Shri Shah are as follows "She worked in Operation Theatre. Netaji was treated in the medical ward. He was brought to the hospital about noon of August 18 and died at 11 in the same night.....he stayed about 11 hours in the hospital.....there was an A.D.C. with Netaji, tall man with beard.....three other men (Japanese Officers) were burnt and admitted with Netaji. These three Japanese Officers died after 3 days.....details about the injuries to Netaji were not known to her. After the Netaji's death, the body was put in a wooden box and put in a truck,.....There is a house, called a temple, inside the Hospital compound, where dead bodies are taken for rites. Netaji's body was taken to that house.....After the death, Netaji's body was taken to the temple, stated above and kept there for

3 days according to the Japanese Budhist Customs, after being removed from the Hospital.....he had a military uniform only, nothing else.....Netaji was placed in the medical ward, which was converted for surgical purpose. She is a Surgical nurse and took care of Netaji till he died..... Netaji was burnt all over the body, only olive oil was applied.....he was unconscious .... As he was very severely burnt, there was no place where injections could be given. Just before death he seemed to groan and seemed to her to say 'quiet death'..... Netaji's bed was kept in a corner of the room and Habibur Rahman's bed was close to Netaji's bed. There were three beds; Netaji's bed, Habibur Rahman's bed and third bed was for the Nurse."

The Chairman tried to bring this nurse to Tokyo, but having failed to do so, he tried to get her written statement. I regret I have no knowledge whether he met with success or not. In any case, this piece of contradictory evidence from a nurse, who states to have attended on Netaji and taken care of him till he died, is also enough to furnish an additional confirmation of my finding that Netaji did not die, as alleged by the witnesses.

Witness No. 21, Col. H. L. Chopra, who held an important position in the I. N. A., has stated that at Bangkok on the afternoon of 18. 8. 45, Major

Ran Singh, also of the I. N. A., informed him that a message had been received that Netaji had been killed in an air crash, though the general evidence on record is that death took place between 8 and 9 P. M. Major S. Nagatomo, witness No. 60, has stated that, as second Adjutant in the Army Headquarters at Taihoku, he received a series of telephone messages from the aerodrome and subsequently from the Hospital about the plane crash, injuries to Netaji, his treatment in the Hospital and subsequent death, which news he also received at about 3 P. M., after which the Army Commander, Gen. Ando, went to the hospital and saw Netaji's dead body within 4 P. M. and he, the Major, saw the dead body also within 5 P. M.

In my opinion, the evidence, regarding Netaji's injuries, his treatment in the hospital and his death there, as obtained also from the two Medical Officers, one nursing Orderly and a Formosan nurse, all said to have been attached to that hospital and who are alleged to have attended on Netaji, is so discrepant and contradictory, that no reliance can be placed on the same and what they stated has been fabricated. Narration of a true incident, even after a lapse of ten years could not be so discrepant and contradictory. As the injuries, alleged to have been received by

Netaji as a result of an alleged plane crash, and also his alleged death, as a result of those alleged injuries, have not been established in any way and as such worthless evidence only proves that those alleged incidents did not take place, such stories were concocted to support the secret plan of the Japanese as well as of Netaji to announce that Netaji had died. I am convinced that these are additional confirmations of my finding, already arrived at, that the Aircraft Accident Did Not Take Place.

#### FAILURE TO PRODUCE 'PHOTOGRAPH OF COFFIN OR DEAD BODY

There is a very interesting feature about the photograph, which Col. Rahman stated was taken by a photographer sent by the Military Headquarters at Taihoku on the morning of 20. 8. 45. No explanation has been given anywhere why the photographer was not sent on 18-8-45 or 19-8-45. He admitted that the lid of the coffin was removed, the body was uncovered, the face was open and he could recognise the face, and a photo of the body inside the coffin, but excluding the face, was taken along with him sitting by the side of that coffin. He asked the photographer to exclude the face, as it was disfigured and which, according to him, was done. This would mean that the photograph of the

whole of the coffin was not taken. If the photograph of the face was not taken, it is not understood with what intention or idea or utility, the face was excluded in the photograph. Then again, the Colonel stated that he sent a copy of this photograph to the Committee, but as they have not sent me that photograph, or, as a matter of fact, any other photograph or sketch or other relevant papers, it is not within my knowledge whether the Chairman actually received that photograph or not. The newspapers have not published any such photograph. What I have seen, is one in which Col. Rahman is said to be sitting on a chair with some parts of his body in bandages and in front of something said to be an urn. In my opinion, the real necessity for this photograph would be to prove that Netaji was dead and that his dead body would be shown inside a coffin. As I can in no way be satisfied for the exclusion of Netaji's face in that alleged photograph, the fact of its exclusion makes me believe that the body shown in that photograph, if any, was not that of Netaji. It would at the same time confirm my conviction that as Netaji did not die, his dead body was not available for being photographed. The Japanese proclaimed to the world that Netaji was dead. If they had any intention of confirming the truth of what they had

## Appendix T



PHOTOGRAPH SAID TO BE OF COL. HABIBUR RAHMAN,  
SITTING IN FRONT OF AN URN AND NOT A COFFIN.

proclaimed, a photographic print of Netaji's dead body would have been the best unfailing proof of the same, and which could not possibly have been challenged and so they would decidedly have taken a photograph of Netaji's dead body and shown it to the world, if Netaji had actually been dead. Col. Rahman stated that they took a photograph of his dead body, but exclusion of his face in it, which is something very ridiculous, would convince anybody that as Netaji was not dead, his dead body could possibly be available for being photographed and if a photograph had been taken of a dead body without a face, it could have been somebody else's body. In any case, no such ridiculous photograph was produced. This also goes to confirm my opinion that Netaji did not die, as alleged.

#### CREMATION.

The next important stage in the evidence would be the cremation. As the evidence on record regarding the aircraft accident, the injuries received by Netaji, his treatment in the hospital and his death there have been such, as to come to the only conclusion that they are all concocted and false, the evidence regarding cremation should be considered very carefully and a conclusion arrived at accordingly.

According to Col. Rahman, the coffin was put in a Military lorry or ambulance on 20-8-45 and in front of which was a car occupied by Japanese Officers and behind the coffin, were two lorries, full of Japanese soldiers and hospital staff, followed by their cars, carrying officers. Mr. J. Nakamura stated that on 20-8-45, the coffin was carried in an ambulance, which was accompanied by only 2 or 3 cars, containing 5 or 6 civilians and military officers, and which was deliberately done, to keep the news of Netaji's death a secret and to keep it confined only to high ranking military officers. Major Nagatomo, the second Adjutant in the Army Headquarters at Taihoku, stated that he was put in charge of making arrangements for the cremation. As has been the rule, as stated before, he has come forward with a new story and starting with it, he has given the date as 19-8-45 and not 20-8-45, as stated by the other two witnesses, when, soon after mid-day, after paying due respects to Netaji's body inside the coffin, he closed the lid, nailed it and had it placed in the middle of a military truck, with 12 soldiers all around it. Col. Rahman, Mr. Nakamura and he got into a car and went direct to the crematorium with the truck following them. There were 3 furnaces or incinerators in the crematorium, as shown in his sketch A, (App. Z)

and after opening the door of furnace no. I, which was in the middle, the sliding plate was pulled out and the coffin, containing the dead body was placed on it and pushed back into the furnace, because it is customary with the Japanese to cremate the body in the coffin. They then went behind the furnace and lit the fire, after which, he came to the front and after locking the furnace door, he took the key with him and all three of them went away in the same car. Next day, at about 8 a. m., all three of them came to the crematorium and after unlocking the furnace door with the key that was with him, he pulled out the sliding plate and according to Buddhist custom, he picked up, first the throat bone with a pair of chop sticks and placed it inside a wooden box, 8" cube, which he had taken with him. He then picked a bone from every portion of the body and placed them in that box. Col. Rahman then did the same and after the whole of that box was filled up, the lid was nailed and after wrapping it in white cloth, it was hung from the neck of Col. Rahman and all three of them went in the car to Nishi ( West ) Honganji Temple, for depositing the same there, after due ceremony.

According to Col. Rahman, however, after they had reached the crematorium, the coffin was

unloaded from the lorry by the Japanese soldiers and escort and placed outside the entrance to the crematorium, where the body was taken out of the coffin by the Japanese and then taken inside, where there were 12 to 14 incinerators in two rows and the body, taken out of the coffin already, was placed inside the Chamber just near the passage. As the fire was burning underneath, he locked the furnace door and kept the key overnight with him and left for the hospital. Next morning, viz., on 21-8-45 and not on 20-8-45, he went to the crematorium with Mr. Nakamura and 1 or 2 other Japanese and opened the lock of the furnace door with the key that was with him and they collected some ashes from the head side, nearest to the door and placed them in the urn and this included a piece of gold, which, he said was the filling of one of Netaji's teeth. They then went to a Japanese Temple outside Taihoku town, where they deposited the urn and where Japanese priests were praying, according to arrangements that had been fixed up earlier.

Mr. Nakamura has narrated a fairly lengthy story, viz., that when he reached the crematorium, he found about 15 Japanese soldiers already there, and who unloaded the coffin from the ambulance and taking it inside, placed it, viz., the coffin, inside the only furnace in the crematorium, which

he has shown in his sketch B, (App. a) and not 3, or 12 or 14 furnaces, as has been stated by the other two witnesses. The soldiers then, returned outside the crematorium, where he, Col. Rahman and the others were waiting and reported to them what they had done. Then, all five of them, led by Col. Rahman, entered the crematorium and stood in front of the furnace door and saluted and paid their respects to the dead body. They then went behind the furnace, where a priest was standing with burning incense sticks in his hand, one of which he offered to the Colonel, who, however, could not catch it with his fingers, as they were bandaged. He took it and made the Colonel hold it between the edge of his palms and helped him in placing it in the hole at the rear of the furnace. He and the others also put in burning incense sticks through the same hole. All of them came out of the crematorium and he went home in a separate car. On the following day, (21-8-45), he arrived at the crematorium at about noon and found Col. Rahman already there with 15 soldiers and some high ranking Officers. A crematorium employee asked them to come in, which they did, Col. Rahman leading them. The employee opened the furnace door, pulled out the sliding tray. A priest brought chop sticks and as the Colonel could

not hold the same, he did so and picked up first the throat bone, then the lower jaw bone and after that, other bones & placed them inside an urn & Col. Rahman touched the upper part of the chop sticks held by him only twice. A Japanese Military Officer then picked up bones and ashes, and after the urn was filled up, he carried the urn from a sling hung round his neck, as the Colonel's neck was burnt and bandaged. Both of them and nobody else, then went to Nishi (West) Honganji Temple, which was near the hospital and handed over the urn to the head priest there. There he saw another urn, which the priest told him contained the ashes of Gen. Shidei. He then went home and the Colonel returned to the hospital.

It will thus be seen that these 3 witnesses have given 3 versions, different from one another on many salient points and which all go to show and confirm that the story of cremation narrated by them is a myth and did not take place at all. Therefore, after a careful consideration of the evidence that has been discussed above, I am fully satisfied that the aircraft accident and all the incidents subsequent to it, viz., the injuries to Netaji, resulting therefrom, his treatment in the hospital, his death there and the cremation of his dead body, as stated by the witnesses, did not take place and are decidedly false

and, vice-versa, due to these incidents not having taken place, the evidence adduced is necessarily contradictory and highly discrepant and of a nature, which one rarely comes across.

### ASHES.

The ashes now held in Renkoji temple in Tokyo cannot, therefore, be those of Netaji and it is for the same reason that the evidence regarding the same, from its transfer from a Temple in or near Taihoku to its final destination in Tokyo, after passing through different channels, is also so discrepant. Such evidence therefore, is unbelievable and unreliable.

It has come to my knowledge from reports published, that my colleagues have held that those ashes are those of Netaji and they have recommended that they be brought to India with due pomp and ceremony, so that suitable memorials may be held throughout the country over the same. I would assert in the strongest terms that I am firmly convinced that the evidence on record would lead to the only conclusion that the Aircraft Accident and the incidents subsequent to that, as stated above, did not take place and that the evidence adduced thereon is concocted and false and I am confident that any person without any bias or

prejudice will also come to the same conclusion. I would, accordingly, state that there is no justification whatsoever for holding that those ashes are of Netaji and, therefore, our Government should refrain from taking any step that would help in bringing those ashes to India, as Netaji's ashes. I would humbly suggest that if our Government is so very eager to spend money for erecting memorials in Netaji's name throughout the country, they could do so in various ways, including constructive ones, that would materially help our poor and deserving countrymen. I am constrained to say that it is shameful on the part of a Government to commemorate Netaji's name now, by spending money over what they believe to be his ashes, when up till now, they have given him practically no recognition, even in ways, that would not have cost them even a copper.

COL. RAHMAN'S STATEMENTS, DATED  
24. 8. 45 TO SHRI J. MURTI.

Before concluding this report, it would be necessary to refer to certain points, which are fairly important, but, at the same time, rather interesting.

Some of the statements made by Col. Habibur Rahman to different persons, at different places and

at different times, after being considered first, may then be compared with his statements before the Committee. Excerpts from the statements made by him at Taihoku on 24. 8. 45 and which he left with Shri Jaya Murti, witness no. (36,) at Tokyo are, as follows :—

“—At 14. 35 hrs. the plane took off. It had not yet gained much height and was within the outskirts of the airfield, when a loud report like that of an explosion was heard from the front. In actual fact, one of the propellers of the aeroplane had broken. Immediately, the plane crashed on the ground and it caught fire both in the front and in the rear. At the time of the accident Netaji's position in the aeroplane was as follows—On his immediate right was the petrol tank—Netaji got out of the plane from the left side from the front—As soon as I got out I saw that Netaji's clothes were on fire, from head to foot—he had sustained severe burns on his body in addition to serious head injuries—within 15 minutes we were rushed to the nearest Nippon Army Hospital—but he unfortunately expired at 21.00 hrs. (T. T.)—prior to his death he was in his senses—prior to his death he asked me to convey a message from him to our countrymen to the following effect:—I have fought to the last for India's Independence and now am giving my life in the same attempt.

Countrymen ! continue the Independence fight.  
Before long, India will be free. Long live Azad Hind.'—the body was cremated on 22. 8. 45 at Taihoku. Taihoku, Taiwan, 24, 8. 45 Sd. Habibur Rahman, Colonel."

Then, in the evening of 8. 9. 45, at the house of Mrs. A. M. Sahay in Tokyo, Col. Rahman narrated to Mrs. Sahay and Shri S. A. Iyer, a story, which has been recorded at pages 112 to 114 of Shri Iyer's book "Unto him a witness," excerpts of which, are :-  
"It was 2. 35 P. M. when the plane took off. We had just cleared the runway and gained two or three hundred feet. We were on the outskirts of the aerodrome. We had been up in the air only a minute or two. Then a sudden deafening noise ... Actually there was no enemy plane about. I learnt later that one of the propellers of the port Engine had broken. The port Engine is out of action .. We are losing height pretty fast ... And in less than a few seconds the plane crashed on its nose and then everything went dark for a while. When I recovered consciousness after a few seconds, I realised that all the luggage had crashed on top of me and a fire had started in front of me . Netaji was injured in the head, but he had struggled to his feet and was about...to get out of the plane through the rear ..

So I said to him 'Aagese nikliya Netaji' (Please go out through the front, Netaji)....With both his hands he fought his way through the fire. He got out and stood there about ten to fifteen feet away anxiously looking out for me ..So he stood with his clothes burning and himself making desperate attempts to unbuckle the belt of his bushcoat and round his waist. I dashed up to him and tried to help him remove the belts ... my heart nearly stopped when I saw his face, battered by iron and burnt by fire. A few minutes later, he collapsed and lay on the ground....I too was exhausted and went and lay down next to him .. The next thing I knew was that I was lying on a hospital bed next to Netaji .... Netaji lost consciousness almost immediately after reaching the hospital. He revived a little later and relapsed again into a state of coma. The Japanese made superhuman efforts to save Netaji. But it was all in vain. Six hours after he was brought into the hospital, i. e., at 9 P. M. on 18th August, Netaji's end came peacefully...A few moments before his end came, he said to me : Habib my end is coming very soon, I have fought all my life for my country's freedom. Go and tell my countrymen to continue the fight for India's freedom. India will be free and before long'...The funeral service with full military honours was held

in the Shrine attached to the hospital and the cremation took place on the 20th."

#### • OTHER STATEMENTS & EXCERPTS FROM SECRET REPORTS.

Soon after the surrender of the Japanese on 15. 8. 45, and Netaji's departure from Saigon two days latter, the British Indian Government sent Police Officers, Shri H. K. Roy & Shri K. P. Dey, witnesses Nos. 14 & 15 respectively, and others to the Far East for arresting Netaji under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance. Having failed in their mission, they made thorough enquiries about his whereabouts and so did the British and American Military Intelligence Departments. Extracts from one of those reports, viz., by the Counter Intelligence Corps, G. H. Q. AFPAC on death of Subhas Chandra Bose, dated 29th September, 1945 (Tokyo) are :—

—“The following information concerning the circumstances of the death of Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Indian National Army, was obtained on 24th September, 1945 through interview of Habib-ur-Rahman, former Deputy Chief of Staff and Aide-de-Camp to Bose, at the Tokyo residence of Ram Murti..... According to Rahman the plane had not gained much altitude after the

take-off from Taihoku, when he heard a terrific explosion and felt the plane vibrating violently..... and the plane crashed at the end of airfield. Rahman stated that he was not rendered unconscious and noticed immediately after the crash that the interior of the plane broke into flames at the nose and tail. Due to the terrific crash the canopy overhead was broken and it was through this opening that those not too seriously injured or instantly killed escaped from the burning plane. He revealed that he had no knowledge of how Bose escaped or was removed from the plane. He stated that upon alighting from the plane he noticed his own coat afire. He removed it immediately and then saw Bose lying by the plane with his clothing afire..... He added that the seat Bose occupied in the aircraft was beside a petrol tank..... It was later determined that Bose received severe injuries about the head and neck in addition to his severe burns..... According to Rahman, Bose recovered sufficiently to carry on a conversation and complained of pain in his head..... Rahman declared at approximately 21.00 honrs, 18th August 1945, Bose died of the injuries received in the plane crash..... On 20th August 1945 Bose was removed from the Hospital and his remains were placed in a box provided by the Japanese..... Major (FNU) Nagatome, a Japanese Staff Officer, informed

Rahman on 21st August 1945 that the body be cremated, and Rahman, after careful consideration agreed. On 22nd August 1945 the ashes were removed by Nakamura and Major Nagatoma ..... According to Rahman, photos were taken at the scene of the crash and also at the hospital after the death of Bose. These photos are at present in possession of the Japanese War Office in Tokyo .....”.

It will thus be seen that the first statement was written by Col. Rahman at Taihoku on 24. 8. 45, i. e., only 6 days after the alleged plane crash, the second was what he personally told Shri S. A. Iyer on 8. 9. 45 at Tokyo, which was just at the end of the third week after that alleged incident and his third one is contained in the Top Secret Report dated 29. 9. 45 of the Combined British and American Intelligence Officers, as a result of the information they secured from the Colonel on 24-9-45 at Tokyo. On an examination of these three statements, it would appear there are some discrepancies in them and the impression he has given in them is that the plane was only a minute or two in the air and had not gained much altitude, after which it crashed within the airfield, whereas his statements before the Committee are that the plane reached an altitude of more than 1,000 feet, after being in the air for 5 or 6 minutes and it crashed at

a distance of 1 or 2 miles from the boundaries of the airfield. Here, he is reported to have stated that he had no knowledge as to how Netaji escaped or was removed from the plane, whereas, elsewhere, he stated definitely that Netaji rushed out of the plane through fire and he immediately followed him also through the same fire. Here he introduced a new story that his coat was afire, but all other statements are that his uniform remained untarnished and he admitted having worn the same in that condition for several years after his return to India. As stated here, he saw Netaji lying on the ground with his clothes on fire, but all the other statements of his are that Netaji was standing, and after he succeeded in putting out the fire, he made Netaji lie down on the ground. His sketch (App. I) clearly shows that the petrol tank was much below and away from Netaji's seat in the plane and not by his side, as he had stated here. The dates of the alleged cremation of Netaji as stated here and elsewhere are also different.

The information, contained in the Secret Headquarters, Main File 10 Misc I. N. A., 273 I. N. A. Subject : Subhas Chandra Bose, (Extracts bearing on his alleged death) Pages 1 to 40, is worth considering and it discloses quite a number of facts of varying interest. As it was a very thorough inves-

tigation, they started with Netaji's plan of going to Russia and ended with his ashes deposited in Tokyo.

I quote below certain extracts from this report.

At Page 10—Reference B2 dated 5-10-45, it is written "Bose had been trying to persuade the the Japanese to allow him to go to Manchuria since October, 44. When he told them that they had no chance of invading India through Burma, and that accordingly he would prepare to try another road to Delhi via Moscow. Reference should be made to Hikari's telegram at the time Bose arrived in Saigon. Isoda was also there and this fact may be significant that there was any plan on the part of Hikari Kikan to allow Bose to escape and to publish a false story regarding his death. This would have been the ideal place for Isoda to put into operation any such plan ...If they are part of a colossal and well executed deception manoeuvre. This file of telegrams along with numerous other documents must have been purposely left for the British to find them. "***Although at this stage one cannot rule out the possibility of Bose being still alive,***" this file of telegrams contains four and the most important one, which gives an idea of the plan "to allow Bose to escape and to publish a false story regarding his death" is as follows :—

“2. To O. C. Kikan, From Chief of Staff Southern Army, Staff II Signal 66, 20th Aug. ‘Top Secret’— ‘T’, while on his way to the Capital, as a result of an accident to this aircraft at Taihoku at 14.00 hours on the 18th, was seriously injured, and died at midnight on the same date. His body has been flown to Tokyo by the Formosan Army.” It should be stated here that Netaji was referred to as ‘T’ in all their secret communications regarding him. As it is difficult to challenge the correctness of the statements, made in this telegram sent by such a high-ranking military officer, regarding such an important person and about his alleged death, viz., that the death took place at midnight and the dead body was flown to Tokyo, it cannot be understood why the evidence adduced before the Committee is in general that death took place at about 9 p. m. and the body was cremated at Taihoku after 2 or 3 days. As regards the statements made by Col. Rahman at different places, this report has said at Page 5, No. C-5, Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi, 19-5-46 that “Habib-ur-Rahman’s report is unsatisfactory. The multitude of discrepancies in accounts of the actual aircrash, as given first to C1C” (Combined Intelligence Corps, which I have referred to above), “in Tokyo and later to CSDIC is being taken up. You will understand our pressing anxiety to get

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the truth of whether Bose is actually and permanently dead. Government wants to know where they stand in the matter in view of the sayings by Gandhi and others in India that he is still alive. Our examination so far only permits us to say unless there was a very cleverly contrived and executed deception plot, involving a very few of the highest Japanese Officials, Bose is almost certainly dead."

Shri Dwijendranath Bose and Shri Arobindu Bose have stated before us that, though they helped Netaji in leaving Calcutta secretly on 16-1-41, they declared his departure on 26-1-41, after they received information that he had crossed the Indian frontier and had entered Afghanistan and this was in accordance with the instructions Netaji had left with them. They also stated that the Japanese Government had also done the same and which is borne out by the entries at Page 8 noted below :—

"Extract from Allied Land Forces S.E.A., No. 57 for week ending 2 November 1945. The first news of the alleged death of Bose was contained in a Domei message from Tokyo dated 23 August 1945. It is stated that he was treated in a hospital in Japan where he succumbed to injuries at midnight on 18-19 August." The death is alleged to have

taken place on 18-8-45, and so the reason for the delay in the announcement of the same, may agree with that given by the two witnesses named above, but it cannot be explained, as to why the announcement was to the effect that he was treated in a hospital in Japan and that he died there and not at Taihoku, as has been stated before as by all the witnesses, except by the explanation that the question of death is false.

At Page 30, it has been written as follows:—  
"Extract from Top Secret letter No, SLO/CS/1,  
dated 1-3-46 from C. I. C. B., to A.D. (J)

" My dear Wright,

..... There are major discrepancies regarding the disposal of the body. Isoda and the captured signal state that he died at midnight in Taihoku hospital and that his body was flown to Tokyo by the Formosan Army. Domei, on the other hand, states that he died in Japan, while Habib-ur-Rahman states that he was cremated and buried in Taihoku. The discrepancy here is great and appears suspicious. In addition, if it is a deception plan it is one which has been extremely carefully and ingeniously organised..... In conclusion it can be said definitely that Bose left Saigon and probably that there was a plane crash at the take-off at Taihoku. It is

possible that Bose escaped from the crash unhurt and either hid in Formosa on his own initiative or was hidden by local authorities who took an ad hoc decision....

I can think of no other channel which would be worth while exploring."

This clearly shows that at the conclusion of the investigation, the suspicion remained that Netaji had escaped and had hid himself somewhere and this is, therefore, a very strong challenge to the findings of my colleagues that Netaji was dead.

A letter at page 32 written just before the one considered above, also arrives at the same conclusion.

"No C-5, Intelligence Bureau, (H. D.), New Delhi 3, Dated the 19 Feb. 46, Secret.

My dear Young,

We have at last completed an examination of the information available here relating to the alleged death of Bose, and the result is not entirely satisfactory for it reveals many discrepancies which, until clarified, make any definite conclusion on this incident a little doubtful ... .... The SACSEA Commission No. 1 report dated 6 November 1945 states : - ... .... It is beyond doubt that he ( Bose ) had plans to go underground together with a number of selected friends of his movement. The earlier

report from the Commission dated 18 October, 1945,  
suggested that the Japanese had undertaken to give  
Bose the necessary protection ( to go underground ). .

Major Courtenay Young,  
Intelligence Division,  
C. I. C. B., H. G. SACSEA,  
Singapore.

Yours sincerely,  
Sd. W. Mckwright.

The facts elicited from these extracts from Top Secret Reports clearly show that the findings of my colleagues, that aircraft accident took place and that Netaji died, cannot be correct, as British and American Intelligence officers, inspite of thorough investigation in all those areas, soon after Netaji's departure from Saigon on 17/8/45, themselves failed to arrive at that conclusion and had to remain content with the suspicion that Netaji was alive somewhere.

As regards the ashes, this report says at Page 17, "**Ashes May Not Be Bose's**". Second, what happened to his remains ? The ashes, supposed to be his, were brought to Tokyo. But ashes don't prove who the dead man is, they might be anybody's or they may not be those of a human being at all" and about the photographs, it has been observed at Page 18, "The above story cannot be taken as final until the photographs stated to have been taken

at this spot, and the actual remains of Bose have been examined."

Finally, at Page 17, the conclusion is, "**So the mystery remains unsolved**, and local Indians are no more convinced of his death than they were at the time it was announced. If anything, they are more convinced than ever, that it is all a make-believe by Mr. Bose". So, this Secret report finally concludes that the local Indians, even with the lapse of time and with no further news regarding Netaji, instead of believing that he is dead, are more convinced than ever that his death is a make-believe or, in other words, a faked story concocted by him.

It will thus be seen, from what has been written above, that British Indian Police Officers, both British and Indian, as well as British and American Military Intelligence Officers, made thorough investigations and search for Netaji in all the areas, where they thought he could possibly have been, soon after his departure from Saigon on the 17th August, 1945, but inspite of their sincere efforts to arrest him under a warrant under the Enemy Agents' Ordinance, which they were armed with, or as a War Criminal, for having waged war against the Victorious Allies and, especially, against his King and Emperor, they not only

failed in their mission, but were unable to trace his whereabouts. As a result of this frustration, it would ordinarily have been expected of them to report that Netaji died as a result of that aircraft accident, but it is strange, that the result of such vigorous and on-the-spot enquiries, led them to come to the finding, that they could not secure conclusive evidence that Netaji was dead and that they were left with no other alternative, but to give the final verdict, that he was probably living and hiding somewhere.. I consider myself exceedingly fortunate to have succeeded in securing some Top Secret Reports, the findings in which must be admitted by everybody to be very important and exceedingly reliable, and extracts from which, quoted above, fully support my findings, and in my being able to secure a few photographs, sketches and other papers, which along with other important papers, were indispensably necessary for writing my report and which our Government have intentionally withheld from me, for some of the reasons, stated by me already and which, I believe, will be readily understood by my countrymen and others. By the Almighty's Grace and Blessings, I have been able to surmount at least some of the obstructions and hindrances that were intentionally placed in my way by our Government to make it impossible -

for me to write this report and that He only has enabled me to fulfil my duty in a humble manner and with my limited capabilities, not only to my humble self, but also to my Government and to my esteemed countrymen.

#### DEATH DENIED, INITIALLY BY CHAIRMAN, THEN BY 14 OTHERS.

The remaining evidence on record is, however, in quite a different strain, viz., that Netaji is not dead. The Chairman made a public announcement recently, that out of about 70 witnesses examined, only four stated that Netaji was not dead and they were Shri U. M. Thevar, M. L. A. Madras, Dy. Chairman, All India Forward Bloc, who was the first to appear before us, but for certain reasons, declined to make any statement and Sarbashri S. M. Goswami, Dwijendranath Bose and Arobindu Bose, the two named last, being Netaji's nephews. This number is far from being a correct one. It should be fifteen. It compels me to repeat, that due to His Grace, these fifteen persons were at one time led by no other person than the Chairman of this Committee, who, according to the statement of Shri Arabindu Bose before us on 26.4.56, publicly declared at a meeting near the Octerlony Monument in Calcutta on the 23rd January 1951, Netaji's

Birthday Anniversary, as the main speaker, that Netaji was alive. Evidently, with the intention of proving that he did not make such a declaration, he called upon Shri Bose to produce some evidence to prove this allegation against him, whereupon Shri Bose made the following statement on 8. 6. 56 :- “The Chairman has challenged the veracity of my statement and wanted me to produce some evidence that he actually made that sort of statement. At that time, I had told him that thousands and thousands of people would come and bear me out on this point, if they were put this question whether Shri Shah Nawaz Khan had made such a statement in these meetings or not. The Chairman had mentioned whether there were any reports on the same lines in the newspapers. I have gone through the old files of only two Calcutta newspapers, namely, the Hindusthan Standard, dated 24th January, 1951 and the Ananda Bazar Patrika, dated 25th January, 1951 and have got the following excerpts from the news published in the papers”, which are quoted here, viz., Hindusthan Standard (front page), dated 24th January, 1951..... “Said Major General Shah Nawaz Khan hoisting the National Flag amidst shouts of ‘Netaji Zindabad’, ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Bonde Mataram’. The General expressed the hope that Netaji would come back in

their midst at the time when they would be celebrating his next birthday".

Verbatim transliteration of excerpts from news published in the Ananda Bazar Patrika, dated 25th January, 1951, are :— ".... Tumul Bondemataram, Jai Hind abong Netaji Zindabad probhiriti Dhwanir moddhe pataka uttalan karite uthiya Major General Shah Nawaz Khan balen agami bathsar jakhan tahara Netajir 56th janmothsab koriben, takhan tini swayang tahader majhe ekanta bhabe thakiben boliya asha karen".

So the Chairman himself made an announcement in a public meeting in Calcutta on 23. 1. 51, where more than 100 thousand persons were present, that Netaji was alive. He is now definitely of the opposite opinion and it may be due to his having received some secret information after 23. 1. 51 about Netaji's death or it may be due to some other reason.

In addition to the four persons named by the Chairman, the following eleven have also stated before us that Netaji did not die viz., Captain Gulzara Singh, Lt. N. B. Das, Mr. Kazo Satoh, Col. Thakur Singh, Mr. N. Kitazawa, Dr. S. N. Dutt, Srimati Ila Pal Chowdhury, and Sarbashri Aswini Kumar Gupta, Jagadish Chandra Sinha, Narayan Das and Satyendra Nath Sen, out of whom

Mr. K. Satoh and Lt. N. B. Das have stated that they saw Netaji take off in a separate plane, without Col. Rahman in it and Dr. S. N. Dutt has given very clear and cogent reasons that Netaji is alive. He has very thoughtfully narrated a story from the evidence on record, which is certainly worthy of serious consideration. It is, "Sherlock Holmes would probably sum up the situation as follows:— At Taihoku, a minor plane accident was stage-managed by a deliberate collision with a boulder. This would support the police officers' statement of having seen the plane under repairs at the airport. Netaji's face was then heavily bandaged up to avoid identification and Col. Rahman's hand was touched with carbolic acid. They were then rushed off to a hospital. During the night, the pilot, the navigator, General Shidei and Netaji, the four '*dead*' victims of the crash, left for their destination. In the morning, it was given out locally that Netaji had died at night and a *covered* deadbody or an empty coffin was placed in a room in the hospital. Four days later, after the completion of further evidence, in support of the plane crash and the news of his safe arrival at his destination, the death of Netaji was announced in a broadcast". Another observation made by him is worth recording here, viz., 1. If he were alive at

that time, why did the Japanese Government broadcast his death? The answer to the first question is that the Japanese Government wanted to curry favour with General Mac Arthur after the actual surrender. It would have been an act of extreme meanness and downright treachery on the part of the Japanese Government to have handed over Netaji, their erstwhile friend and collaborator to the Anglo-Americans and of this they were incapable, as a self-respecting and a cultured nation. The only other alternative therefore was to broadcast his death after he had left, and continue to support it with what manufactured and tutored evidence they could place before the Enquiry Commission. They could not very well say that Netaji had escaped from their territory to an unknown destination, as they would have been accused of aiding and abetting the flight of a man who, in the eyes of the Anglo-Americans, was a war criminal."

Mr. N. Kitazawa, witness No. 61, was the Deputy of the Japanese Ambassador in Burma at that time. He is a top-ranking Diplomat and a Member of the House of Representatives, Japan. He stated that when the British forces began to advance, the Japanese forces started evacuating from Rangoon on 23. 4. 45 and Netaji and his party

also left Rangoon a day or two later. His Government decided to give protection to the Burmese Ministers and so, in accordance with their instructions, he accompanied 6 or 7 Burmese Ministers with their families from Rangoon for taking them to a safe place. Eventually, Dr Ba Maw, the Prime Minister, was taken to Japan and given asylum there. His Government had also decided to give protection to the Heads of all the States, that had helped them in the prosecution of the war, viz., Burma, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, the Phillipines, China, Manchuko, Indonesia and Thailand. Accordingly, Mr. Hachiya, the Japanese Minister to Netaji's Government, informed Netaji, that if he wished to seek shelter in Japan, his Government would give him every facility to do so. Netaji accepted this proposal and moved away with that intention. On 16. 8. 45 or 17. 8. 45, he went to Saigon aerodrome and saw Netaji off from there. He reached Saigon on 5. 8. 45 and though he stayed at the official residence of the Japanese Ambassador there up to 23. 8. 45, he received no information, and, evidently, the same with his Ambassador also, that Netaji's plane had crashed and that Netaji had died at Taihoku on 18. 8. 45. This is exceedingly unusual and could not otherwise be explained, except, probably, by saying that the incident did

not take place. On the other hand, he was informed at Saigon, that Netaji wanted to go to Soviet Russia via Manchukuo, but Netaji was persuaded by his Government to go to Japan instead.

Shri Aswini Kumar Gupta, witness No. 8, who was Joint Editor of the Hindusthan Standard, has stated that in May 1951, when he was on a special assignment in the North Eastern Frontier Agency, he visited, Manipur and Naga Hills area, where he met the great Naga leader, Mr. Phizo, who is in the limelight at the present moment. Mr. Phizo told him that he was informed previous to 18. 8. 45, that a plane crash involving Netaji would be announced, but he was not to believe it. On another occasion in December 1950 or in January 1951, when he was travelling in the Mishmi Hills area, he saw Netaji's picture in the houses of the Mishmis and he was told by them that at a place called Rima, the Chinese Army had given them news about Netaji and they also knew that Netaji had visited the Naga Hills and other areas. Some Mishmi headmen also told him that when they declined the request of the Chinese Commanders to help them in making roads, they were told by the Chinese that one of the great Indian leaders was with them. The Chinese took some of them to an interior place, where they saw a person in

military uniform, resembling Netaji's picture, sitting in a tent. The Chinese Commanders then told them that he was Netaji. On the third occasion when Shri Gupta was in Kalimpong in October, 1949, he met a Maharashtrian Scholar, probably holding a doctorate degree and who was doing research work there, who suddenly brought out a group photograph and showed it to him and asked him whether he knew anybody in that group. He told the scholar that there was one in the group, who resembled Netaji very much, but he was in a closed-collar suit and not in military uniform. The scholar then told him that this was the reason why the photograph was shown to him. On asking him about Netaji's whereabouts, he kept silent. When Shri Gupta was shown the group photograph, facing Page 8 in the book, "Netaji Mystery Revealed", by Shri S. M. Goswami, witness No. 16, he said there was one person in it, who resembled Netaji, but this was not the group photograph, which he was shown at Kalimpong. Shri Gupta is a respectable and educated gentleman and does not appear to be unusually interested in Netaji and so there is no reason why he would make statements that were not true.

The deposition of Shri S. N. Goswami may now be taken up. He was at one time a Special

Officer in the Anti-Corruption Department of the Government of West Bengal and is now doing business. He has been making investigations regarding Netaji's whereabouts or otherwise both in India and abroad, during the last few years and has published a book, "Netaji Mystery Revealed". When in 1949, he went to Germany, he met Herr Heins von Have, who told him that Netaji was alive. This he has written in some details at Pages 11 & 12 of his book, named above. At Page 41 of the same book, he has stated about a news that was flashed by the Associated Press from New Delhi on 29. 8. 45, that an American correspondant told Shri Jawaharlal Nehru that Netaji was alive and ought to "be treated as a War Criminal, as his men caused murder to many Americans and he himself had forcibly extracted money from the poor in Malay and Burma." On the following page, he has reported a similar news issued by Reuter from London on 2. 9. 45 and by A. P. from Kandy (Ceylon) on 3. 9. 45. He has made a few other similar statements and given reference to newspaper reports, which, not being in my possession, I refrain from referring to them. At Page 1 of his book, he has made a reference to an extract from a report by the Manchester Guardian, which

is to the effect that "Though Subhas Bose was reported to have been killed in an aircraft in Formosa at the end of the war, his body was not found and a legend grew up that he was in hiding...". Further on, he stated that he had with him a booklet "Trade Union Delegation in China", at Page 4 of which was a group picture of a Mongolian Delegation, said to have visited Peking in 1952, with a person third from the left, having a striking resemblance to Netaji. I regret I am not in possession of this booklet or the enlargement of this picture either, which he stated he had filed before the Committee. Col. H. L. Chopra has supported Shri Goswami, by saying that a person in that group photograph resembled Netaji.

Shri S. A. Iyer in his book, "Unto Him A Witness" has made a few interesting observations which are as follows:—Page 69, "But *where* was Netaji going? We did not ask him and he ~~did~~ did not tell us. But we knew and he knew that we knew. The plane was bound for Manchuria." Page 71, "shall I ever see him again? If so, when and where?....There were so many bombers and transport planes in that very aerodrome. Legal or illegal, it should be possible for a Japanese pilot to turn the propellers start the engine and take

off with us aboard the plane and fly us to wherever Netaji may be.” Page 72, “At 5: 15. p. m. 17th August, the plane took off from Saigon aerodrome carrying Netaji. *God knows where !*” Pages 75 & 76, “Each one of us knew very well how all the five of us were impatient to reach Netaji...Then Abid cut short the talk in his characteristic way, Look here Ayer Saheb, Netaji will not rest for a moment wherever he may be...So you ought to go and there is no need to argue about it. If he is *already in Moscow* or on his way, you must reach him as early as possible. There will be plenty to do. So, we stand down in your favour, and we want you to go.” Pages 84 & 85. “No. no. Oh, no. Netaji can’t be dead. It is impossible. Netaji is immortal. How *can* he die before he sees India completely fr. No. No. He is *not* dead. He is very much alive somewhere. I don’t believe what this man says. This story is a fake.” ...“Look Colonel, I want to be frank with you. Not a single Indian in India or East Asia will believe this story unless you produce conclusive proofs....You must now take me at once to Taihoku. I *must* see Netaji’s body with my own eyes....Whatever happens, I *must* be taken to Taihoku”. The Colonel replied “I shall do my best. We have already told Taihoku to take photos and collect all positive

evidence of the accident". "I must be taken Taihoku", I mumbled again. "At last we landed.... It was nearly 10. 00. P. M. I took it for granted that it was Taihoku ..." Page 86, "I felt like wanting to fly at the Colonel's throat when Aoki replied :— No, we are in Taichu, not Taihoku". "Why", I barked. From these words, it is apparent that Shri Iyer had a reasonable doubt that Netaji's death, as announced, was concocted.

#### PHOTOSTAT COPY OF DR. RADHA BINOD PAL'S LETTER.

Mention has been made in an earlier part of this report of the name of Dr. Radha Binod Pal, the jurist of international fame. ( App. b.) is a photostatic copy of a letter written by him on 14. 2. 53 to Shri A. M. Nair of Tokyo and which was filed by Shri Arabindu Bose, in which he has written, "As a matter of fact, I could not accept as true the story of Netaji's death at Formosa. In any case, I feel that the whole thing demands a thorough investigation. Statements by individuals made here and there will not convince me as to the truth of the whole story given out. I have reasons to doubt its correctness." It is very well known that Dr. R. B. Pal was one of the Judges in

the War Criminals' Tribunal at Tokyo and his dissentient judgment in it is historic. As such, I believe, he had ample opportunities of coming in contact with the top-ranking Allied Secret Service Officers. It is impossible for him to make any statement, until he could vouch for its correctness. I would therefore accept the same fully.

#### SHRI M. K. GANDHI & RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS BELIEVE NETAJI ALIVE.

I have already quoted certain extracts from the Allied Secret Report, No 10/Misc/I.N.A. and what is quoted below is considered to be very important and they appear at Pages 38 & 39. "Gandhi stated publicly at the beginning of January that he believed that Bose was alive and in hiding..... ascribing it to an inner voice..... Congressmen believe that Gandhi's inner voice is secret information which he had received..... This is however, a secret report which says Nehru received a letter from Bose saying he was in Russia and that he wanted to escape to India..... The information alleges that Gandhi and Sarat Bose are among those who are aware of this ..... it is probable that the letter from Bose arrived about the time Gandhi made his public statement. In January also Sarat Bose is reported to have said that he was

## Appendix b

21, BEADON STREET,  
CALCUTTA-6

14th Feb. 1953.

Dear Mr. Nair,

I am thankful for your letter dated the 5th instant.


It is really surprising that my name should be used in that manner. I did not go to any temple either with or without the ambassador to see the alleged ashes. As a matter of fact I could not accept as true the story of Netaji's death at Formosa. In any case I feel that the whole thing demands a thorough investigation. Statements by individuals made here and there will not convince me as to the truth of the story given out. I have reasons to doubt its correctness.

I am glad that Mr. Shimonaka and Mr. Tanaka are doing their best to educate the public mind of Japan. Satyen has come back. He tells me that Mr. Shimonaka has already engaged a house near Yokohama for starting the school that I suggested during my last visit. I shall indeed be happy if the scheme materializes.

Kindly remember me to all my Japanese friends and convey to them my best regards.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,



(RADHABINOD PAL)

PHOTOSTATE COPY OF LETTER, DATED CALCUTTA,  
14th. FEBRUARY, 1953, BY DR. RADHA BINODE PAL

convinced his brother was alive. Another piece of intelligence which connects Bose with the N. W. Frontier is a letter written by the President of the Frontier Students Congress. In this letter the writer said that Bose was in T. T. and that he was going there himself ..... The information received from internal sources is puzzling and the same can be said about external information. On the 7th of January, the Russian paper "Pravda" denied in strong terms that Bose was in Russia. Before then, however, the Ghilzai Malang had been coupling a live Bose with Russia and in December a report said that the Governor of the Afghan Province of Khost had been informed by the Russian Ambassador in Kabul that there were many Congress refugees in Moscow and Bose was included in their number. There is little reason for such persons to bring Bose into fabricated stories. At the same time, the view that Russian officials are disclosing or alleging that Bose is in Moscow is supplied in a report received from Teheran. This states that Moradoff, the Russian Vice Consul General disclosed in March that Bose was in Russia where he was secretly organising a group of Russians to work on the same lines as the I. N. A. for the freedom of India. Taihoku, Congress and Russian representatives in Teheran and Kabul are the most important objec-

tives in this case as it stands now.

The reliability and importance of this secret report have already been stressed. It is clear from the lines noted above that both internal sources, viz., Indian and external sources viz., abroad, have had sufficient materials to say that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was expected to be living somewhere.

#### SHRI HARIN SHAH'S ENQUIRY IN 1946.

The evidence of Shri Harin Shah, the journalist, has been given much prominence by my colleagues, though, admittedly, he had very little personal knowlegee of the facts stated by him. To analyse his deposition, it would appear, that far from supporting the alleged death of Netaji, it would disprove it. According to him, in the Japanese newspaper "Taiwan (Formosa) Nichi Nichi Shinbun" published from Taihoku on 22-8-45, it was reported that Netaji died on 19-8-45 at midnight and that Lt. Gen. Suechengche, not Shidei, died immediately and 4 other Generals and Colonels were injured. Then again, when Shri Shah went to the Bureau of Health and Hygiene at Taihoku for consulting the Death Certificate Records and permission to cremate Netaji's body, he met Dr. Kan, the Officer-in Charge and the 2 clerks, who were in service there at that time. They

stated, that as the body was that of a distinguished person, they were not allowed to see it, but it was taken out of the coffin, placed on a wooden plank, wrapped in cloth and then transferred to a bier, which is quite a new story.

He took photostat copies of the following documents : -

- (1) Doctor's report on the death of Netaji,
- (2) The police officer's report and
- (3) the certificate issued by the Bureau, permitting cremation. They were written in Japanese.

The doctor's report was translated into English by Mr. Chung and is as follows :—

From the Army Hospital, To The Bureau of Health and Hygiene.

Date of the Report : 21st August, 1945.

Certificate of the Death.

Name of the person      Okara Ochiro ( meaning big warehouses of food and Ichiro means eldest son ).

Sex                      Male.

Birth                      Born in the Heiti 22nd year, April 9.

Occupation              He was Taiwan ( Formosa ) Military Government Army's obedient officer.

Reason of death	By sickness.
Nature of sickness	Heart failure.
Time of sickness	17th August, 1945
Time of death	19th August, 4 P. M.
Place of death	Army Hospital.
Date	21st August

Name of the doctor and

the seal Chuluta Toyoji Chentza,  
Siskwan ( Japanese University ).

On asking the clerks, Shri Shah was told that false details were noted, according to the instructions of the Japanese Officer, accompanying the body. This reason cannot be accepted, because if the person had actually died, no further action could be taken against him and the necessity for secrecy could not arise any longer. As against this, Netaji's death was given great publicity by all the different sources, soon after his alleged death. I fail to understand the utility of this ridiculous piece of evidence to prove Netaji's death.

The Police report, according to Shri Shah was more or less a confirmatory paper on the lines of the doctor's report, but the cremation permit from the Taipeh ( Taihoku ) Bureau of Health and Hygiene was, as follows :—

Column 1	Official Permit of the Bureau to cremate the body.
Column 2	Native Place—Tokyo Present address—Taipeh (Taihoku, which is the other name of Taipeh)
Columns 3 & 4	Same as in Doctor's certificate with regard to Death, Name, Sex, Birth, Date and Occupation of the deceased.
Column 5	Where the body will be cremated—Taihoku City Government Crematorium.
Column 6	Time and date for cremation—6 P. M. 22nd August, 1945.
Column 7	Relationship of applicant—His close friends.
Columns 8 & 9	The capital printed Japanese letters show that this is an application for the Government to cremate that body.
Column 10	Blank
Column 11	Date of application—August 21st, 1945.
Column 12	Blank.
Column 13	Army and the number of deceased—Army in Formosa, No. 21123. In Japanese it was put down as Taiwan Dainichi nichi Bruhai.

Column 14      Name of the applying Japanese Officer of the Police station—Yoshimi Yani Yoshi.

The Officers' seal in red is also on the paper.

I cannot but make an observation that this is another ridiculous piece of evidence to prove Netaji's death.

The next point, considered by Shri Harin Shah, is cremation. It has already been stated that the 3 witnesses, viz., Major Nagatomo, who was the 2nd Adjutant to the Formosan Army Commander at Taihoku and who was deputed by the Army Command to arrange for the cremation, Col. Habibur Rahman and Mr. J. Nakamura, the Interpreter meant for Netaji, and whose services, appear to have been requisitioned even after Netaji's death, have given 3 different versions. It will presently be seen, whether the fourth version by Shri Harin Shah follows the rule, that has generally been maintained, regarding the evidenee from the Aircraft Accident onwards, or whether it will be an exception. Shri Shah stated that Mr. Chu Tsuang, a Formosan, was in charge of the same crematorium also at that time and who narrated the following story :- "The coffin was a very big one and 7 or 8 Japanese officers accompanied the body in plain clothes and they reached at 3 P. M. It took about

8 hours for the body to be consumed and the officers paid the ordinary fee of 18 yens. The coffin was so big, that it could not be accommodated even in Class I Chamber and so the body was taken out and placed inside another coffin, evidently, a smaller one and which was put inside the chamber for cremation. According to the usual practice, he collected the ashes the next morning in the usual wooden box, after which, an Indian, with a bandaged forearm, and a few Japanese, who came in a truck and in a Sedan Car, took away the box. This, being the fourth different version regarding cremation, the general rule has been maintained. As such, the only conclusion, that can possibly be arrived at, is that the story regarding cremation is concocted and false, and it would naturally be so, as the Aircraft Accident Did Not Take Place and that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Did Not Die, as has been held already.

Another important point, referred to by Shri Shah, is that, on reaching Taihoku in August, 1946, the first idea that struck him was to get a confirmation regarding Netaji's alleged death from the War Graves' Commission, that was in session there and he, accordingly, met Lt. Richards, Officer Commanding, Research Division, American Head Quarters, Taihoku, who, however, said that he never came

across any information or mention about Netaji's grave. It is my firm belief that if Netaji had actually died at Taihoku, all the people there, young or old, rich or poor, would certainly have known about it and his grave would have been in a very prominent and conspicuous place.

NO ENQUIRY HELD, STATES JAPANESE  
FOREIGN OFFICE.

In this connection, the statements of Gen. H. Isayama, witness No. 57, are rather important, as he was Chief of the General Staff, Formosan Army with Head Quarters at Taihoku and, as such, he would be expected to know everything about the alleged plane crash and all other subsequent incidents. In addition to this, Gen. Shidei was his classmate and he was informed that Gen. Shidei, on arriving at Taihoku aerodrome, had enquired about him. He has started his narration with a statement rather suspicious, viz., that he heard about the plane crash and everything else, including Netaji's death, when he went to his office the next morning, from a staff Officer and that there was no official enquiry about it, even up to the time of his leaving Formosa in April, 1945. It is not understood why the General stated later

on, that the report resulting from an enquiry regarding this accident was submitted by staff Officer Lt. Col. Shibuya through him to the Imperial General Head Quarters, Tokyo, which is, however, definitely denied by that Officer. It is exceedingly strange that both this Staff officer as well as the Chief of Staff, Gen. Isayama, heard about the plane crash and the death of such a big person as Netaji and also the death of Gen. Shidei on the following day, though Major Nagatomo has stated that he regularly informed the Headquarters there regarding every detailed incident, viz., the plane crash, Netaji's injuries etc, very frequently. This would go also to create a reasonable suspicion that the plane crash and Netaji's death, as alleged, did not take place. A report was also received by the Committee from the Japanese Foreign Office that no enquiry was made regarding this incident, which is rather unusual. The same Office also sent us a copy of the service book of Gen. Shidei, in which the date and cause of death are recorded as "18. 8. 45" and "Death by War" respectively. This is far from being correct, as the War had ended and Japan had officially surrendered on 15. 8. 45. Accepting the plane crash to be a concocted and a faked story, the entries in his Service Book should in the usual course show death and nothing else. No evi-

dence has been adduced regarding the death of the Radio Operator, N.C.O. Tominaga or the Navigator, Sergeant Okshita and the other 1 or 2 persons, probably Engineers, forming part of the crew and who are alleged to have died. The Service book entries, regarding Major Takizawa, Chief Pilot and N.C.O. Aoyagi, Co-Pilot and the other members of the crew, alleged to have died, have not been produced either. The evidence regarding the death of both these Pilots is also very insufficient and shaky and that, regarding their remains, is even worse. Capt. Nakamura stated that he buried the entrails of these 3 persons, viz., Gen. Shidei and the two Pilots, which is a new and uncorroborated story, whereas, another witness, Capt. Arai, even went to the extent of saying that Gen. Shidei was definitely brought to the Hospital, where he expired. The evidence of the doctors, however, is that N.C.O. Aoyagi was also treated in the Hospital, where he died later on and not inside the plane, as stated by some witnesses.

BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE  
DISBELIEVE COL. RAHMAN.

From the Top Secret reports of the British and American Intelligence Officers, as a result of

thorough investigations made soon after the alleged incident, it appears that they failed to obtain conclusive proof that Netaji died as a result of a plane crash. To quote only a few extracts, it states at Page 3, "Habib-ur-Rahman's report is unsatisfactory. The multitude of discrepancies in accounts of the actual air crash as given first to CIC in Tokyo and later to CSDIC, is being taken up", and at Page 17, "The Indian ( Col. Rahman ) who supposedly was with Mr. Bose on the same plane has been seen with his hands and face bruised. But this again is no conclusive proof. He might have been involved in some other accident". It is, therefore, clear that even these officers failed to accept Col. Rahman's version, as to the manner in which he received those burns and injuries. This is with regard to Col. Rahman only, but with regard to the alleged incident, one military officer, W. Mckwright, in his No. C. 5, Intelligence Bureau (Headquarters), New Delhi 3, dated the 19th February, 1946, while reviewing the whole story, wrote to Major C. Young, Intelligence Division, C. I. C. B. H. G., SACSEA, Singapore at Page 32, "We have at last completed an examination of the information available here relating to the alleged death of Bose, and the result is not entirely satisfactory for it reveals many discrepancies, which,

until clarified, make any definite conclusion on this incident a little doubtful" and at page 36, he has concluded, "You will understand our pressing anxiety to get to the truth of whether Bose is actually and permanently dead. Government want to know where they stand over the matter, in view of claims by Gandhi and others in India that he is still alive. Our examination so far only permits us to say that, unless there was a very cleverly contrived and executed deception plot, involving a very few of the highest Japanese officials, Bose is almost certainly dead." It will, therefore, be agreed on all hands that these reports, based on thorough investigation, are sufficient by themselves to falsify the definite findings of my colleagues that Netaji died as the result of a plane crash.

Mr. K. Satoh, who was a bomber mechanic attached to 136 Air Unit at Taihoku at that time, has stated that there was a minor plane accident there, and the only 2 inmates of the plane, one resembling Netaji and the other a Japanese, came out of the plane unscathed and started talking to each other. Incidentally, this witness stated Netaji was wearing a big round wrist watch, which gives the lie direct to Col. Rahman's version of a rectangular wrist watch.

## NETAJI'S WRIST WATCH.

The wrist watch used by Netaji has been mentioned in brief earlier under the heading "Itinerary". Col. Rahman produced a rectangular wrist watch, with a leather strap, with the edges slightly burnt, and which eventually came into the possession of the late Sarat Chandra Bose, who got it from Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, who in turn got it from the late Bhullabhai Desai. The Colonel said that he got

Appendix. c

Netaji's half burnt watch



this watch from Dr. Yoshimi, witness No. 48, under whose treatment at the Military Hospital at Taihoku, Netaji was said to have expired. The Doctor has denied all knowledge of this statement made by the Colonel, which, therefore, remained uncorroborated, though it should have been supported by the doctor. Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, who produced before the Committee a photograph of this rectangular watch, (App. c) challenged the Colonel regarding this statement of his, when they met at the birthday anniversary celebration of Netaji at

the Belgachia Villa in Calcutta on the 23rd January, 1947, but the Colonel failed to give any reply to him.

No other witness has stated that Netaji ever used this rectangular wrist watch, nor has any photograph of Netaji been filed, showing Netaji wearing that rectangular wrist watch. It is highly improbable that this watch would escape any damage, though the plane is alleged to have crashed in such a manner that 2 or 3 inmates of the plane died instantaneously and Netaji, who is alleged to have worn the watch, died about 6 hour later. The time shown in the watch is about 8 minutes past 1, which can in no way be explained, as the plane is alleged to have crashed at 2.38 P. M.


On the other hand, Shri S. M. Goswami has stated that Netaji never wore that watch, but always wore a round wrist watch, which was presented to him by his father. Col. H. L. Chopra, who was in the I. N. A., has stated that Netaji always wore the same round wrist watch and he never wore any other wrist watch. Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, one of Netaji's nephews, and who stated to have worked with his uncle, regarding the latter's political activities and who also helped him to move out secretly from Calcutta in January, 1941, also stated that, when Netaji left Calcutta, the only article taken by him, out of all those, which he was

using in Calcutta, including clothing, spectacles etc., was this round wrist watch, which he insisted on taking with him, as he said, it was of great sentimental value to him, being a present from his revered mother. Shri Arabindu Bose, another of Netaji's nephews and who, also along with Shri Dwijendra Nath Bose, helped Netaji in getting away secretly from Calcutta, has fully and in details supported the statements made by his cousin. He has filed a photograph, (App. d), showing Netaji wearing his "famous round wrist watch" during his sojourn in the Far East. He has gone further and stated that, as Netaji could not spare this round wrist watch of his and also his pair of spectacles, reading glasses, cigarette case, cigarette lighter, Hindu religious books and other small articles, which he usually carried on his person, and as there was no possibility of getting substitutes for any of them, it was impossible for Col. Rahman to bring back any of these personal effects of Netaji, as proof of his alleged death. Instead of any of these articles, the Colonel brought a rectangular wrist watch (App. c), which was one of the many such watches, which were presented to Netaji by Dr. Jose Laurel, the then President of the Phillipines and which, Netaji presented to the Colonel and also to the Chairman of this Committee, when he was in the

I. N. A. and to others. Shri Kundan Singh, witness No. 65, who was Netaji's personal valet from the date of his first arrival at Singapore from Tokyo on 2. 7. 43 till the date of his final departure from Bangkok on 17. 8. 45, has stated that the round wrist watch, (App. d) was the only wrist watch, Netaji ever wore during this period. Netaji, however, had a round pocket watch, which he generally placed under his pillow and which he carried in his attache case. I am, therefore, fully convinced, from the evidence that has been adduced, that Netaji never wore the rectangular wrist watch, (App. c), which Col. Rahman produced, saying that it was worn by Netaji at the time of his alleged death and so the Colonel's attempt has ended in a miserable failure. This is another conclusion, which has helped to falsify Netaji's alleged death.

I shall, therefore, conclude, that on a careful consideration of all the evidence that has been placed before us and from all the other papers, photographs, sketches, etc. that I have been able to secure, and after mature deliberation and careful thought, I am firmly of opinion that the Aircraft Accident Did Not Take Place And That Netaji - Subhas Chandra Bose Did Not Die, As Alleged.

## Appendix D



PHOTOGRAPH OF NETAJI AT IMPERIAL HOTEL, TOKYO.  
( JAPAN ) IN 1944, WEARING ROUND WRIST WATCH.

## MYSELF, A DESERTER ?

There are 1 or 2 other points, which should be incorporated in this report, otherwise, it may be construed to be a serious omission. Firstly, it is exceedingly strange that there does not appear to be any mention in the report submitted by my colleagues to the Government that a separate dissentient report is expected to be submitted by me, though they were fully aware of that fact. Being an ex-military man, the Chairman considered me to be a sort of a deserter, whose duty and responsibility had ceased, when I parted company with him in the course of our Committee sitting on 16. 7. 56 at New Delhi. On 14. 7. 56, when I disagreed with the findings of my colleagues, I requested him to let me know what my next move should be and he replied that I would have to write a separate dissenting note, to which, I immediately said that it would be uphill task for me, as I would have to do it all by myself. Subsequent to that, the Chairman, the Prime Minister, the Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, the Chief Minister of West Bengal and others knew about this and the latest communication in this connection is the Joint Secretary's No. 6630 JS (E) marked "Express Delivery" dated 7. 9. 56, requesting me to send

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my Note by 10. 9. 56, though unfortunately the Postal seal shows that it was posted at Karol Bagh, Delhi on 10. 9. 56, and was received by me on the afternoon of the following day, viz., on 11. 9. 56.

#### MY PERSONAL NOTE.

The next point is regarding a note made by me for my personal use on 30. 6. 56, in which I recorded the suggestions made by all three of us for the preparation of my draft report. Some of the highest officials of the land, having failed in all other ways to persuade me to sign the report of my colleagues and thereby make it a unanimous one, fell back on this note of mine as a trump card and tried their best to compel me to sign my colleagues' report, alleging that, I had signed that note, which contained a statement, that said, that after examining the witnesses, I was convinced that Netaji was dead. The matter was pursued further and the help of the Press was also taken by them and it was duly published in the newspapers on 9-8-56, that, "*No Note of Dissent.*" Two members of the Committee have already signed the report. The third member, it is understood, may not sign for special reasons. The Committee, however has in its possession a statement signed by him saying that

after examining the witnesses, he was convinced that Netaji was dead. He has not appended any note of dissent or submitted a separate report-(U. P. I)" In addition to newspaper reports, the matter came up before the Parliament on questions put by Shri N. C. Chatterji, Shri H. V. Kamath and probably by others on 12. 9. 56, to which the Prime Minister gave a reply, which, in the opinion of these members, was that the answer was not satisfactory and the issue was evaded. However, the matter did not stop there either. The Chief Minister of West Bengal requested me to meet him in his office on 15. 8. 56, which I did. In the course of a lengthy and at times, a heated conversation, he dealt with this point alone for at least 20 minutes and in different ways, tried his best to compel me to sign my colleagues' report on the main ground, that on 30. 6. 56, I had signed a statement that was said by them to have contained the finding that Netaji was dead, as noted above. This note of mine has been printed at Pages 70 and 71 of the Report of my colleagues and as it contained the suggestions of all three of all us, some of those suggestions may have been of the nature of findings, but they were definitely not "*points agreed to*". In my opinion, the trump card failed, because the house of cards collapsed, as will be borne out from Item No.-

7, viz., "*Shri Thevar's Statements and Statements of Shri Goswami*"—their statements should be discussed while dealing with *Netaji's death or otherwise* and a little more in details separately later on. "The words, "*Netaji's death or otherwise*" clearly show that there was no definite finding or opinion expressed in this note that Netaji was dead. On the other hand, it shows that the question of Netaji's death in this note remained undecided. This is further supported from the fact that Shri Thevar and Shri Goswami were definitely of opinion that Netaji was not dead, but was alive and that opinion of theirs was conveyed in their statements and which the Chairman had several times openly declared that he was aware of. I have, therefore, failed to understand, how this note could be said to have contained a definite finding that Netaji was dead. Item No. 5 would, in my opinion, also show that there was no definite finding about the "Ashes" either. It is also my opinion, that this is not simply a mis-statement of facts, but a false statement, deliberately made, and to give colour and support to it, the Heading, "Principal Points Agreed To For Draft Report, Dated 30. 6. 56" was intentionally concocted. There is no Heading in the Original note of mine, it only bears the date 30. 6. 56. Curiosity will be further, aroused as to why the dates by the side of the

signatures as printed, are 2. 7. 56 and not 30. 6. 56. I would, therefore, unhesitatingly state that it was rank dishonesty and meanness to coin and concoct a headline with the intention of proving a false charge against me, which by the Almighty's Blessings, has ended in a dismal failure.

### APPEAL TO MY COUNTRYMEN.

I would, with all humility, appeal to my esteemed countrymen not to accept the reports submitted by my learned colleagues or by my humble self, but to make a demand to our Government to place at their disposal, the whole of the evidence that was made available to the Committee and I would earnestly request them to form their own opinion after a careful perusal and consideration of the same, ~~R~~ and, if the general opinion be that the aircraft accident did not take place and that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose did not die, as alleged, to demand an impeachment of all those, who have taken part in this nefarious game.

I consider myself extremely unfortunate in having been the victim of such machinations on the part of some of the highest officials of our Government, apparently, because I did not fall in with

their opinion that Netaji was dead and because my considered opinion was that, that the evidence placed before us justified the only conclusion that Netaji did not die, in view of the circumstances alleged. He is His Grace has given me the requisite strength and courage to do what I have been able to do in the service of my esteemed countrymen in my own humble way, keeping aloft the banner of Truth and Justice.

SATYAMEBA JAYATE !! JAI HIND !!

**Suresh Chandra Bose**

Calcutta,  
Mahalaya,  
3rd October, 1956.

Non-Official Member,  
Netaji Enquiry Committee.

## Appendix A

Suresh Chandra Bose

62, Pataudi House, New Delhi,

Dated, 2nd April, 1956.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,

Prime Minister of India,  
New Delhi.

Dear Sir,

As a member of "Netaji Enquiry Committee", I think the following items mentioned in brief among others, need clarification :—

1. *Terms of Reference*: The External Affairs Department in their letter dated 3rd February, 1956 to me have mentioned—"circumstances of the *disappearance of*,"—whereas the same department in their letter dated, 16th March, 1956 to me have stated—"circumstances of the *death of*."—

2. As regards the *manner in which the enquiry* would be made, I asked Shri Shah Nawaz Khan yesterday as to whether the enquiry would be open to the public or to the press or to both or whether it would be held *in camera*. He replied that all Government of India enquiries are done secretly & only reports are made public.

3. Whether the *itinerary* of the "Enquiry Committee" will be decided by any party other than the Committee or by the Committee alone & which may be added, omitted or altered in accordance with the requirements suggested, as the investigation proceeds.

4. Whether with regard to *witnesses, documents, papers* etc. necessary to be examined or inspected, the procedure mentioned in item No. 3 above will be followed or not.

5. With due respect to Shri Shah Nawaz Khan, I am of opinion that, as this *enquiry* is more or less *of a judicial nature* & not appertaining to military matters, his position in the Committee as Chairman is not appropriate & because he does not appear to be in possession of much additional information, which would be helpful to the Committee, regarding the places to be visited by us or regarding the subject-matter of this enquiry.

6. It is considered important by me on behalf of the Committee to know whether the name of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was & still is in the list of *War Criminals* drawn up by America & her Allies. If his name still exists & if they request the Government of India to hand him over to them, if he be found on Indian soil, for being tried as a War Criminal, whether this Government will have the option of handing or not handing him over to them for the aforesaid purpose.

7. As I consider this Enquiry to be a very important one and as it will be of great concern to millions of persons throughout the world, it requires mature deliberation and sound judgment. As such, it is my humble opinion that *Dr. Radha Binode Pal* be requested and persuaded to join the Committee and to lead it.

I remain,  
Yours faithfully  
Suresh Chandra Bose

2-4-56

## Appendix B

### INSPECTION NOTE ON TREASURE DEPOSITED WITH NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

19. 6. 1956.

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Packet No. 11. Charred rings. Kundan Singh says he re-cognises them, but they are charred.

Bundle No. 2. Charred gold mixed with melted metal. Kundan Singh recognises-

(i) a gold cigarette case encrusted with precious stones as the one gifted by Hitler to Netaji.

(ii) a star shaped pendant.

(iii) a paper knife.

(iv) medal of Rani Jhansi regiment.

(v) part of Cigarette lighter used by Netaji

(vi) belt buckle used by Netaji with civilian clothes.

Bundle No. 3. Kundan Singh recognises a small knife used by Netaji for manicure.

Packet No. 12. Charred rings and chains. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.

Packet No. 13. Button studs etc. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.

Packet No. 10. Charred ear-rings with stones and rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.

(iii)

Packet No. 9. Charred bangles, brooches and nose rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred. Recognises a gold rope as part of a garland presented to Netaji by Mr. Habib of Rangoon.

Packet No. 8 Charred rings and nose rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.

Packet No. 5. Charred ear-rings, nose rings set with stones. Kundan Singh recognises but says they are charred.

Packet No. 4. Charred necklace pieces, medals and rings. Kundan Singh recognises metal beads of necklaces.

Packet No. 2. Charred and broken bangles, pins, buckles etc. Kundan Singh recognises-  
( i ) metal charkha emblem presented to Netaji with his name engraved.  
( ii ) a metal tricolour ribbon holder presented to Netaji.  
( iii ) half of small oval gold case used by Netaji for carrying **Supari**. (betelnuts .

Packet No. 6. Charred and broken anklets and bangles. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.

Packet No. 7. Charred and broken rings, nose rings and pendants. Kundan Singh recognises but says they are charred. Identifies-  
( i ), One long ear-ring of gold as belonging to wife of one Mr. Banerjee of Singapore who used to look after Netaji's household.  
( iv )

Packet No. 3. Charred and broken bangles, pendants, snuff box, medals,, coins and rings. Kundan Singh recognises them but says they are charred.. Identifies—  
( i ) Other half of oval gold **Supari** box of Netaji.

Packet No 1. Charred rings and pendants. Kundan Singh recognises 3 heavy rings.

The weight of the four boxes in which jewellery and other valuables were kept would be approximately 2 to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  maunds including the weight of boxes. The weight of the charred valuables shown to me today would probably not be more than 10 seers.

## Appendix C

### LIST OF WITNESSES EXAMINED BY THE COMMITTEE

Sl. No.	Name	Date	Place
1	Shri U. M. Thevar	4th April, 1956	New Delhi
2	Shri Debnath Das	5th April, 1956	New Delhi
3	Capt. Gulzara Singh	6th April, 1956	New Delhi
4	Col. Habibur Rahman	6th to 9th April, 1956	New Delhi
5	Col. Pritam Singh	10th April, 1956	New Delhi
6	Shri S. A. Ayer	11th, 12th & 14th April, 1956	New Delhi
7	General J. K. Bhonsle	16th April, 1956	New Delhi
8	Shri A. K. Gupta	16th April, 1956	New Delhi
9	Sri Harin Shah	16th & 17th April, 1956	New Delhi
10	Col. Thakur Singh	17th April, 1956	New Delhi
11	Shri S. Mazumdar	20th April, 1956	Calcutta
12	Mr. K. Kunizuka	23rd April, 1956	Calcutta
13	Lt. N. B. Das	23rd April, 1956	Calcutta
14	Shri H. K. Roy	24th April, 1956	Calcutta
15	Shri Kalipada Dey	24th April, 1956	Calcutta
16	Shri S. M. Goswami	24th April, 1956 and 9th June, 1956	Calcutta
17	Shri J. C. Sinha	25th April, 1956	Calcutta
18	Shri Deben Das	25th April, 1956	Calcutta
19	Shri H. Singha	25th April, 1956	Calcutta
20	Mr. T. Negishi	25th April, 1956	Calcutta
21	Col. H. L. Chopra	26th April, 1956	Calcutta

22	Shri D. N. Bose	26th April, & 8th June, 1956	Calcutta
23	Mrs. Ila Pal Chowdhury, M. P.	26th April, 1956	Calcutta
24	Shri A. Bose	26th April & 8th June, 1956	Calcutta
25	Pandit Raghunath Sharma	28th April, 1956	Bangkok
26	Sirdar Ishar Singh	28th April, 1956	Bangkok
27	Shri U. C. Sharma	28th April, 1956	Bangkok
28	Shri A. C. Das	30th April, 1956	Bangkok
29	Shri Ramneo Gosai	1st May, 1956	Saigon
30	Shri A. M. Sahay	1st & 3rd May, 1956	Saigon
31	Shri M. G. Dastgir	2nd May, 1956	Tourane
32	Mr. T. Hachiya	8th May, 1956	Tokyo
33	Shri Narain Das	8th May, 1956	Tokyo
34	Capt. K. Arai	9th & 10th May, 1956	Tokyo
35	General S. Isoda	10th & 12th May, 1956	Tokyo
36	Mr. J. Murti	11th May, 1956	Tokyo
37	Lt. Col. S. Nonogaki	14th May, 1956	Tokyo
38	Mr. K. Watanabe	14th May, 1956	Tokyo
39	Dr. T. Tsuruta	15th May, 1956	Tokyo
40	Mr. Satoh Kazo	16th May, 1956	Tokyo
41	Major T. Kono	16th May, 1956	Tokyo
42	Mr. T. Miyata	17th May, 1956	Tokyo
43	Major I. Takahashi	17th May, 1956	Tokyo
44	Col. M. Yano	18th May, 1956	Tokyo
45	Major M. Kinoshita	21st May, 1956	Tokyo
46	Lt. Col. M. Takakura	21st May, 1956	Tokyo
47	Mr. T. Hayashida	22nd May, 1956	Tokyo
48	Dr. T. Yoshimi	22nd & 23rd May, 1956	Tokyo

1956

49	Shri S N Sen	22nd & 23rd May, 1956	Tokyo
50	Lt. Col. M. Shibuya	24th May, 1956	Tokyo
51	Capt. M. Yamamoto	25th May, 1956	Tokyo
52	Mrs. M. Yamamoto	25th May, 1956	Tokyo
53	Major K. Sakai	28th May, 1956	Tokyo
54	Mr. Kazo Mitsui	29th May, 1956	Tokyo
55	Mr. J. Nakamura	30th May, 1956	Tokyo
56	Rev. K. Mochizuki	30th May, 1956	Tokyo
57	General H. Isayama	31st May, 1956	Tokyo
58	Mr. Ota Hide Maru	31st May, 1956	Tokyo
59	Mr. M. Miyoshi	1st June, 1956	Tokyo
60	Major S Nagatomo	1st June, 1956	Tokyo
61	Mr. N. Kitazawa	2nd June, 1956	Tokyo
62	Mr. K. Asada	2nd June, 1956	Tokyo
63	Col. J. G. Figgess	5th June, 1956	Tokyo
64	Dr. S. N. Dutt	9th June, 1956	Calcutta
65	Shri Kundan Singh	19th June, 1956	New Delhi
66	Shri Ramamurti	21st June, 1956	New Delhi
67	Shri A. M. N. Sastri	27th June, 1956	New Delhi

Col. T. Sakai—Written Statement.

## Appendix D

### NETAJI DIED IN A FORMOSA HOSPITAL DURING LAST WAR, ENQUIRY FINDINGS. REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TOMORROW.

New Delhi, August, 8.

The Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Enquiry Committee, appointed by the Government of India, has come to the conclusion that Netaji Bose's death is established and that it occurred in Formosa during the Second World War, it is authoritatively learnt. The Committee's Chairman Mr. Shah Nawaz Khan, who was a highranking officer in Netaji's Indian National Army and now Parliamentary Secretary to the Railway Minister, is expected to submit the report to the Prime Minister on Friday.

The Committee took evidence from some 70 witnesses in Japan, Thailand, India and other places, and 66 of them told the Committee they had no doubt about the death. The four witnesses who thought Netaji was alive were Mr. Thevar, Madras M. L. A., Mr. Goswami, who produced the photo of a Mongolian Trade Union Leader resembling Subhas Bose, and two members of the Bose family.

#### DOCTOR EXAMINED.

The Japanese doctor, who treated Bose after the air accident near Taipeh, it is understood, certified that Bose died in the air accident. The Committee examined the records of the Military Hospital where he was treated, the funeral records, obtained the evidence of the nursing orderly and others who were with Bose at the time of his death. Of the

seven passengers of the ill-fated plane in which Bose travelled, the Committee examined 6 and all of them were of the same opinion. It is understood the British Consul in Formosa, who was requested by the Government of India, to record the evidence of the Chinese nurse, who attended on Netaji, could not trace the nurse.

Heads of the then British Intelligence Service in Tokyo and of the American Intelligence Service in the Far East were examined by the Committee. Others, who appeared before the Committee, included Mr. Himansu Kumar Roy and Mr. Kalipada De, two senior members of the Indian Intelligence Service, who were engaged in a search for Netaji in South East Asia and the Far East under instructions from the then British Government of India to bring Subhas Bose dead or alive, were also examined by the Committee.

#### NO NOTE OF DISSENT.

Two members of the Committee have already signed the report. The third member, it is understood, may not sign for special reasons. The Committee, however, has in its possession a statement signed by him saying that he was convinced that Netaji was dead. He has not appended any note of dissent or submitted a separate report.

AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA,

CALCUTTA.

Thursday, dated 9-8-56.

## Appendix E

SURESH C. BOSE

2, Moira Street, Calcutta-16

10th August, 1956

The Chairman, Netaji Enquiry Committee,  
1, Canning Lane, New Delhi.

Dear Sir,

With reference to your announcement in the Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, of yesterday's date, under the heading, "Netaji died in a Formosa Hospital during last war—Enquiry Findings: Report to be submitted tomorrow," I have to inform you that I have been shocked at this for two main reasons, firstly, that the findings of the Enquiry Committee should not have been given publicity through the Press before submission of the same to the Government and, secondly, that you had stated to different persons at different places, both in India and abroad, on innumerable occasions, that this Enquiry was being made in a secret manner and its report would be submitted confidentially to the Ministry of External Affairs, for submission of the same to the Prime Minister, who would then place it before the Parliament, when for the first time it would gain publicity.

I would refer you to the sittings of the Committee, in which, apart from the three members and the stenographer, only the witness and whenever necessary, the interpreter were the only persons present and it was invariably held under closed doors. You will also please remember that when Mr. Hattori of the Japanese Foreign Office made the request in Tokyo to be present during the examination of the Japanese witnesses, he was so kindly arranging to produce before us, I was the first to express my regret for our inability

to do so, as we had not allowed such a procedure before. So our sittings were carried out more or less in a secret manner.

In a reference made by me to the Prime Minister on 2nd April, 1956, viz., "As regards the manner in which this enquiry would be made, I asked Shri Shahnawaz Khan yesterday, as to whether the Enquiry would be open to the public or to the press or to both or whether it would be held *in camera*. He replied that all Government of India enquiries are done secretly and only reports are made public." Both of us were with the Prime Minister, when this and other points were clarified by him, and he was further pleased to reply on this point on 14th April 1956, as follows:— "It is desirable that members of the Committee should not give any interviews or make any statements to the Press. They should avoid even informal talks on this subject with others who might give the information to the Press". So the Prime Minister was pleased to go even further and to caution us to such an extent as to see that our deliberations did not reach the Press either direct or even through any other source.

I am aggrieved to state that in this respect, you have intentionally and deliberately disobeyed the clear instructions given to you by the Prime Minister, by having made the above-mentioned announcement in the Press.

It is a mystery to me as to why in this announcement, you did not remain content only with your findings, but went to the extent of justifying the same by introducing details, some of which, however, to my knowledge, appear to be incorrect, but, if correct, have been intentionally withheld from me, e. g. examination of Military Hospital records and those regarding the funeral.

As regards the contents of your announcement under the heading, "No Note of Dissent", which I emphatically state

you know to be false, I have to state that you have not only withheld facts, but have also distorted the same with the expectation that you will be exonerated from all blame. I can assure you that people are not hoodwinked so easily. "No Note of Dissent" is not a usual thing that would be expected, especially when only two out of three members have signed and submitted a report, and so the first question that would strike my countrymen is that there must have been unusual circumstances to bring about this unusual result.

As regards the statement, alleged to have been signed by me, the less said the better, as a reply would necessitate the inclusion of certain allegations against you, which I would prefer to avoid at this stage.

In reply to your telegram of the 29th July last, which reads as follows:— "From Shahnawaz Khan Chairman Netaji Enquiry Committee your telegram of the twentyfourth stop as decided all reports were to be written-and-finalised-in Delhi stop you were not authorised to go anywhere else to write any report stop no question of sending papers to you arise unless you return to Delhi stop as you are aware Committee's life extends to thirtyfirst July and report or reports must be submitted to Government by then stop unless you send whatever report you wish to reach me by the thirteen July will assume you have no submission to make," I have to state that the contents of the same are either incorrect, unauthorised, unreasonable or improper and the tone ungentlemanly.

As no decision that reports were to be written and finalised in Delhi was taken with my knowledge or with my consent, written or verbal, this statement is anything but correct.

The question of not authorising me to go anywhere for writing any report, as stated by you, did not arise and there was no occasion for it, but I informed the Deputy Secretary, External Affairs, with whom you had put me in contact, that I was returning the Calcutta for reasons known to him.

I may state for your information that even in important suits pending before District as well as High Courts, in which correct judicial procedure is strictly followed, judgments have been sent from elsewhere and even from outside India.

As regards your statement, that "no question of sending papers to you arise unless you return to Delhi," I am constrained to state that it befits a bully and not a sensible person, having the least respect for reasonable constitutional procedure. I may remind you here that on 16. 7. 56 during our sittings at New Delhi, I requested both Shri Maitra and you to send me the remaining portion of your joint draft report, as I was entitled to be in possession of the whole of it and on the basis of which, I would have to write my dissentient report and which Shri Maitra promised to send me in sections, as soon as he completed the same. This was, however, not carried out, evidently, due to your interference. I had to speak to him about this, as presumably, due to your incompetence in writing it, he had to do so on your behalf.

As regards your statement, viz., "as you are aware Committee's life extends to thirtyfirst July and report or reports must be submitted to Government by then," I regret very much to state that it is a shameless statement. On your considered estimate of five weeks, which has terminated on the 30th April, 1956, Government's approval was obtained and the Finance Department sanctioned an expenditure of about Rs. 27,500/- for the Committee. This period elapsed, when we were still in Calcutta and had not proceeded abroad. On

the eve of our departure from Tokyo to India, you expressed the view that the report must be submitted by the 15th. June, which you subsequently extended to the 30th. idem and finally to the 16th July positively, as the Prime Minister would be returning to India and the Parliament coming into session soon. Unable to do so by that date, you put it off to the end of that week or latest on the following Monday, the 23rd July. I was not informed of any further extension of date by you, as I parted company with you. In your telegram dated 29. 7. 56, you informed me for the first time that the life had been extended to 31. 7. 56. This life appears to draw out more easily than most elastic article one can think of. In yesterday's paper, I found that it has been drawn out 10. 8. 56, which I do wish will be the final limit of your elastic estimate of life.

Then, in your telegram issued from Delhi on 29. 7. 56 to me in Calcutta, you have said, "unless you send whatever report you wish to reach me by the thirteen July will assume you have no submission to make". The tone and demand here again befit more a bully than a gentleman.

Accepting thirteen July to be correct, 13. 7. 57 appears to be quite a reasonable date that fits in with your elastic estimate, as in spite of my verbal request to you in Delhi on 16. 7. 56 and my telegrams dated 18. 7. & 21. 7. 56 from Calcutta to send me the necessary papers, you have intentionally refrained from doing so and have no intention of doing so easily. If, however, thirteen be a telegraphic department mistake for thirtieth, meaning 30. 7. 56, which you surely could not have meant, as it is an impossibility, then the only epithet, that comes up uppermost in my mind for this unreasonable demand of yours, is one which I refrain from using.

You have introduced the names of British and American Intelligence Services in this brief announcement to yours, but you have intentionally omitted to record what their finding was, because it did not support your view. The evidence on record shows that from the time of the announcement of the Japanese that Netaji died in a plane crash, they believed it to be a hoax, that it was a cleverly-conceived master deception plan on the part of the Japanese and others and that Netaji was living and hiding somewhere. They immediately despatched different teams of officers to arrest Netaji under the provisions of the Enemy Agents' Ordinance. After scouring the territories concerned in a frantic search for him, they were unable to trace his whereabouts, but in spite of that, they could not come to the definite conclusion that Netaji was dead. This was the final opinion held by them and probably the main object of this enquiry.

As I regret not to have received any papers from you, as requested several times by me, I would again reiterate here my legitimate demand for the same and to observe that you have no right what soever to withhold such papers from me and that such conduct of yours is quite in keeping with what you have generally meted out to me during the course of this enquiry and that our Government and my countrymen will surely consider your conduct in its proper perspective. Please note that delay in the submission of my dissentient report due to your inaction is solely your responsibility and that you will have to render explanation to Government and to the people for the same, not speak of the opinion they will form regarding you.

I would request you to arrange and send me bank cheques in my favour in payment of the two bills submitted by me sometime ago and about which, you have personal knowledge.

I remain,  
Yours truly,  
Suresh C. Bose

## Appendix F

No. 414-PMO/56.

NEW DELHI.

August 13, 1956.

My dear Suresh Babu,

I have just received copy of your letter dated 10th August, 1956 addressed to the Chairman, Netaji Enquiry Committee in New Delhi. I have read this and find it difficult to understand what you have written.

The Chairman, Shri Shah Nawaz Khan and the other Member of the Committee, Shri Moitra, came to see me on, I think, the 3rd August and presented me with the report of their Committee as well as the evidence etc. I enquired about you from them. They informed me that you had come to Delhi, as arranged, to help in writing the report, but had later suddenly left Delhi without any previous intimation to them. They gave me a paper also which was signed by you and which contained the broad points of agreement, on the basis of which the report was to be written.

I enquired from them if you were likely to sign the report later or send a separate note. They said that they did not know.

The report, the evidence and the other papers were handed over to the External Affairs Ministry who now posses them. In the ordinary course, the Ministry will examine these papers and will place the report before the Cabinet. If the Cabinet so decides, the report will then be

placed before Parliament. That will mean its publication also. Probably the report will be placed before the Cabinet soon. It is likely to be printed.

That is the procedure, and Shri Shah Nawaz Khan and the other Member of the Committee have nothing to do with the report now, as the Committee has ceased to function. Should you, however, wish to send any kind of note, we shall consider it. I am afraid no papers can be sent away from here now. If you so wish, you can come here and examine such papers as we have.

You refer in your letter to the Chairman, Netaji Enquiry Committee to some announcement in the Amrita Bazar Patrika of the 9th August, and you accuse the Chairman of having broken the rule of secrecy in making this announcement. On enquiry, I find that he has made no announcement and, in fact, that he did not even know of this item which appeared in the Amrita Bazar Patrika. As a matter of fact, the report was submitted to me many days before that announcement in the Press. It would appear that the reference in the press was some kind of an intelligent guess by some reporter or some clerk in our office here. Obviously, the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee had nothing to do with it.

Yours sincerely,  
Sd/- Jawharlal Nehru.

Shri Suresh Chandra Bose,  
2, Moira Street,  
Calcutta-16.

## Appendix G

SURESH C. BOSE.

Telephone: 44-5959 2, Moira Street, Calcutta-16,  
Telegrams: "SUVASBOS". 15th August, 1956.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru,  
Prime Minister of India,  
New Delhi:

My dear Shri Nehru,

I thank you for your kind letter No. 414-PMO/56 of yesterday's date.

I have been very much disappointed to learn that you find it difficult to understand my letter. If it be the English, I cannot claim to write it up to the standard of an Englishman. If, however, it be the subject matter of the letter, it may be due to the fact that one, who has a strong conviction regarding a certain matter, sometimes fails to understand how another could possibly hold the contrary view.

I regret, I will have to encroach on your valuable time, as my reply to the points mentioned in your letter, on the basis of statements received by you, as well as certain circumstances concerning me, as a member of the Committee, may be a bit lengthy and for which I may be excused.

I stayed in Delhi with my daughter on the first occasion from 27. 3. 56 to 17. 4. 56 and on the second occasion from 17. 6. 56 to 12. 7. 56 i. e., for a total period of 48 days, for which the Government did not have to spend anything

for my board and lodging there. As she ~~was~~ suddenly asked to vacate her quarters, I had to shift from there at about 10.10 PM on 12.7.56 and a friend of mine there, helped me out of an awkward situation by giving me shelter. On the morning of the following day, when I met the Chairman of our Committee, I requested him to arrange for my stay in Delhi. He was good enough to contact somebody immediately and after my repeated requests, we were informed the next morning viz., 14.7.56, that accommodation had been secured for me at Kotah House. As I had no idea of that place, I enquired of the Chairman about the room, bathroom and food there. He assured me that they were quite nice. As I wanted to see about it myself, after finishing our work, all three of us went there on our way home, but we were astonished to find that accommodation had been arranged in a hutment and not in the main building. I told the Chairman forthwith that I considered this to be an insult and I demanded accommodation in the Imperial Hotel, which I could justly demand, as only a few years ago, I had stayed on my own in Maidens, after failing to get rooms in the Imperial and that it was very urgent, as I was inconveniencing both my kind friend as well as myself. The Chairman said that as it was about 1.45 P.M., and being a Saturday, the officer had gone home. On this, I told him that as Government had provided telephones in your residences, urgent work was meant to be taken up from there outside office hours. Evidently, no action was taken and inconvenience continued. On the morning of 16.7.56, I enquired of the Chairman again as to why nothing had been done regarding my stay in Delhi, though that was the fourth day and I told him that I could no longer inconvenience my friend and myself. He then contacted somebody, whom I proposed to meet personally for explaining the situation

I was in. At the same time, I requested the Chairman to get into touch with the Imperial Hotel. At about 11.30 AM., Shri S. K. Roy, Deputy Secretary, informed us that a room had provisionally been reserved for me there and that he would confirm it before lunch. As there was no news till about 2.45 PM., I phoned Shri Roy, who met me soon after and told me that after speaking to Shri Kaul, Joint Secretary, he would meet me again at about 4 PM. In the meantime, I went to the Imperial Hotel, where I was informed that a room had provisionally been reserved for me and that they were awaiting confirmation from the External Affairs Department. Shri Roy did not meet me, as promised, nor did he send me any information. When at about 6 PM., the driver of the staff car of the External Affairs Dept. came to enquire of me as to at what time the next day he would bring the car for taking me to the Imperial Hotel, I asked him whether he had brought any letter or news from the office or from Shri Roy regarding my shifting there. He replied in the negative.

The same morning, during our sitting in the Committee Room, I was informed by my colleagues that I could no longer sit with them, as I had dissented from them. On this, I requested Shri Maitra to send me the remaining portion of their draft report for enabling me to write my dissentient report. He promised to do so section by section, as soon as he completed each.

As dissentient judgments in District as also in High Courts are sent from elsewhere and even from outside India, I did not consider it indispensably necessary for me to stay in Delhi for that purpose, especially when after four days of inconvenience, nothing had been done about my stay there and as no assurance had been given to me that something

would be done soon. I was, therefore, compelled to leave Delhi. If your officers are callous, non-obliging and indifferent, there is a limit to my endurance.

As regards the report given to you by my colleagues, "That they did not know" that I was "Likely to sign the report later or send a separate note", I emphatically state that they did know. I am astonished to find men holding such positions, making diabolic false statements. Shri S. N. Maitra, who was selected to write the report, and who undertook to submit the draft report by 10. 7. 56, submitted only a portion of the same on 13. 7. 56, when all three of us started discussing it. He had mentioned about discrepancies in the statements of witnesses at some places in his report. I was not satisfied with the explanations given by him and I told him that there were many more of such on many major points. As such, I would have to consider the evidence very carefully and then inform them as to whether I could for those reasons, agree with their finding that the plane, alleged to be carrying Netaji, crashed and whether Netaji died.

When we met the next day, viz., on 14-7-56, for further discussion of the draft report, I expressed my regret to them for my inability to agree with their finding. On asking the Chairman as to what should be my next move under such circumstances, he told me that I would have to write a separate dissenting report, on which I remember having told him distinctly that it would be uphill work for me, as I would have to write such a report all by myself. I went further and told them that, in view of the multitude of discrepancies in the statements of witnesses, whether they would not agree with me that the plane crash did not take place and so Netaji did not die. They said they would stick to their own finding.

The next day, 15-7-56, being a Sunday, we assembled on 16-7-56, when the Chairman told me that, as I had dissented from them, it would not be proper for me to sit with them any longer, when they would be busy in writing their report: I, accordingly, requested them to send me the remaining portion of their draft report and copies of relevant papers, which I was legitimately entitled to, so as to enable me to write my separate report. In their presence, I took a few sheets of paper from the Secretary, Shri R. Dayal and asked him to send me copies of depositions of the remaining witnesses he had not given me together with all other papers, I had requested the Chairman for. I have not received any of these papers as yet, in spite of several requests by me to the Chairman, even by telegrams.

As my presence was no longer required there, I told the Chairman that I wanted to meet the officer, who was arranging for my accommodation. As no orderly was available, Shri Maitra was very good to come to the staff officer's room and to ask the new Sikh gentleman, who had been deputed to help us as a Stenographer, to take me to Shri S. K. Roy, Deputy Secretary, which he did.

I, therefore, fail to understand how under such circumstances my colleagues could make up their mind to tell a gentleman of the position of the Prime Minister of India that they did not know that I would not sign their report or that I would submit a separate dissentient report. If they did say so, as stated, I am constrained to say that it is a brazen-faced lie.

I am very much aggrieved to learn that no papers can be sent to me. I never wanted or thought of the original papers. As a member, I am legitimately entitled to one set

of copies of all relevant papers. I would humbly suggest that it would cost the Government very much less by making and sending a copy of those papers to me here than by paying me the expenses of my journey from here to Delhi and back and for my stay there. I forget, however, that for poor people like us expenses do matter, but not for those in high circles, especially, Governmental ones. When the Chairman curtly turned down my request for relevant papers, I suspected that without inspiration from high-ups, he would not have had the audacity to decline the legitimate request of his colleague. My suspicion has now been confirmed.

As regards the announcement in the newspaper referred to, it is my humble opinion, that it would be desirable to have official news given publicity by the office master in a straightforward manner, rather than remain complacent and allow its surreptitious leakage by disloyal subordinates and outsiders, as suggested by you.

Before concluding, I would inform you with due respect that as the Government has been pleased to nominate me as a member of the Committee and as it has to spend so much money and time on me and as I have spent my time and energy on this piece of work, which I agreed to undertake, I would be failing in my duty to myself, to the Government and to my countrymen, if I did not submit a report, which I consider it incumbent on me to do. I will, therefore, submit my report to the best of my limited capabilities and as you will be pleased to realise that, as I have been doing so under several handicaps, inconveniences, and want of facilities, there will naturally be a certain amount of delay, which would otherwise not have been caused and which consequently means an additional expen-

iture to the Government on my account. I am, however, making a very sincere and earnest effort to complete it as quickly as possible and I expect to get it ready for submission within about ten days from today at the latest.

Kindly excuse me for remarks, if any, which you may consider to be too strong.

With regards,

Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru,  
Prime Minister of India,  
NEW DELHI.

I remain,  
Your sincerely,  
Suresh Chandra Bose.

## Appendix H

The  
News Editor,

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.....

Shri Suresh C. Bose, Member, Netaji Enquiry Committee, has issued the following statement:—

I have seen certain reports in the Press relating to the Netaji Enquiry Committee. Since conflicting reports about me have been made and because there is much confusion in the minds of the public on the subject, I am constrained to issue this statement, which, I hope, will clarify my position.

On the completion of recording of evidence, the Enquiry Committee assembled at New Delhi on 30-6-56 to draft its findings. In the preliminary stages, there was unanimity of the members. But, as the two official members of the Committee came to prepare the ground for arriving at the conclusion that Netaji had died in the alleged plane crash, I expressed my difference with them. At this, the Chairman told me that, in that case I would have to write a dissentient report and submit it separately. Thereafter, I returned to Calcutta and started preparing my report with the papers that were with me. The non-availability of the other papers of the Enquiry Committee, being a serious handicap in my completing the report, I requested the Chairman several times to send them to me. On the 29th July, I received a

telegram from the Chairman giving me at the ultimatum that if he did not receive my report by the next day, then he would take it that I did not have anything to say on the subject. For obvious reasons, I could not oblige him. Recently, however, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru has requested me to send my report.

I would like to assure the public that I shall certainly complete my report and send it to the Govt. of India. It will be left to them to incorporate it in the report of the Enquiry Committee or not. But the keen interest evinced by my countrymen in the matter, entitles them to know the full details. I shall certainly take them into confidence at the proper time.


Suresh Chandra Bose  
Non-official member,  
Netaji Enquiry Committee.

2, Moira Street,  
Calcutta-16.  
17th August, 1956.

## Appendix O

B

Plan showing the Runway and the Tent  
at Taihoku Aerodrome, Formosa 18. 6. 1945.




Sd/- N. Nonogaki      Sd/- S.N.Khan  
14. 5. 1956      14. 5. 56

Sd/- S.C.Bose  
14. 5. 56

## Appendix X


Sketch Plan by Capt. Yamamoto  
(Nakamura)

II




## Appendix U

Major Takahashi



1, 2, 3 are various positions  
to which I moved


AERODRONE




Sq/- J. Takahashi

## Appendix W

Major Kono




## Appendix L




K. ARAI

## Appendix K


Major Kono



## Appendix J




## Appendix M



Appendix V


Major Kono

B



## Appendix P

### Plan showing the Runway




Sd/- N. Nanogoki

## Appendix Y


Sketch of Japanese Bomber in which  
Netaji travelled from Saigon to Taihoku (Formosa)

Major K. Sakai



## Appendix N

SKETCH PLAN Submitted by Capt. M. Yamamoto (Nakamura)




## Appendix Z

Sketch A showing furnaces

Major Nagatomo


2 m



## Appendix A

B

Sketch Plan of the Crematorium at Taihoku



Appendix 1-

SKETCH OF JAPANESE BOMBER  
IN WHICH NETAJI TRAVELED  
FROM SAIGON TO TOHOKU (FORMOSA)

